For more than twenty years Afghanistan reigned as one of the world's leading sources of illicit opium. Lack of governance civil unrest and instability contributed to the country's dominance of opium cultivation and trade. Shortly following 9/11 and fall of the Taliban a new Afghan governmental structure was formed. The establishment of a democracy in Afghanistan charts a new era for the country and could potentially set in motion a movement to abolish cultivation and trade of opium. Afghanistan's challenge however to establish a secure and stable government directly impacts on its status as the worlds largest source of illicit opium. This paper examines the nexus between Afghanistan's opium economy and government authority as well as the impact they have on post conflict reconstruction. Key areas include a historical perspective of the country's political environment and opium economy the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan & the United Kingdom's drug control policy and US drug control policy for Afghanistan. If Afghanistan is to succeed as a nation-state devoid of an illicit opium economy it must prevent deterioration of the central authority of the government.
For more than twenty years, Afghanistan reigned as one of the world's leading sources of illicit opium. Lack of governance, civil unrest and instability contributed to the country's dominance of opium cultivation and trade. Shortly following 9/11 and fall of the Taliban, a new Afghan governmental structure was formed. The establishment of a democracy in Afghanistan charts a new era for the country and could potentially set in motion a movement to abolish cultivation and trade of opium. Afghanistan's challenge however, to establish a secure and stable government directly impacts on its status as the world's largest source of illicit opium. This paper examines the nexus between Afghanistan's opium economy and government authority as well as the impact they have on post conflict reconstruction. Key areas include a historical perspective of the country's political environment and opium economy, the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan & the United Kingdom's drug control policy, and US drug control policy for Afghanistan. If Afghanistan is to succeed as a nation-state devoid of an illicit opium economy, it must prevent deterioration of the central authority of the government.
Oscillations in opium poppy production in Afghanistan have long been associated with how the state was perceived, such as after the Taliban imposed a cultivation ban in 2000-1. The international community's subsequent attempts to regulate opium poppy became intimately linked with its own state-building project, and rising levels of cultivation were cited as evidence of failure by those international donors who spearheaded development in poppy-growing provinces like Helmand, Nangarhar and Kandahar. Mansfield's book examines why drug control - particularly opium bans - have been imposed in Afghanistan; he documents the actors involved; and he scrutinizes how prohibition served divergent and competing interests. Drawing on almost two decades of fieldwork in rural areas, he explains how these bans affected farming communities, and how prohibition endured in some areas while in others opium production bans undermined livelihoods and destabilized the political order, fuelling violence and rural rebellion. Above all this book challenges how we have come to understand political power in rural Afghanistan. Far from being the passive recipients of violence by state and non-state actors, Mansfield highlights the role that rural communities have played in shaping the political terrain, including establishing the conditions under which they could persist with opium production.
The narcotics trade poisons the Afghan financial sector and undermines the Afghan state's legitimacy by stoking corruption, sustaining criminal networks, and providing significant financial support to the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Despite spending over $7 billion to combat opium poppy cultivation and to develop the Afghan government's counternarcotics capacity, opium poppy cultivation levels in Afghanistan hit an all-time high in 2013. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghan farmers grew an unprecedented 209,000 hectares of opium poppy in 2013, surpassing the previous peak of 193,000 hectares in 2007. With deteriorating security in many parts of rural Afghanistan and low levels of eradication of poppy fields, further increases in cultivation are likely in 2014. As of June 30, 2014, the United States has spent approximately $7.6 billion on counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Despite the significant financial expenditure, opium poppy cultivation has far exceeded previous records. In past years, surges in opium poppy cultivation have been met by a coordinated response from the U.S. government and coalition partners, which has led to a temporary decline in levels of opium production. However, the recent record-high level of poppy cultivation calls into question the long-term effectiveness and sustainability of those prior efforts.
