This manual provides infantry doctrine, tactics, and techniques for urban combat at battalion level and below.The urban growth in all areas of the world places a high premium on the development of those skills described in this manual and on the highest standards of discipline and leadership.
Few lessons are as prevalent in military history as is the adage that tanks don't perform well in cities. The notion of deliberately committing tanks to urban combat is anathema to most. In "Breaking the Mold: Tanks in the Cities," Ken Gott disproves that notion with a timely series of five case studies from World War II to the present war in Iraq. This is not a parochial or triumphant study. These cases demonstrate that tanks must do more than merely "arrive" on the battlefield to be successful in urban combat. From Aachen in 1944 to Fallujah in 2004, the absolute need for specialized training and the use of combined arms at the lowest tactical levels are two of the most salient lessons that emerge from this study. When properly employed, well-trained and well-supported units led by tanks are decisive in urban combat. The reverse also is true. Chechen rebels taught the Russian army and the world a brutal lesson in Grozny about what happens when armored units are poorly led, poorly trained, and cavalierly employed in a city. The case studies in this monograph are high-intensity battles in conflicts ranging from limited interventions to major combat operations. It would be wrong to use them to argue for the use of tanks in every urban situation. As the intensity of the operation decreases, the 2nd and 3rd order effects of using tanks in cities can begin to outweigh their utility. The damage to infrastructure caused by their sheer weight and size is just one example of what can make tanks unsuitable for every mission. Even during peace operations, however, the ability to employ tanks and other heavy armored vehicles can be crucial. "Breaking the Mold" provides an up-to-date analysis of the utility of tanks and heavy armored forces in urban combat. The U.S. Army will increasingly conduct combat operations in urban terrain, and it will be necessary to understand what it takes to employ tanks to achieve success in that battlefield environment.
First published by the Combat Studies Institute Press. The resulting anthology begins with a general overview of urban operations from ancient times to the midpoint of the twentieth century. It then details ten specific case studies of U.S., German, and Japanese operations in cities during World War II and ends with more recent Russian attempts to subdue Chechen fighters in Grozny and the Serbian siege of Sarajevo. Operations range across the spectrum from combat to humanitarian and disaster relief. Each chapter contains a narrative account of a designated operation, identifying and analyzing the lessons that remain relevant today.
This manual provides guidance for the organization, planning, and conduct of the full range of military operations on urbanized terrain. This publication was prepared primarily for commanders, staffs, and subordinate leaders down to the squad and fire team level. It is written from a Marine air-ground task force perspective, with emphasis on the ground combat element as the most likely supported element in that environment. It provides the level of detailed information that supports the complexities of planning, preparing for, and executing small-unit combat operations on urbanized terrain. It also provides historical and environmental information that supports planning and training for combat in built-up areas
This research was undertaken to gain a better understanding of the relationship between deception and the urban environment, first to explore the power of deception when employed against U.S. forces in urban operations, and second to evaluate the potential value of deception when used by U.S. forces in urban operations.
This book looks at several troop categories based on primary function and analyzes the ratio between these categories to develop a general historical ratio. This ratio is called the Tooth-to-Tail Ratio. McGrath's study finds that this ratio, among types of deployed US forces, has steadily declined since World War II, just as the nature of warfare itself has changed. At the same time, the percentage of deployed forces devoted to logistics functions and to base and life support functions have increased, especially with the advent of the large-scale of use of civilian contractors. This work provides a unique analysis of the size and composition of military forces as found in historical patterns. Extensively illustrated with charts, diagrams, and tables. (Originally published by the Combat Studies Institute Press)
The inevitability of U.S. Armed Forces future involvement in urban contingencies worldwide demands that those responsible for arming, manning, sustaining, and otherwise supporting these operations prepare for the challenges inherent in such undertakings. This report provides an overview of these tasks and ways in which the U.S. Army combat service support (CSS) community can prepare itself to meet them. The authors conclude that CSS operations, like other ground force undertakings, need not undergo fundamental changes simply because the environment is urban. CSS personnel approaching urban tasks will be better served by employing tried-and-true doctrine while anticipating and adapting to environmental conditions; recognizing that command and control requirements within CSS functional areas and between CSS, combat support, and combat elements should be uniform; and maintaining the flexibility essential to overcoming the extraordinary challenges inherent in urban undertakings. In the course of this study, the authors conducted literature reviews and interviews, and they drew on extensive prior research. The findings fall into two broad categories: (1) functional-area specific, applying exclusively to arming, manning, sustaining, moving, fixing, force protection, and selected other areas; and (2) those with broader application. Under the latter, the limited availability of many CSS assets will encourage their central management. Commanders will have to consider weighting front-line assets with low-density assets or keeping them centralized for dispatch as needed. CSS resources will require the same command, control, and communications assets as do other units. Additionally, CSS drivers and others throughout the area of operations are a potentially vital and underused source of intelligence. A bibliography of 12 books, 34 articles, 44 reports, 19 interviews, and 42 briefings and e-mails is included. (7 figures).