On 25 January 2010, at 00:41:30 UTC, Ethiopian Airlines flight ET 409, a Boeing 737-800, on its way from Beirut to Addis Abeba, crashed just after take-off from Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut, Lebanon, into the Mediterranean Sea about 5 NM South West of Beirut International Airport. All 90 persons on board were killed in the accident. The investigation concluded that the probable causes of the accident were pilot errors due to loss of situational awareness. Ethiopian Airlines refutes this conclusion. Other factors that could have lead to probable causes are the increased workload and stress levels that have most likely led to the captain reaching a situation of loss of situational awareness similar to a subtle incapacitation and the F/O failure to recognize it or to intervene accordingly. Ethiopian Airlines refutes the investigation. According to the airline the final report was biased, lacking evidence, incomplete and did not present the full account of the accident.
On February 24, 1989, United Airlines flight 811, a Boeing 747-122, lost a cargo door as it was climbing between 22,000 and 23,000 feet after taking off from Honolulu, Hawaii, en route to Sydney, Australia with 355 persons aboard. As a result of the incident nine of the passengers were ejected from the airplane and lost at sea. The cargo door was recovered in two pieces from the ocean floor at a depth of 14,200 feet on September 26 and October 1, 1990. The probable cause of this accident was a faulty switch or wiring in the door control system. Contributing to the cause of the accident was a deficiency in the design of the cargo door locking mechanisms. Also contributing to the accident was a lack of timely corrective actions by Boeing and the FAA following a 1987 cargo door opening incident on a Pan Am B-747.
In Africa, where poor roads, ports, and railways often constrain efficient transportation, air transport holds great potential as a lever for economic growth and development. Yet Africa has suffered several decades of inefficient air services. Uncompetitive flag carriers, set up by newly independent African states, offered primarily intercontinental flights, while the domestic air service market remained underdeveloped and underserved. The 1999 pan-African treaty on liberalization of access to air transport markets, the Yamoussoukro Decision, attempted to address these shortcomings. Yet a decade later, only partial liberalization has been achieved. 'Open Skies for Africa: Implementing the Yamoussoukro Decision' reviews progress made in carrying out the treaty and suggests ways in which the liberalization process can be encouraged. The book analyzes the completed and still-pending steps toward implementation of the Yamoussoukro Decision, both on a pan-African level and within various regions. Special focus is given to the challenges posed by the poor aviation safety and security standards that exist in most African countries. Finally, the book measures the impact that certain policy steps of the Yamoussoukro Decision have had and evaluates the economic significance of air transportation and its full liberalization in Africa. The book concludes that the process of liberalizing African air services must continue, and provides policy recommendations for the way forward.
However, the forces of law have failed to keep ahead of advancing threats. As hijacking has become more difficult, terrorists have adopted new tactics, such as sabotage bombing. Thus, while the 1960s and the 1970s were the age of aircraft hijackings, the 1980s could be said to be the age of sabotage bomb attacks in civil aviation history.
On February 12, 2009, about 2217 eastern standard time, Colgan Air, Flight 3407, a Bombardier DHC-8-400, on approach to Buffalo-Niagara International Airport, crashed into a residence in Clarence Center, New York, 5 nautical miles northeast of the airport. The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 45 passengers aboard the airplane were killed, one person on the ground was killed, and the airplane was destroyed. The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was a pilot's error.
In August 1964, thousands of Simba rebels attacked and captured the city of Stanleyville in the newly independent Republic of the Congo and took more than 1,600 European and American residents as hostages, threatening to kill them if any attempt was made to recapture the city. In November of that year, after months of increasingly tense and complex discussions among the governments whose nationals were being held, an airborne assault by Belgian paracommandos dropped by American Air Force planes, combined with a CIA-piloted air strike against the Stanleyville airport, liberated most of the hostages, but only after a Simba-initiated massacre. "Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965" provides both the political background to these events and a detailed account of the actual operations: Dragon Rouge, the operations in Stanleyville, and Dragon Noir, focused on the city of Paulis, several hundred miles away. The book highlights the difficulties in organizing an international rescue effort with insufficient joint planning and inadequate command and control among the Belgian and American forces, as well as their differing political ideas and goals. The ad hoc nature of the planning was exemplified by an initial American Special Forces plan to air drop its forces east of Stanleyville and float down the river to Stanleyville. This plan was aborted when it was pointed out that the existence of Stanley Falls between the drop zone and the city was an insuperable obstacle. The operation also suffered from the Belgian commander's colonial-era contempt for the numerical strength of the Simbas and American fears of what was in reality a non-existent Communist element in the rebel movement."Dragon Operations" demonstrates that, despite the slapdash nature of their planning and communications aspects, as well as the distance involved, the austere support, the large number of hostages, and a lack of intelligence data, they were remarkably successful in rescuing most of the hostages. Although less than ideal, the operations worked better than expected, given the conditions under which they were conducted. This important study of an almost forgotten episode of the Cold War has much to offer to military strategists and tacticians, political scientists and students of contemporary history alike. Orginally published in 1988: 236 p. maps. ill.
