With the right method, aggregate indicators can provide useful estimates of basic governance concepts as well as measures of the imprecision of these aggregate estimates and their components.
Abstract: The authors report on the latest version of the worldwide governance indicators, covering 213 countries and territories and measuring six dimensions of governance from 1996 until end-2005: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The latest indicators are based on hundreds of variables and reflect the views of thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents and experts worldwide. Although global averages of governance display no marked trends during 1996-2005, nearly one-third of countries exhibit significant changes [for better or for worse] on at least one dimension of governance. Three new features distinguish this update. (1) The authors have moved to annual reporting of governance estimates. This update includes new governance estimates for 2003 and 2005, as well as minor backward revisions to biannual historical data for 1996-2004. (2) The authors are, for the first time, publishing the individual measures of governance from virtually every data source underlying the aggregate governance indicators. The ready availability of the individual data sources underlying the aggregate governance indicators is aimed at further enhancing the transparency of the methodology and of the resulting aggregate indicators, as well as helping data users and policymakers identify specific governance challenges in individual countries. (3) The authors present new evidence on the reliability of expert assessments of governance which, alongside survey responses, form part of the aggregate measures of governance.
This study helps users find their way through the jungle of governance indicators, and shows how they tend to be widely misused both in international comparisons and in tracking changes in individual countries.
Abstract: The Worldwide Governance Indicators, reporting estimates of six dimensions of governance for over 200 countries between 1996 and 2005, have become widely used among policymakers and academics. They have also attracted some explicit written criticisms. In this short paper the authors synthesize 11 critiques offered by four recent papers. They then refute them as either conceptually incorrect or empirically unsubstantiated.
A guide for constructing and using composite indicators for policy makers, academics, the media and other interested parties. In particular, this handbook is concerned with indicators which compare and rank country performance.
With the advance of an increasingly globalized market, the opportunities for, and scale of, corruption is growing. The size of corporations and their wealth relative to nations provides the resources for corrupt practices. The liberalization of international financial markets makes transferring and hiding the proceeds of corruption easier. Moves towards privatization in East and West are providing once-only incentives for corruption on an unprecedented scale, as officials not only deal with the income of the state, but with its assets as well. In this book, Transparency International's (TI) world-renowned 'Corruption Perception Index' (CPI) and 'Bribery Perception Index' (BPI) are explained and examined by a group of experts. They set out to establish to what extent they are reliable measures of corruption and whether a series of surveys can measure changes in corruption and the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies. The book contains a variety of expert contributions which deal with the complexity, difficulty and potential for measuring corruption as the key to developing effective strategies for combating it.
Abstract: "An extensive literature on the relationship between decentralization (or localization) and corruption has developed in recent years. While some authors argue that there is a positive relationship between decentralization and corruption, others claim that decentralization in fact leads to a reduction in the level of corruption. This important policy question has not yet been laid to rest since previous empirical work simply uses eclectic regressions and lacks a conceptual framework to discover the root causes of corruption. Gurgur and Shah attempt to fill this void by presenting a framework in identifying the drivers of corruption both conceptually and empirically to isolate the role of centralized decisionmaking on corruption. The following results emerge: * For a sample of 30 countries (developing and industrial), corruption is caused by a lack of service orientation in the public sector, weak democratic institutions, economic isolation (closed economy), colonial past, internal bureaucratic controls, and centralized decisionmaking. * Decentralization is found to have a negative impact on corruption, with the effect being stronger in unitary than in federal countries. This paper--a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division, World Bank Institute--is part of a larger effort in the institute to exchange ideas on the reform of public sector governance"--World Bank web site.
Updated governance indicators report estimates of six dimensions of governance for 175 countries in 2000-01. They can be compared with those constructed for 1997-98.
This book is available as open access through the Bloomsbury Open Access programme and is available on bloomsburycollections.com. While good governance is a worthy goal, this book argues that it is not a prerequisite for economic growth or development. The book exposes the methodological shortcomings of the commonly-used governance indicators developed within the World Bank. The authors argue that donors should not impose onerous good governance conditions, expecting the developing world to simulate now-developed countries. They contend that most poor countries lack the administrative and financial capacity to achieve these reforms or institutions - so donor conditionality often becomes a recipe for failure. In place of grand government reforms aimed at enhancing market efficiency, the book's position is that the reform agenda should target strategic bottlenecks for development and enhance the state's capacity to deal with these disruptions. Bringing together contributions from leading political scientists, political economists and development practitioners, this is the first book to provide a systematic critical perspective on received notions of good governance.
"The paper presents a nontechnical summary of the current state of debate on the measurement and implications of global inequality (inequality between citizens of the world). It discusses the relationship between globalization and global inequality. And it shows why global inequality matters and proposes a scheme for global redistribution. "--World Bank web site.