Opiates originating in Afghanistan threaten the health and well-being of people in many regions of the world. Their illicit trade also adversely impacts governance, security, stability and development in Afghanistan, in its neighbors, in the broader region and beyond. This report, the second such report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime research project on the topic, covers worldwide flows of Afghan opiates, as well as trafficking in precursor chemicals used to turn opium into heroin. By providing a better understanding of the global impact of Afghan opiates, this report can help the international community identify vulnerabilities and possible countermeasures. This report presents data on the distribution of trafficking flows for Afghan opiates and their health impact throughout the world. A worrying development that requires international attention is the increasing use of Africa as a way station for Afghan heroin shipments to Europe, North America and Oceania. This is fuelling heroin consumption in Africa, a region generally ill-equipped to provide treatment to drug users and to fight off the corrupting effects of drug money. Another new trend is the growing use of sea and air transport to move Afghan heroin around the world, as well as to smuggle chemicals used in heroin production into Afghanistan. Traffickers in Afghan heroin have traditionally relied on overland routes, and law enforcement services will need to respond to this new threat. The findings of this report identify areas that need more attention. Strengthening border controls at the most vulnerable points, such as along Afghanistan's border with Pakistan's Baluchistan province, could help stem the largest flows of heroin, opium and precursor chemicals. Increasing the capacity to monitor and search shipping containers in airports, seaports and dry ports at key transit points and in destination countries could improve interdiction rates. Building capacity and fostering intelligence sharing between ports and law enforcement authorities in key countries and regions would help step up interdiction of both opiates and precursor chemicals. Addressing Afghan opium and insecurity will help the entire region, with ripple effects that spread much farther. Enhancing security, the rule of law and rural development are all necessary to achieve sustainable results in reducing poppy cultivation and poverty in Afghanistan. This will benefit the Afghan people, the wider region and the international community as a whole. But addressing the supply side and trafficking is not enough. We need a balanced approach that gives equal weight to counteracting demand for opiates.
“The present study goes beyond reporting on a single year's production and value. It examines Afghanistan's opium economy in order to understand its dynamics, the reasons for its success, its beneficiaries and victims, and the problems it has caused domestically and abroad.”-- Executive summary.
A Washington Post Best Book of 2021 The #1 New York Times bestselling investigative story of how three successive presidents and their military commanders deceived the public year after year about America’s longest war, foreshadowing the Taliban’s recapture of Afghanistan, by Washington Post reporter and three-time Pulitzer Prize finalist Craig Whitlock. Unlike the wars in Vietnam and Iraq, the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 had near-unanimous public support. At first, the goals were straightforward and clear: defeat al-Qaeda and prevent a repeat of 9/11. Yet soon after the United States and its allies removed the Taliban from power, the mission veered off course and US officials lost sight of their original objectives. Distracted by the war in Iraq, the US military become mired in an unwinnable guerrilla conflict in a country it did not understand. But no president wanted to admit failure, especially in a war that began as a just cause. Instead, the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations sent more and more troops to Afghanistan and repeatedly said they were making progress, even though they knew there was no realistic prospect for an outright victory. Just as the Pentagon Papers changed the public’s understanding of Vietnam, The Afghanistan Papers contains “fast-paced and vivid” (The New York Times Book Review) revelation after revelation from people who played a direct role in the war from leaders in the White House and the Pentagon to soldiers and aid workers on the front lines. In unvarnished language, they admit that the US government’s strategies were a mess, that the nation-building project was a colossal failure, and that drugs and corruption gained a stranglehold over their allies in the Afghan government. All told, the account is based on interviews with more than 1,000 people who knew that the US government was presenting a distorted, and sometimes entirely fabricated, version of the facts on the ground. Documents unearthed by The Washington Post reveal that President Bush didn’t know the name of his Afghanistan war commander—and didn’t want to meet with him. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld admitted that he had “no visibility into who the bad guys are.” His successor, Robert Gates, said: “We didn’t know jack shit about al-Qaeda.” The Afghanistan Papers is a “searing indictment of the deceit, blunders, and hubris of senior military and civilian officials” (Tom Bowman, NRP Pentagon Correspondent) that will supercharge a long-overdue reckoning over what went wrong and forever change the way the conflict is remembered.
