A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk

A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk

Author: Viral V. Acharya

Publisher:

Published: 2015

Total Pages: 69

ISBN-13:

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We model a loop between sovereign and bank credit risk. A distressed financial sector induces government bailouts, whose cost leads to increased sovereign credit risk. Increased sovereign credit risk in turn weakens the financial sector by eroding the value of its government debt guarantees and bond holdings. Using credit default swaps (CDS) rates on European sovereigns and banks for 2007-11, we show that bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk. We document that post-bailout changes in sovereign CDS explain changes in bank CDS even after controlling for aggregate and bank-level determinants of credit spreads, confirming the sovereign-bank loop.


A?Pyrrhic Victory? - Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk

A?Pyrrhic Victory? - Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk

Author: Viral V. Acharya

Publisher:

Published: 2011

Total Pages:

ISBN-13:

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Abstract: We show that financial sector bailouts and sovereign credit risk are intimately linked. A bailout benefits the economy by ameliorating the under-investment problem of the financial sector. However, increasing taxation of the non-financial sector to fund the bailout may be inefficient since it weakens its incentive to invest, decreasing growth. Instead, the sovereign may choose to fund the bailout by diluting existing government bondholders, resulting in a deterioration of the sovereign's creditworthiness. This deterioration feeds back onto the financial sector, reducing the value of its guarantees and existing bond holdings and increasing its sensitivity to future sovereign shocks. We provide empirical evidence for this two-way feedback between financial and sovereign credit risk using data on the credit default swaps (CDS) of the Eurozone countries for 2007-10. We show that the announcement of financial sector bailouts was associated with an immediate, unprecedented widening of sovereign CDS spreads and narrowing of bank CDS spreads; however, post-bailouts there emerged a significant co-movement between bank CDS and sovereign CDS, even after controlling for banks' equity performance, the latter being consistent with an effect of the quality of sovereign guarantees on bank credit risk.


Sub-National Credit Risk and Sovereign Bailouts

Sub-National Credit Risk and Sovereign Bailouts

Author: Ms.Eva Jenkner

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2014-01-30

Total Pages: 29

ISBN-13: 1484398874

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Studies have shown that markets may underprice sub-national governments’ risk on the implicit assumption that these entities would be bailed out by their central government in case of financial difficulties. However, the question of whether sovereigns pay a premium on their own borrowing as a result of (implicitly or explicitly) guaranteeing sub-entities’ debt has been explored only little. We use an event study approach with separate equations for two levels of government to test for a simultaneous increase in sovereign risk premia and decrease in sub-national risk premia—or a de facto transfer of risk from the latter to the former—on the day a sovereign bailout is announced. Using daily financial market data for Spain and its autonomous regions from January 2010 to June 2013, we find support for our risk transfer hypothesis. We estimate that the Spanish sovereign’s spread may have increased by around 70 basis points as a result of the central government’s support for fiscally distressed comunidades autónomas.


Managing the Sovereign-Bank Nexus

Managing the Sovereign-Bank Nexus

Author: Mr.Giovanni Dell'Ariccia

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2018-09-07

Total Pages: 54

ISBN-13: 1484359623

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This paper reviews empirical and theoretical work on the links between banks and their governments (the bank-sovereign nexus). How significant is this nexus? What do we know about it? To what extent is it a source of concern? What is the role of policy intervention? The paper concludes with a review of recent policy proposals.


Bailouts

Bailouts

Author: Robert E. Wright

Publisher: Columbia University Press

Published: 2010-02-04

Total Pages: 161

ISBN-13: 0231521731

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Today's financial crisis is the result of dismal failures on the part of regulators, market analysts, and corporate executives. Yet the response of the American government has been to bail out the very institutions and individuals that have wrought such havoc upon the nation. Are such massive bailouts really called for? Can they succeed? Robert E. Wright and his colleagues provide an unbiased history of government bailouts and a frank assessment of their effectiveness. Their book recounts colonial America's struggle to rectify the first dangerous real estate bubble and the British government's counterproductive response. It explains how Alexander Hamilton allowed central banks and other lenders to bail out distressed but sound businesses without rewarding or encouraging the risky ones. And it shows how, in the second half of the twentieth century, governments began to bail out distressed companies, industries, and even entire economies in ways that subsidized risk takers while failing to reinvigorate the economy. By peering into the historical uses of public money to save private profit, this volume suggests better ways to control risk in the future. Additional Columbia / SSRC books on the privatization of risk and its implications for Americans: Health at Risk: America's Ailing Health System--and How to Heal ItEdited by Jacob S. Hacker Laid Off, Laid Low: Political and Economic Consequences of Employment InsecurityEdited by Katherine S. Newman Pensions, Social Security, and the Privatization of RiskEdited by Mitchell A. Orenstein


