The book deals witht the course of air combat during the Israeli-Arab wars that had taken place since the Israeli War of Independence in the late 1940s, until fighting against Syrian air force at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. It describes military operations as well as selected information on the combat aircraft and Polish topics related to the aviation of the Middle East countries
The majority of narratives about the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War stress that air power did not play a dominant role. The deployment of strong, well-integrated air defenses by Egypt and Syria, that caused heavy losses to the Israeli air force early during that conflict, not only spoiled Israel's prewar planning, but prevented it from providing support for Israeli ground forces too. A cross-examination of interviews with dozens of Egyptian participants in that conflict, contemporary reporting in the media, and also intelligence reports, offers an entirely different picture. Accordingly, for much of that war, the Israelis flew heavy air strikes on Port Said, on the northern entry to the Suez Canal. Furthermore, they repeatedly attacked two major Egyptian air bases in the Nile Delta - el-Mansourah and Tanta - in turn causing some of the biggest air battles of this war. Indeed, in Egypt, the response to these attacks reached the level of legend: the supposed repelling of an Israeli air strike on el-Mansourah, on 14 October 1973, prompted Cairo to declare not only a massive victory, but also that date for the day of its air force. However, the actual reasons for Israeli air strikes on Port Said, el-Mansourah and Tanta remain unclear to this day: there are no Israeli publications offering a sensible explanation, and there are no Egyptian publications explaining the reasoning. Only a cross-examination of additional reporting provides a possible solution: el-Mansourah was also the base of the only Egyptian unit equipped with R-17E ballistic missiles, known as the SS-1 Scud in the West. As of October 1973, these missiles were the only weapon in Egyptian hands capable of reaching central Israel - and that only if fired from the area around Port Said. While apparently unimportant in the overall context, this fact gains immensely in importance considering reports from the US intelligence services about the possible deployment of Soviet nuclear warheads to Egypt in October 1973. Discussing all the available information, strategy, tactics, equipment and related combat operations of both sides, '1973: the First Nuclear War' provides an in-depth insight into the Israeli efforts to prevent the deployment of Egyptian Scud missiles - whether armed with Soviet nuclear warheads or not - in the Port Said area: an effort that dictated a lengthy segment of the application of air power during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and resulted in some of the most spectacular air-to-air and air-to-ground battles of that conflict. Illustrated by over 100 photographs, a dozen maps and 18 color profiles, this book thus offers an entirely new thesis about crucial, but previously unknown factors that determined the flow of the aerial warfare in October 1973.
The Arab-Israeli balance now consists of two subordinate balances: Israel versus Syria and Israel versus the Palestinians. This book analyzes these two balances and their impact on defense planning in each country and on the overall strategic risk to the whole region. It covers military developments in each of six states--Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine--and provides and analytical view of how the changing natures of the military and political threats faced by each is impacting its military force readiness and development. The roles of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are analyzed in light of the changing political landscape in both Israel and Palestine. Finally, the book explores the ways that internal instability in Lebanon could escalate into regional conflict.--Publisher's description.
“Reads like a World War II thriller, only better because every word is true.… One of the great untold stories of history. Robert Gandt has brought it vividly, unforgettably to life.” —Steven Pressfield, best-selling author of Gates of Fire In 1948, when the newly founded nation of Israel came under siege from a coalition of Arab states, a band of volunteer airmen from the United States, Canada, Britain, France, and South Africa arrived to help. They were a small group, fewer than 150. Many were World War II veterans; most of them knowingly violated their nations’ embargoes on the shipment of arms and aircraft to Israel. The airmen risked everything—their careers, citizenship, and lives—to fight for Israel. The saga of the volunteer airmen in Israel’s war of independence stands as one of the most stirring—and little-known—war stories of the past century.
Includes 8 maps and more than 20 illustrations Armies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967. This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain strategic success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance. The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.
Operation HOREV - the Israeli offensive from December 1948 until January 1949 - practically ended Israel's War for Independence, with an Israeli victory that forced Egypt to seek ceasefire and to negotiate a settlement. From HOREV Day 1 on 23 December 1948 until HOREV Day 16 on 7 January 1949, this title presents Israeli Air Force missions during O
By participating in 1956 Suez Crisis Israel exploited an opportunity to join forces with France and the United Kingdom in an attack against Egypt in order to accomplish diplomatic, military and political objectives: to open the Red Sea international shipping lane to ships sailing from and to Eilat; to strengthen its alliance with France; to end - or at least to scale down - Egyptian hosted Palestinian terror attacks against Israel; to launch a preventive war in order to crush Egyptian military power before its completion of the transition to Soviet weapons could tempt Egypt to attack Israel and in order to accomplish a profound victory to deter Egypt from pursuing a another round of war policy. Operation KADESH was the Israeli part in the Anglo-French attack and this title chronicles Israeli Air Force operations along the timeline of Operation KADESH - from day 1 on 29 October 1956 until day 11 on 8 November 1956 - in thus far unmatched depth and detail; all known Israel Air Force missions and sorties are listed and described and all air combats between Israeli Mysteres and Egyptian MiGs and Vampires are presented and analyzed. The large variety of aircraft flown - Dassault Mysteres, Dassault Ouragans and Gloster Meteors; B-17 Flying Fortresses, P-51 Mustangs and De Havilland Mosquitoes; T-6 Texans (Harvards) and T-17 Kaydets (Stearmans); Nord 2501 Noratlases, C-47 Skytrains (Dakotas), Pipers and Consuls and even a pair of Sikorsky S-55 helicopters - are all covered in this title, which presents Israeli Air Force operations during the Suez War in a depth and detail unseen in previous publications. The text is supported by numerous photographs and color profiles. Middle East@War - following on from our highly successful Africa@War series, Middle East@War replicates the same format - concise, incisive text, rare images and high quality color artwork providing fresh accounts of both well-known and more esoteric aspects of conflict in this part of the world since 1945.
The light and agile A-4 Skyhawk was the first modern American jet to be offered to the Israeli Air Force, marking the point where the US took over from France as Israel's chief military supplier. Deliveries began too late for the A-4 to fight in the Six-Day War, but it soon formed the backbone of the IAF's ground-attack force. From 1969 to 1970 it flew endless sorties against Egyptian forces in the War of Attrition. Then, during the Yom Kippur War, five squadrons of A-4s saw combat and 50 planes were lost as they battled against the Arab armored onslaught. Using previously unpublished first-hand accounts and rare photography from the IAF archives and pilots' private collections, Shlomo Aloni tells the definitive history of the IAF's A-4 squadrons, including the story of Ezra “BABAN” Dotan who became an ace with an unique double-kill of MiG17s.