The pre-Gaṅgeśa Navya-Nyāya treatise Upādhidarpaṇa (UD) deals with the upādhi, a key concept in the Navya-Nyāya theory of inference. This volume is the first published edition and translation of the only manuscript of the UD. Notes have been added to elucidate the historical context of the authors, works, and philosophical doctrines in the UD.
Nyana is the most rational and logical of all the classical Indian philosophical systems. In the study of Nyana philosophy, Karikavali with its commentary Muktavali, both by Visvanatha Nyayapancanana, with the commentaries Dinakari and Ramarudri, have been of decisive significance for the last few centuries as advanced introductions to this subject. The present work concentrates on inference (anumana) in Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari, carefully divided into significant units according to the subject, and translates and interprets them. Its commentary makes use of the primary interpretation in Sanskrit contained especially in the Ramarudri and Subodhini. The book begins with the Sanskrit texts of Karikavali and Muktavali; followed by English translation of these texts. Next is given the Sanskrit text of Dinakari which comments on the first two texts, followed by its English translation. Lastly, the book contains a commentary on all the texts included.
The Character of Logic in India is the last work of the eminent philosopher Bimal Krishna Matilal. It traces the origins of logical theory in India, with chapters on the general characteristics of Indian logic, the analysis of debate, Dinnaga and the triple-conditioned sign, Dharmakirti and the problem of induction, the Jaina contribution to logic, and later developments in Navya-Nyaya.
Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics introduces the reader to new perspectives on Indian philosophy based on philological research within the last twenty years. Concentrating on topics such as perception, inference, skepticism, consciousness, self, mind, and universals, some of the most notable scholars working in classical Indian philosophy today examine core epistemological and metaphysical issues. Philosophical theories and arguments from a comprehensive range of Indian philosophical traditions (including the Nyaya, Mimamsa, Saiva, Vedanta, Samkhya, Jain, Buddhist, materialist and skeptical traditions, as well as some 20th century thought) are covered. The contributors to this volume approach the topics from both a philosophical and a philological perspective. They demonstrate the importance of the subject matter for an understanding of Indian thought in general and they highlight its wider philosophical significance. By developing an appreciation of classical Indian philosophy in its own terms, set against the background of its unique assumptions and historical and cultural development, Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics is an invaluable guide to the current state of scholarship on Indian philosophy. It is a timely and much-needed reference resource, the first of its kind.
As a system of realism, the Nyëya deserves special study to show that Idealism was not the only philosophical creed of ancient India. This book is an attempt to give a complete account of the Nyëya theory of knowledge in comparison with the rival theories of other systems, Indian and Western, and critical estimation of its worth. Though theories of knowledge of the Vedënta and other schools have been partially studied in this way by some, there has as yet been no such systematic, critical and comparative treatment of the Nyëya epistemology, The importance of such a study of Indian realistic theories of knowledge can scarcely be overrated in this modern age of Realism.
The articles in this volume are all landmarks in the evolution of modern studies in Indian logic. The book traces the development of modern studies in Indian logic from their beginnings right up to the latest work.
A new proposal for integrating the employment of formal and empirical methods in the study of human reasoning. In Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science, Keith Stenning and Michiel van Lambalgen—a cognitive scientist and a logician—argue for the indispensability of modern mathematical logic to the study of human reasoning. Logic and cognition were once closely connected, they write, but were “divorced” in the past century; the psychology of deduction went from being central to the cognitive revolution to being the subject of widespread skepticism about whether human reasoning really happens outside the academy. Stenning and van Lambalgen argue that logic and reasoning have been separated because of a series of unwarranted assumptions about logic. Stenning and van Lambalgen contend that psychology cannot ignore processes of interpretation in which people, wittingly or unwittingly, frame problems for subsequent reasoning. The authors employ a neurally implementable defeasible logic for modeling part of this framing process, and show how it can be used to guide the design of experiments and interpret results.
Relevant to philosophy, law, management, and artificial intelligence, these papers explore the applicability of nonmonotonic or defeasible logic to normative reasoning. The resulting systems purport to solve well-known deontic paradoxes and to provide a better treatment than classical deontic logic does of prima facie obligation, conditional obligation, and priorities of normative principles.
In this book a comprehensive study of the theories of error in classical Indian philosophy has been made by applying the techniques of linguistic and conceptual analysis. The special feature of this volume is that the different tools of analysis are directly applied on the classical Indian arguments. By way of analysis, it is maintained that the Indian theories of error are neither advancing a psychological account of error nor are the theories advancing any metaphysical theory regarding the ontological status of the object of error but are primarily engaged in unravelling the logical structure of the concept of error. It is held in this work that the Khyativadas are theories about the logical nature or erroneous about the ontological status of the object.
Defeasibility, most generally speaking, means that given some set of conditions A, something else B will hold, unless or until defeating conditions C apply. While the term was introduced into philosophy by legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart in 1949, today, the concept of defeasibility is employed in many different areas of philosophy. This volume for the first time brings together contributions on defeasibility from epistemology (Mikael Janvid, Klemens Kappel, Hannes Ole Matthiessen, Marcus Willaschek, Michael Williams), legal philosophy (Frederick Schauer) and ethics and the philosophy of action (Claudia Blöser, R. Jay Wallace, Michael Quante and Katarzyna Paprzycka). The volume ends with an extensive bibliography (by Michael de Araujo Kurth).