Sovereign Risk and Belief-Driven Fluctuations in the Euro Area

Sovereign Risk and Belief-Driven Fluctuations in the Euro Area

Author: Giancarlo Corsetti

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2013-11-06

Total Pages: 49

ISBN-13: 1475516800

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Sovereign risk premia in several euro area countries have risen markedly since 2008, driving up credit spreads in the private sector as well. We propose a New Keynesian model of a two-region monetary union that accounts for this “sovereign risk channel.” The model is calibrated to the euro area as of mid-2012. We show that a combination of sovereign risk in one region and strongly procyclical fiscal policy at the aggregate level exacerbates the risk of belief-driven deflationary downturns. The model provides an argument in favor of coordinated, asymmetric fiscal stances as a way to prevent selffulfilling debt crises.


Banks, Government Bonds, and Default

Banks, Government Bonds, and Default

Author: Nicola Gennaioli

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2014-07-08

Total Pages: 53

ISBN-13: 1498391990

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We analyze holdings of public bonds by over 20,000 banks in 191 countries, and the role of these bonds in 20 sovereign defaults over 1998-2012. Banks hold many public bonds (on average 9% of their assets), particularly in less financially-developed countries. During sovereign defaults, banks increase their exposure to public bonds, especially large banks and when expected bond returns are high. At the bank level, bondholdings correlate negatively with subsequent lending during sovereign defaults. This correlation is mostly due to bonds acquired in pre-default years. These findings shed light on alternative theories of the sovereign default-banking crisis nexus.


This Time Is Different

This Time Is Different

Author: Carmen M. Reinhart

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2011-08-07

Total Pages: 513

ISBN-13: 0691152640

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An empirical investigation of financial crises during the last 800 years.


Modeling Banking, Sovereign, and Macro Risk in a CCA Global VAR

Modeling Banking, Sovereign, and Macro Risk in a CCA Global VAR

Author: Mr.Dale F. Gray

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2013-10-23

Total Pages: 62

ISBN-13: 1484387201

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The purpose of this paper is to develop a model framework for the analysis of interactions between banking sector risk, sovereign risk, corporate sector risk, real economic activity, and credit growth for 15 European countries and the United States. It is an integrated macroeconomic systemic risk model framework that draws on the advantages of forward-looking contingent claims analysis (CCA) risk indicators for the banking systems in each country, forward-looking CCA risk indicators for sovereigns, and a GVAR model to combine the banking, the sovereign, and the macro sphere. The CCA indicators capture the nonlinearity of changes in bank assets, equity capital, credit spreads, and default probabilities. They capture the expected losses, spreads and default probability for sovereigns. Key to the framework is that sovereign credit spreads, banking system credit risk, corporate sector credit risk, economic growth, and credit variables are combined in a fully endogenous setting. Upon estimation and calibration of the global model, we simulate various negative and positive shock scenarios, particularly to bank and sovereign risk. The goal is to use this framework to analyze the impact and spillover of shocks and to help identify policies that would mitigate banking system, sovereign credit risk and recession risk—policies including bank capital increases, purchase of sovereign debt, and guarantees.


Sovereign Risk and Bank Risk-Taking

Sovereign Risk and Bank Risk-Taking

Author: Mr.Anil Ari

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2017-12-14

Total Pages: 72

ISBN-13: 148433356X

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I propose a dynamic general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and slow recovery from crises. When banks' investment decisions are not contractible, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a return on deposits according to their risk. This creates strategic complementarities and possibly multiple equilibria: in response to an increase in funding costs, banks may optimally choose to pursue risky portfolios that undermine their solvency prospects. In a bad equilibrium, high funding costs hinder the accumulation of bank net worth, leading to a persistent drop in investment and output. I bring the model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis, in the course of which under-capitalized banks in defaultrisky countries experienced an increase in funding costs and raised their holdings of domestic government debt. The model is quantified using Portuguese data and accounts for macroeconomic dynamics in Portugal in 2010-2016. Policy interventions face a trade-off between alleviating banks' funding conditions and strengthening risk-taking incentives. Liquidity provision to banks may eliminate the good equilibrium when not targeted. Targeted interventions have the capacity to eliminate adverse equilibria.