It has been argued in the multitask agency literature that effort distortion can be mitigated by applying several performance measures in incentive contracts. This paper analyzes the efficient aggregation of multiple performance measures aimed at motivating non-distorted effort. It demonstrates that non-distorted effort can be induced by combining a sufficient quantity of informative performance measures. However, this is only optimal if the required aggregation concurrently maximizes the precision of the agent's performance evaluation. This paper further illustrates how the optimal performance evaluation is affected by individual agent's ability to perform relevant tasks.
This paper analyzes a multi-task agency framework where the agent exhibits task-specific abilities. It illustrates how incentive contracts account for the agent's task-specific abilities if contractible performance measures do not reflect the agent's multidimensional contribution to firm value. This paper further sheds light on potential ranking criteria for performance measures in multi-task principal-agent relationships. It demonstrates that performance measures in multi-task agencies cannot necessarily be compared by their respective signal-to-noise ratio as in single-task agency relationships. In fact, it is indispensable to take the induced effort distortion and the measure-cost efficiency into consideration - both determined by the agent's task-specific abilities.
This book provides an integrated, technical exposition of key concepts in agency theory, with particular emphasis on analyses of the economic consequences of the characteristics of contractible performance measures, such as accounting reports. It provides a succinct source for learning the fundamentals of the economics of incentives. It will appeal to accounting researchers as well as those in other disciplines who are interested in the economics of management incentives.
This book is the result of a multi-year research project led and sponsored by the University of Chieti-Pescara, National Chengchi University, University of Salamanca, and Osaka University. It is the fifth volume to emerge from that international project, held under the aegis of the United Nations Academic Impact in 2020. All the essays in this volume were (virtually) discussed at the University of L’Aquila―as the venue of the 2nd International Conference on Decision Economics, a three-day global gathering of approximately one hundred scholars and practitioners—and were subjected to thorough peer review by leading experts in the field. The essays reflect the extent, diversity, and richness of several research areas, both normative and descriptive, and are an invaluable resource for graduate-level and PhD students, academics, researchers, policymakers and other professionals, especially in the social and cognitive sciences. Given its interdisciplinary scope, the book subsequently delivers new approaches on how to contribute to the future of economics, providing alternative explanations for various socio-economic issues such as computable humanities; cognitive, behavioural, and experimental perspectives in economics; data analysis and machine learning as well as research areas at the intersection of computer science, artificial intelligence, mathematics, and statistics; agent-based modelling and the related. The editors are grateful to the scientific committee for its continuous support throughout the research project as well as to the many participants for their insightful comments and always probing questions. In any case, the collaboration involved in the project extends far beyond the group of authors published in this volume and is reflected in the quality of the essays published over the years.
Game theory has been applied to a growing list of practical problems, from antitrust analysis to monetary policy; from the design of auction institutions to the structuring of incentives within firms; from patent races to dispute resolution. The purpose of Game Theory and Business Applications is to show how game theory can be used to model and analyze business decisions. The contents of this revised edition contain a wide variety of business functions – from accounting to operations, from marketing to strategy to organizational design. In addition, specific application areas include market competition, law and economics, bargaining and dispute resolution, and competitive bidding. All of these applications involve competitive decision settings, specifically situations where a number of economic agents in pursuit of their own self-interests and in accordance with the institutional “rules of the game” take actions that together affect all of their fortunes. As this volume demonstrates, game theory provides a compelling guide for analyzing business decisions and strategies.
This paper studies optimal task assignments in a risk neutral principal-agent model in which agents are compensated according to an aggregated performance measure. The main trade-off involved is one in which specialization allows the implementation of any possible effort profile, while multitasking constraint the set of implementable effort profiles. Yet, the implementation of any effort profile in this set is less expensive than that under specialization. The principal prefers multitasking to specialization except when tasks are complements and the output after success is small enough so that it is not second-best optimal to implement high effort in each task. This result is robust to several extensions such as the existence of multiple performance measures.
A management accounting research journal. It features articles on a variety of topics in management accounting that are relevant to researchers in both practice and academe. It intends to meet the needs of management accounting scholars.
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
This book constitutes revised selected papers from the 9th international Global Sourcing Workshop 2015, held in La Thuile, Italy, in February 2015. The 14 contributions included were carefully reviewed and selected from 40 submissions. The book offers a review of the key topics in outsourcing and offshoring, populated with practical frameworks that serve as a tool kit to students and managers. The range of topics covered is wide and diverse, but predominately focused on how to achieve success and innovation in global sourcing. The topics discussed combine theoretical and practical insights regarding challenges that industry leaders, policy makers, and professionals face. Case studies from various organizations, industries and countries are used extensively throughout the book to illustrate results and findings.
