Steven Burton's AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING, Second Edition continues to be an ideal learning tool for first-year law students in a variety of introductory courses including orientation programs, legal reasoning, lawyering skills, or first-year substantive courses. Written specifically for beginning law students, this concise paperback helps students gain an understanding of law and legal reasoning by emphasizing how they can use cases, rules, precedent, holding, and other elementary legal concepts to solve legal problems. Especially easy to use, The Second Edition: offers concise, lucid text gives more attention to competing, contemporary modes of analysis including Critical Legal Studies and philosophical critiques clearly delineates the structure of law as precedents, rules, principles, and policies introduces many new examples coherently organized in nine chapters, INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING covers cases and rules, analogical and deductive legal reasoning, legal reasons and conventions, purposes, judges' and lawyers' perspectives, and legitimacy. short and affordable, this book is a good fit for orientation programs, introductory courses on legal reasoning or legal method, lawyering skills courses, or as a supplementary text in any first-year substantive course.
This primer on legal reasoning is aimed at law students and upper-level undergraduates. But it is also an original exposition of basic legal concepts that scholars and lawyers will find stimulating. It covers such topics as rules, precedent, authority, analogical reasoning, the common law, statutory interpretation, legal realism, judicial opinions, legal facts, and burden of proof. In addressing the question whether legal reasoning is distinctive, Frederick Schauer emphasizes the formality and rule-dependence of law. When taking the words of a statute seriously, when following a rule even when it does not produce the best result, when treating the fact of a past decision as a reason for making the same decision again, or when relying on authoritative sources, the law embodies values other than simply that of making the best decision for the particular occasion or dispute. In thus pursuing goals of stability, predictability, and constraint on the idiosyncrasies of individual decision-makers, the law employs forms of reasoning that may not be unique to it but are far more dominant in legal decision-making than elsewhere. Schauer’s analysis of what makes legal reasoning special will be a valuable guide for students while also presenting a challenge to a wide range of current academic theories.
In a book that is a blend of text and readings, Martin P. Golding explores legal reasoning from a variety of angles—including that of judicial psychology. The primary focus, however, is on the ‘logic’ of judicial decision making. How do judges justify their decisions? What sort of arguments do they use? In what ways do they rely on legal precedent? Golding includes a wide variety of cases, as well as a brief bibliographic essay (updated for this Broadview Encore Edition).
After years of teaching law courses to undergraduate, graduate, and law students, Michael Evan Gold has come to believe that the traditional way of teaching – analysis, explanation, and example – is superior to the Socratic Method for students at the outset of their studies. In courses taught Socratically, even the most gifted students can struggle, and many others are lost in a fog for months. Gold offers a meta approach to teaching legal reasoning, bringing the process of argumentation to the fore. Using examples both from the law and from daily life, Gold's book will help undergraduates and first-year law students to understand legal discourse. The book analyzes and illustrates the principles of legal reasoning, such as logical deduction, analogies and distinctions, and application of law to fact, and even solves the mystery of how to spot an issue. In Gold's experience, students who understand the principles of analytical thinking are able to understand arguments, to evaluate and reply to them, and ultimately to construct sound arguments of their own.
