Vertical Relationships and Coordination in the Food System
Vertical Relationships and Coordination in the Food System

Author: Giovanni Galizzi

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2012-12-06

Total Pages: 637

ISBN-13: 3642487653

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New analysis and empirical evidence on several topics such as the determinants of shape and nature of the vertical relationships in the food system, the determinants of vertical co-ordination and competition, types and mechanisms of co-ordination as well as the consequences for competitiveness, consumer welfare and policy implications are provided. The focus is on vertical issues at different stages of the food chain with a particular emphasis on the increasing role played by retailers in shaping the vertical relationships in the food system through the development of food supply-chain management.

An Agency/transactions-costs Approach and Application to Vertical Coordination Arrangements in Food and Agricultural Markets
An Agency/transactions-costs Approach and Application to Vertical Coordination Arrangements in Food and Agricultural Markets

Author: Kaouthar Lajili

Publisher:

Published: 1995

Total Pages: 382

ISBN-13:

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A micro-analytic approach based on an integration of elements from Agency and Transactions-cost theories, was followed to develop a theoretical framework for characterizing vertical coordination decisions at the firm level. Vertical coordination modes were defined as all possible arrangements between buyers and sellers along a continuum including spot markets and vertical integration at the extremes, and contracts in between. By including asset specificity in a principal-agent model under conditions of uncertainty and different risk attitudes, the study's main argument has been that both individuals' characteristics (such as risk attitudes, leverage position, and size) and transaction attributes jointly determine optimal vertical coordination mode decisions. An experimental design approach with an application to crop contracting in East Central Illinois, was followed to test the study's hypotheses. In addition to supporting transactions-costs arguments and mainly the significant effect of asset specificity in driving organizational form choice, the results further suggest that a joint treatment of transaction and individual characteristics is warranted, for explaining and predicting vertical coordination or organizational form decisions.