Bidding Behavior in Multi-unit Auctions
Bidding Behavior in Multi-unit Auctions

Author: Dirk Engelmann

Publisher:

Published: 2004

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with at demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. We also provide some theoretical insights concerning the equilibria of uniform-price auctions with incomplete information.

Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders
Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders

Author: Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

Publisher:

Published: 2008

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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Recent auction theory and experimental results document strategic demand reduction by bidders in uniform-price auctions. The present article extends this area of research to consider the effects of varying the number of bidders. Our theoretical model predicts that demand reduction should decrease with an increase in the number of bidders. Considerable demand reduction remains even in the asymptotic limit, although truthful bidding yields profits very close to those of equilibrium play. We experimentally confirm several of our predictions by examining bidding behavior of subjects in an actual marketplace, auctioning dozens of sportscards using both uniform-price and Vickrey auction formats.

Large-scale Multi-item Auctions
Large-scale Multi-item Auctions

Author: Sascha Michael Schweitzer

Publisher: KIT Scientific Publishing

Published: 2014-10-16

Total Pages: 212

ISBN-13: 3866449046

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This book presents two experimental studies that deal with the comparison of multi-item auction designs for two specific applications: the sale of 2.6 GHz radio spectrum rights in Europe, and the sale of emissions permits in Australia. In order to tackle the complexity of these experiments, a cognitively based toolkit is proposed, including modularized video instructions, comprehension tests, a learning platform, a graphical one-screen user interface, and comprehension-based group matching.

Experimental Comparisons of Auctions Under Single- and Multi-Unit Demand
Experimental Comparisons of Auctions Under Single- and Multi-Unit Demand

Author: P.M Alsemgeest

Publisher:

Published: 2009

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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An English clock auction and a sealed-bid auction with lowest accepted-bid pricing are studied in a controlled laboratory setting. Buyers bid for either a single unit or two units of the good. The sealed-bid auction generates more revenue than the English clock auction in both cases. The revenue from the English clock auction is lower in the two-unit demand environment than in the single-unit demand environment, due to strategic demand reduction on the part of bidders.

Essays on Multi-unit Auctions
Essays on Multi-unit Auctions

Author: Jinsoo Bae (Ph. D. in economics)

Publisher:

Published: 2020

Total Pages: 114

ISBN-13:

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Chapter 3 studies a pro-competitive effect of joint bidding in multi-unit uniform price auctions where bidders have private values and demand different quantities of units. I analyze a simple model with three identical items for sale, two small bidders each demanding a single unit, and a big bidder demanding two units. I show that joint bidding of the two small bidders, which recovers the symmetry of bidders, enhances competition among the bidders and increases efficiency and revenue of the auction.