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Published: 2002

Total Pages: 0

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The U.S. Air Force is currently confronting unprecedented problems in managing fighter aircrews. There are too few pilots in the active component, yet so many new pilots are entering the force that operational units cannot absorb them without jeopardizing readiness and safety. The 1990s saw sizable cuts in force structure, increased tasking, and fewer training sorties in all remaining active operational units. These factors are the genesis of today's absorption problems. During site visits, we observed the adverse training environment that can result when the number of new pilots arriving at operational units exceeds the units' capacity to absorb them. At an active A/OA-10 combat unit located at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, for example, we found the following: (1) Sixty percent (47 of 78) of assigned primary mission pilots were decertified from combat mission-ready (CMR) status. (2) Pilots averaged too few sorties monthly, exhibited degraded performance in primary bombing events, and performed poorly on check rides. (3) All instructor pilot (IP) and supervisor survey respondents cited problems with both the quantity and the quality of training available to inexperienced pilots. Many also expressed concern that wingmen in their units were flying advanced missions without a fundamental foundation in certain basic skills. (4) Manning and experience levels exacerbated these problems. Available training sorties had to be distributed among an aircrew position indicator-1 (API-1) pilot population that was 16.7 percent overmanned and only 36.9 percent experienced even though the reported experience level was 48.6 percent.