Now in its Third Edition, An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning continues to be the ideal go-to for the first year law student. It is a short, practical book that introduces beginning law students and others to contemporary law and legal reasoning. By presenting these topics through various discussions of cases and examples, it provides students with a solid source to reference for years to come. A dependable, practical source, that: Covers analogical and deductive reasoning, as well as the roles of legal conventions, purposes, and policies in legal reasoning Discusses cases of varying difficulty to diversify the learning process Presents law and legal reasoning primarily through discussions of cases and examples that avoid the abstraction characteristic of most competing books Emphasizes the law as used in practice by lawyers and judges Provides an explicit and systematic introduction to law and legal reasoning Offers a source suitable for use as supplementary reading in any first year course, in legal research and writing courses, in paralegal courses, and in other settings This great new edition has been carefully updated to include: A new chapter, "Hardest Cases," that highlights cases notorious in the press Updates throughout that guarantee the most current legal information
The most glamorous and even glorious moments in a legal system come when a high court recognizes an abstract principle involving, for example, human liberty or equality. Indeed, Americans, and not a few non-Americans, have been greatly stirred--and divided--by the opinions of the Supreme Court, especially in the area of race relations, where the Court has tried to revolutionize American society. But these stirring decisions are aberrations, says Cass R. Sunstein, and perhaps thankfully so. In Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, Sunstein, one of America's best known commentators on our legal system, offers a bold, new thesis about how the law should work in America, arguing that the courts best enable people to live together, despite their diversity, by resolving particular cases without taking sides in broader, more abstract conflicts. Sunstein offers a close analysis of the way the law can mediate disputes in a diverse society, examining how the law works in practical terms, and showing that, to arrive at workable, practical solutions, judges must avoid broad, abstract reasoning. Why? For one thing, critics and adversaries who would never agree on fundamental ideals are often willing to accept the concrete details of a particular decision. Likewise, a plea bargain for someone caught exceeding the speed limit need not--indeed, must not--delve into sweeping issues of government regulation and personal liberty. Thus judges purposely limit the scope of their decisions to avoid reopening large-scale controversies. Sunstein calls such actions incompletely theorized agreements. In identifying them as the core feature of legal reasoning--and as a central part of constitutional thinking in America, South Africa, and Eastern Europe-- he takes issue with advocates of comprehensive theories and systemization, from Robert Bork (who champions the original understanding of the Constitution) to Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, and Ronald Dworkin, who defends an ambitious role for courts in the elaboration of rights. Equally important, Sunstein goes on to argue that it is the living practice of the nation's citizens that truly makes law. For example, he cites Griswold v. Connecticut, a groundbreaking case in which the Supreme Court struck down Connecticut's restrictions on the use of contraceptives by married couples--a law that was no longer enforced by prosecutors. In overturning the legislation, the Court invoked the abstract right of privacy; the author asserts that the justices should have appealed to the narrower principle that citizens need not comply with laws that lack real enforcement. By avoiding large-scale issues and values, such a decision could have led to a different outcome in Bowers v. Hardwick, the decision that upheld Georgia's rarely prosecuted ban on sodomy. And by pointing to the need for flexibility over time and circumstances, Sunstein offers a novel understanding of the old ideal of the rule of law. Legal reasoning can seem impenetrable, mysterious, baroque. This book helps dissolve the mystery. Whether discussing the interpretation of the Constitution or the spell cast by the revolutionary Warren Court, Cass Sunstein writes with grace and power, offering a striking and original vision of the role of the law in a diverse society. In his flexible, practical approach to legal reasoning, he moves the debate over fundamental values and principles out of the courts and back to its rightful place in a democratic state: the legislatures elected by the people.
When Kenneth J. Vandevelde's Thinking Like a Lawyer first published, it became an instant classic, considered by many to be the gold standard introduction to legal reasoning. In this long-awaited second edition, intended for fans of the original and a new generation of lawyers, Vandevelde expands his classic work with useful revisions and updates throughout. Law students, law professors, and lawyers frequently refer to the process of “thinking like a lawyer,” but attempts to analyze in any systematic way what is meant by that phrase are rare. Vandevelde defines this elusive phrase and identifies the techniques involved in thinking like a lawyer. Unlike most legal writings, plagued by difficult, virtually incomprehensible language, Vandevelde's work is accessible and clearly written. The second edition features new sections on the legislative process—describing step-by-step how legislation is enacted—and the judicial process—describing step-by-step how a case is litigated in court. Other new sections address the significance of dissenting and concurring opinions as well as the role of cognitive bias in factual determinations and on persuading a jury, on burdens of proof, and on presumptions. A new chapter provides contemporary perspectives on legal reasoning, which includes new material on feminist legal theory, critical race theory, and the economics of law. A new appendix is intended for prospective law students, explaining how readers can use the techniques in the book to help them excel in law school. Vandevelde's Thinking Like a Lawyer will help students, lawyers, and lay readers alike gain important insight into a well-developed and valuable way of thinking. Professors and students will find the book useful in almost any introductory law course at the graduate level and in advanced undergraduate courses on law.
Demystifying Legal Reasoning defends the proposition that there are no special forms of reasoning peculiar to law. Legal decision makers engage in the same modes of reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do: open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deduction from authoritative rules. This book addresses common law reasoning when prior judicial decisions determine the law, and interpretation of texts. In both areas, the popular view that legal decision makers practise special forms of reasoning is false.
