The book deals witht the course of air combat during the Israeli-Arab wars that had taken place since the Israeli War of Independence in the late 1940s, until fighting against Syrian air force at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. It describes military operations as well as selected information on the combat aircraft and Polish topics related to the aviation of the Middle East countries
The majority of narratives about the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War stress that air power did not play a dominant role. The deployment of strong, well-integrated air defenses by Egypt and Syria, that caused heavy losses to the Israeli air force early during that conflict, not only spoiled Israel's prewar planning, but prevented it from providing support for Israeli ground forces too. A cross-examination of interviews with dozens of Egyptian participants in that conflict, contemporary reporting in the media, and also intelligence reports, offers an entirely different picture. Accordingly, for much of that war, the Israelis flew heavy air strikes on Port Said, on the northern entry to the Suez Canal. Furthermore, they repeatedly attacked two major Egyptian air bases in the Nile Delta - el-Mansourah and Tanta - in turn causing some of the biggest air battles of this war. Indeed, in Egypt, the response to these attacks reached the level of legend: the supposed repelling of an Israeli air strike on el-Mansourah, on 14 October 1973, prompted Cairo to declare not only a massive victory, but also that date for the day of its air force. However, the actual reasons for Israeli air strikes on Port Said, el-Mansourah and Tanta remain unclear to this day: there are no Israeli publications offering a sensible explanation, and there are no Egyptian publications explaining the reasoning. Only a cross-examination of additional reporting provides a possible solution: el-Mansourah was also the base of the only Egyptian unit equipped with R-17E ballistic missiles, known as the SS-1 Scud in the West. As of October 1973, these missiles were the only weapon in Egyptian hands capable of reaching central Israel - and that only if fired from the area around Port Said. While apparently unimportant in the overall context, this fact gains immensely in importance considering reports from the US intelligence services about the possible deployment of Soviet nuclear warheads to Egypt in October 1973. Discussing all the available information, strategy, tactics, equipment and related combat operations of both sides, '1973: the First Nuclear War' provides an in-depth insight into the Israeli efforts to prevent the deployment of Egyptian Scud missiles - whether armed with Soviet nuclear warheads or not - in the Port Said area: an effort that dictated a lengthy segment of the application of air power during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and resulted in some of the most spectacular air-to-air and air-to-ground battles of that conflict. Illustrated by over 100 photographs, a dozen maps and 18 color profiles, this book thus offers an entirely new thesis about crucial, but previously unknown factors that determined the flow of the aerial warfare in October 1973.
The Arab-Israeli balance now consists of two subordinate balances: Israel versus Syria and Israel versus the Palestinians. This book analyzes these two balances and their impact on defense planning in each country and on the overall strategic risk to the whole region. It covers military developments in each of six states--Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine--and provides and analytical view of how the changing natures of the military and political threats faced by each is impacting its military force readiness and development. The roles of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are analyzed in light of the changing political landscape in both Israel and Palestine. Finally, the book explores the ways that internal instability in Lebanon could escalate into regional conflict.--Publisher's description.
Includes 8 maps and more than 20 illustrations Armies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967. This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain strategic success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance. The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.
Post-Yom Kippur War, Israel purchased the F-15 Eagle, the then world's best air-to-air fighter, in an effort to prevent another surprise attack from the air. For the first time in its history the IDF/AF operated a fighter that was a full generation ahead of opposing interceptors in the region. The first 'kill' F-15 Baz (Buzzard) arrived in Israel in 1976 and soon proved its worth in combat. Israeli Baz pilots were credited with 12.5 kills between 1979 and 1981, with 33 victories following during the June 1982 Lebanon War. Despite substantial combat, no Israeli F-15 has ever been lost to enemy action. In the 1990s the US government supplied the IDF/AF with the F-15I Ra'am (Thunder) to fulfill the long-range surface-to-surface missile mission post-Desert Storm. From A to I, the extremely capable, and combat-tested, Israeli F-15 force will continue to deter potential enemies well into the foreseeable future. This book examines the history and development of these units.
By participating in 1956 Suez Crisis Israel exploited an opportunity to join forces with France and the United Kingdom in an attack against Egypt in order to accomplish diplomatic, military and political objectives: to open the Red Sea international shipping lane to ships sailing from and to Eilat; to strengthen its alliance with France; to end - or at least to scale down - Egyptian hosted Palestinian terror attacks against Israel; to launch a preventive war in order to crush Egyptian military power before its completion of the transition to Soviet weapons could tempt Egypt to attack Israel and in order to accomplish a profound victory to deter Egypt from pursuing a another round of war policy. Operation KADESH was the Israeli part in the Anglo-French attack and this title chronicles Israeli Air Force operations along the timeline of Operation KADESH - from day 1 on 29 October 1956 until day 11 on 8 November 1956 - in thus far unmatched depth and detail; all known Israel Air Force missions and sorties are listed and described and all air combats between Israeli Mysteres and Egyptian MiGs and Vampires are presented and analyzed. The large variety of aircraft flown - Dassault Mysteres, Dassault Ouragans and Gloster Meteors; B-17 Flying Fortresses, P-51 Mustangs and De Havilland Mosquitoes; T-6 Texans (Harvards) and T-17 Kaydets (Stearmans); Nord 2501 Noratlases, C-47 Skytrains (Dakotas), Pipers and Consuls and even a pair of Sikorsky S-55 helicopters - are all covered in this title, which presents Israeli Air Force operations during the Suez War in a depth and detail unseen in previous publications. The text is supported by numerous photographs and color profiles. Middle East@War - following on from our highly successful Africa@War series, Middle East@War replicates the same format - concise, incisive text, rare images and high quality color artwork providing fresh accounts of both well-known and more esoteric aspects of conflict in this part of the world since 1945.
An updated edition that sheds new light on one of the most dramatic reversals of military fortune in modern history. The easing of Israeli military censorship after four decades has enabled Abraham Rabinovich to offer fresh insights into this fiercest of Israel-Arab conflicts. A surprise Arab attack on two fronts on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, with Israel’s reserves un-mobilized, triggered apocalyptic visions in Israel, euphoria in the Arab world, and fraught debates on both sides. Rabinovich, who covered the war for The Jerusalem Post, draws on extensive interviews and primary source material to shape his enthralling narrative. We learn of two Egyptian nationals, working separately for the Mossad, who supplied Israel with key information that helped change the course of the war; of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan’s proposal for a nuclear “demonstration” to warn off the Arabs; and of Chief of Staff David Elazar’s conclusion on the fifth day of battle that Israel could not win. Newly available transcripts enable us to follow the decision-making process in real time from the prime minister’s office to commanders studying maps in the field. After almost overrunning the Golan Heights, the Syrian attack is broken in desperate battles. And as Israel regains its psychological balance, General Ariel Sharon leads a nighttime counterattack across the Suez Canal through a narrow hole in the Egyptian line -- the turning point of the war.
This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The fact that the outcome of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War was, at best, a stalemate for Israel has confounded military analysts. Long considered the most professional and powerful army in the Middle East, with a history of impressive military victories against its enemies, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) emerged from the campaign with its enemies undefeated and its prestige tarnished. This historical analysis of the war includes an examination of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine prior to the war, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF during the war. The IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force. ¿An insightful, comprehensive examination of the war.¿ Illustrations.