From actress and activist Angelina Jolie comes the personal journals she compiled while performing humanitarian relief efforts in such countries as Sierra Leone and Tanzania, Pakistan and Cambodia. When award-winning actress Angelina Jolie took on a radically different role as a Goodwill Ambassador for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), she was determined to document everything she witnessed and experienced. Here are her memoirs from her journeys to Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Pakistan, Cambodia, and Ecuador, where she lived and worked and gave her heart to those who suffer the world’s most shattering violence and victimization. Here are her revelations of joy and warmth amid utter destitution...compelling snapshots of courageous and inspiring people for whom survival is their daily work, and candid notes from a unique pilgrimage that completely changed her worldview—and the world within herself.
Antifragile is a standalone book in Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s landmark Incerto series, an investigation of opacity, luck, uncertainty, probability, human error, risk, and decision-making in a world we don’t understand. The other books in the series are Fooled by Randomness, The Black Swan, Skin in the Game, and The Bed of Procrustes. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, the bestselling author of The Black Swan and one of the foremost thinkers of our time, reveals how to thrive in an uncertain world. Just as human bones get stronger when subjected to stress and tension, and rumors or riots intensify when someone tries to repress them, many things in life benefit from stress, disorder, volatility, and turmoil. What Taleb has identified and calls “antifragile” is that category of things that not only gain from chaos but need it in order to survive and flourish. In The Black Swan, Taleb showed us that highly improbable and unpredictable events underlie almost everything about our world. In Antifragile, Taleb stands uncertainty on its head, making it desirable, even necessary, and proposes that things be built in an antifragile manner. The antifragile is beyond the resilient or robust. The resilient resists shocks and stays the same; the antifragile gets better and better. Furthermore, the antifragile is immune to prediction errors and protected from adverse events. Why is the city-state better than the nation-state, why is debt bad for you, and why is what we call “efficient” not efficient at all? Why do government responses and social policies protect the strong and hurt the weak? Why should you write your resignation letter before even starting on the job? How did the sinking of the Titanic save lives? The book spans innovation by trial and error, life decisions, politics, urban planning, war, personal finance, economic systems, and medicine. And throughout, in addition to the street wisdom of Fat Tony of Brooklyn, the voices and recipes of ancient wisdom, from Roman, Greek, Semitic, and medieval sources, are loud and clear. Antifragile is a blueprint for living in a Black Swan world. Erudite, witty, and iconoclastic, Taleb’s message is revolutionary: The antifragile, and only the antifragile, will make it. Praise for Antifragile “Ambitious and thought-provoking . . . highly entertaining.”—The Economist “A bold book explaining how and why we should embrace uncertainty, randomness, and error . . . It may just change our lives.”—Newsweek
For more than a decade, America has been waging a new kind of war against the financial networks of rogue regimes, proliferators, terrorist groups, and criminal syndicates. Juan Zarate, a chief architect of modern financial warfare and a former senior Treasury and White House official, pulls back the curtain on this shadowy world. In this gripping story, he explains in unprecedented detail how a small, dedicated group of officials redefined the Treasury's role and used its unique powers, relationships, and reputation to apply financial pressure against America's enemies. This group unleashed a new brand of financial power -- one that leveraged the private sector and banks directly to isolate rogues from the international financial system. By harnessing the forces of globalization and the centrality of the American market and dollar, Treasury developed a new way of undermining America's foes. Treasury and its tools soon became, and remain, critical in the most vital geopolitical challenges facing the United States, including terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and the regimes in Iran, North Korea, and Syria. This book is the definitive account, by an unparalleled expert, of how financial warfare has taken pride of place in American foreign policy and how America's competitors and enemies are now learning to use this type of power themselves. This is the unique story of the United States' financial war campaigns and the contours and uses of financial power, and of the warfare to come.
One of the most vexing issues that has faced the international community since the end of the Cold War has been the use of force by the United Nations peacekeeping forces. UN intervention in civil wars, as in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda, has thrown into stark relief the difficulty of peacekeepers operating in situations where consent to their presence and activities is fragile or incomplete and where there is little peace to keep. Complex questions arise in these circumstances. When and how should peacekeepers use force to protect themselves, to protect their mission, or, most troublingly, to ensure compliance by recalcitrant parties with peace accords? Is a peace enforcement role for peacekeepers possible or is this simply war by another name? Is there a grey zone between peacekeeping and peace enforcement? Trevor Findlay reveals the history of the use of force by UN peacekeepers from Sinai in the 1950s to Haiti in the 1990s. He untangles the arguments about the use of force in peace operations and sets these within the broader context of military doctrine and practice. Drawing on these insights the author examines proposals for future conduct of UN operations, including the formulation of UN peacekeeping doctrine and the establishment of a UN rapid reaction force.
