This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation, VMCAI 2002, held in Venice, Italy in January 2002. The 22 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 41 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on security and protocols, timed systems and games, static analysis, optimization, types and verification, and temporal logics and systems.
This Festschrift was published in honor of Joshua Guttman on the occasion of his 66.66 birthday. The impact of his work is reflected in the 23 contributions enclosed in this volume. Joshua’s most influential and enduring contribution to the field has been the development of the strand space formalism for analyzing cryptographic protocols. It is one of several “symbolic approaches” to security protocol analysis in which the underlying details of cryptographic primitives are abstracted away, allowing a focus on potential flaws in the communication patterns between participants. His attention to the underlying logic of strand spaces has also allowed him to merge domain-specific reasoning about protocols with general purpose, first-order logical theories. The identification of clear principles in a domain paves the way to automated reasoning, and Joshua has been a leader in the development and distribution of several tools for security analysis.
This handbook of formal analysis in cryptography is very important for secure communication and processing of information. It introduces readers to several formal verification methods and software used to analyse cryptographic protocols. The chapters give readers general knowledge and formal methods focusing on cryptographic protocols. Handbook of Formal Analysis and Verification in Cryptography includes major formalisms and tools used for formal verification of cryptography, with a spotlight on new-generation cryptosystems such as post-quantum, and presents a connection between formal analysis and cryptographic schemes. The text offers formal methods to show whether security assumptions are valid and compares the most prominent formalism and tools as they outline common challenges and future research directions. Graduate students, researchers, and engineers worldwide will find this an exciting read.
The application of formal methods to security protocol analysis has attracted increasing attention in the past two decades, and recently has been sh- ing signs of new maturity and consolidation. The development of these formal methodsismotivatedbythehostilenatureofsomeaspectsofthenetworkand the persistent e?orts of intruders, and has been widely discussed among - searchers in this ?eld. Contributions to the investigation of novel and e?cient ideas and techniques have been made through some important conferences and journals, such asESORICS,CSFW andACM Transactions in Computer Systems. Thus, formal methods have played an important role in a variety of applications such as discrete system analysis for cryptographic protocols, - lief logics and state exploration tools. A complicated security protocol can be abstractedasamanipulationofsymbolsandstructurescomposedbysymbols. The analysis of e-commerce (electronic commerce) protocols is a particular case of such symbol systems. There have been considerable e?orts in developing a number of tools for ensuring the security of protocols, both specialized and general-purpose, such as belief logic and process algebras. The application of formal methods starts with the analysis of key-distribution protocols for communication between two principals at an early stage. With the performance of transactions - coming more and more dependent on computer networks, and cryptography becoming more widely deployed, the type of application becomes more varied and complicated. The emerging complex network-based transactions such as ?nancial transactionsand secure groupcommunication have not only brought innovationstothecurrentbusinesspractice,butthey alsoposeabigchallenge to protect the information transmitted over the open network from malicious attacks.
Security protocols are widely used to ensure secure communications over insecure networks, such as the internet or airwaves. These protocols use strong cryptography to prevent intruders from reading or modifying the messages. However, using cryptography is not enough to ensure their correctness. Combined with their typical small size, which suggests that one could easily assess their correctness, this often results in incorrectly designed protocols. The authors present a methodology for formally describing security protocols and their environment. This methodology includes a model for describing protocols, their execution model, and the intruder model. The models are extended with a number of well-defined security properties, which capture the notions of correct protocols, and secrecy of data. The methodology can be used to prove that protocols satisfy these properties. Based on the model they have developed a tool set called Scyther that can automatically find attacks on security protocols or prove their correctness. In case studies they show the application of the methodology as well as the effectiveness of the analysis tool. The methodology’s strong mathematical basis, the strong separation of concerns in the model, and the accompanying tool set make it ideally suited both for researchers and graduate students of information security or formal methods and for advanced professionals designing critical security protocols.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Formal Engineering Methods, ICFEM 2003, held in Singapore in November 2003. The 34 revised full papers presented together with 3 invited contributions were carefully reviewed and selected from 91 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on testing and validation, state diagrams, PVS/HOL, refinement, hybrid systems, Z/Object-Z, Petri nets, timed automata, system modelling and checking, and semantics and synthesis.
This Festschrift volume is published in honor of Catherine A. Meadows and contains essays presented at the Catherine Meadows Festschrift Symposium held in Fredericksburg, VA, USA, in May 2019. Catherine A. Meadows has been a pioneer in developing symbolic formal verification methods and tools. Her NRL Protocol Analyzer, a tool and methodology that embodies symbolic model checking techniques, has been fruitfully applied to the analysis of many protocols and protocol standards and has had an enormous influence in the field. She also developed a new temporal logic to specify protocol properties, as well as new methods for analyzing various kinds of properties beyond secrecy such as authentication and resilience under Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and has made important contributions in other areas such as wireless protocol security, intrusion detection, and the relationship between computational and symbolic approaches to cryptography. This volume contains 14 contributions authored by researchers from Europe and North America. They reflect on the long-term evolution and future prospects of research in cryptographic protocol specification and verification.
Cryptography, in particular public-key cryptography, has emerged in the last 20 years as an important discipline that is not only the subject of an enormous amount of research, but provides the foundation for information security in many applications. Standards are emerging to meet the demands for cryptographic protection in most areas of data communications. Public-key cryptographic techniques are now in widespread use, especially in the financial services industry, in the public sector, and by individuals for their personal privacy, such as in electronic mail. This Handbook will serve as a valuable reference for the novice as well as for the expert who needs a wider scope of coverage within the area of cryptography. It is a necessary and timely guide for professionals who practice the art of cryptography. The Handbook of Applied Cryptography provides a treatment that is multifunctional: It serves as an introduction to the more practical aspects of both conventional and public-key cryptography It is a valuable source of the latest techniques and algorithms for the serious practitioner It provides an integrated treatment of the field, while still presenting each major topic as a self-contained unit It provides a mathematical treatment to accompany practical discussions It contains enough abstraction to be a valuable reference for theoreticians while containing enough detail to actually allow implementation of the algorithms discussed Now in its third printing, this is the definitive cryptography reference that the novice as well as experienced developers, designers, researchers, engineers, computer scientists, and mathematicians alike will use.
Zero-knowledge interactive proofsystems are a new technique which can be used as a cryptographic tool for designing provably secure protocols. Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff originally suggested this technique for controlling the knowledge released in an interactive proof of membership in a language, and for classification of languages [19]. In this approach, knowledge is defined in terms of complexity to convey knowledge if it gives a computational advantage to the receiver, theory, and a message is said for example by giving him the result of an intractable computation. The formal model of interacting machines is described in [19, 15, 171. A proof-system (for a language L) is an interactive protocol by which one user, the prover, attempts to convince another user, the verifier, that a given input x is in L. We assume that the verifier is a probabilistic machine which is limited to expected polynomial-time computation, while the prover is an unlimited probabilistic machine. (In cryptographic applications the prover has some trapdoor information, or knows the cleartext of a publicly known ciphertext) A correct proof-system must have the following properties: If XE L, the prover will convince the verifier to accept the pmf with very high probability. If XP L no prover, no matter what program it follows, is able to convince the verifier to accept the proof, except with vanishingly small probability.