This study outlines a planning framework for cultivating multinational force compatibility (MFC) with armies that are not traditional allies. Such coalition partners are increasingly important to the Army in the post-9/11 security environment. Multilateral military operations are often now conducted by coalitions of the willing rather than by alliances, and many of these ad hoc coalitions include key contingents that have no history of sustained peacetime cooperation with the U.S. Army. The Army has only very limited resources available to enhance compatibility with non-allied partner armies, especially compared to the resources devoted to compatibility with traditional allies such as the United Kingdom. The challenge of enhancing compatibility and building partnership capacity with non-core partner armies therefore requires an innovative approach to planning.
Modern warfare is becoming increasingly defined by distance. Today, many Western and non-Western states have shied away from deploying large numbers of their own troops to battlefields. Instead, they have limited themselves to supporting the frontline fighting of local and regional actors against non-state armed forces through the provision of intelligence, training, equipment and airpower. This is remote warfare, the dominant method of military engagement now employed by many states. Despite the increasing prevalence of this distinct form of military engagement, it remains an understudied subject and considerable gaps exist in the academic understanding of it. Bringing together writers from various backgrounds, this edited volume offers a critical enquiry into the use of remote warfare.
The Air Force faces a challenging environment as it devises an approach to managing security cooperation with partner countries. The important mission of countering terrorist and insurgent groups abroad requires working closely with allies and partner countries to strengthen security. Accordingly, current U.S. defense strategy emphasizes that the U.S. armed forces should do more to work "by, with, and through partners" to accomplish missions.
Based on an analysis of security cooperation (SC) data and state fragility scores for 107 countries in 1991-2008, the report describes the correlation between provision of SC by the United States and a reduction in partner state fragility.
At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the United States is involved in two ongoing wars, faces a significant international terrorist threat, and is witnessing an escalation of international resistance to its leadership of the global world order. Looking out to 2025, many see the potential for a prolonged period of instability as a result of competing economic models, demographics, the rise of new international actors and the resurgence old ones, climate change, and the scarcity of resources. The range of stability challenges will stretch the capabilities of any military force structure and require innovative thinking on the part of policymakers and military professionals alike on the appropriate development and use of the military element of power. In this anthology, 16 students of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2008 offer their perspectives on the use of military power across the spectrum of conflict in the 21st century, short of or following general war, and provide insights into the necessary force structure, policy, strategy, and doctrinal approaches for future success. Beyond a focus on operations short of general war, these writings share in common a worthwhile idea or set of ideas that can materially contribute to how the U.S. military can best conduct full spectrum operations. Collectively, these essays reveal the innovative thinking and diversity and depth of thought of the U.S. and foreign military and civilian agency personnel that comprise each student body at the U.S. Army War College as they prepare themselves to become senior leaders and fulfill their roles in their militaries or agencies. This resource offers 16 students of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2008 perspectives and forecasts for the use of military power through year 2025. Scholars and policymakers, alike, may find these essays beneficial for long-term strategy planning. Related products: Navies and Soft Power: Historical Case Studies of Naval Power and the Nonuse of Military Force can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-046-00290-8 Lessons Encountered: Learning From the Long War can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00619-7 The Asia-Pacific Century: Challenges and Opportunities can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-070-00868-8 Other products produced by the U.S. Army, Strategic Studies Institute are available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/1609
It is often challenging to determine whether security cooperation activities conducted by the Defense Department have contributed to U.S. objectives. This monograph, based on themes that emerged from a May 2008 assessment workshop held at RAND, lays out a framework for security program assessment and stresses the need for injecting a greater level of objectivity into the assessment process.
Ongoing operations and emerging mission requirements place a heavy burden on Army resources, resulting in capability gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. One solution is to build the appropriate capabilities in allies and partner armies through focused security cooperation. To do this, Army planners need a more comprehensive understanding of the capability gaps and a process for matching those gaps with candidate partner armies.
RAND research identified practices and factors associated with success in security cooperation. A related diagnostic tool can help defense planners identify mismatches between funding, priorities, and propensity for success with a given country.
The authors describe possible regional security structures and bilateral U.S. relationships with Iraq and Afghanistan. They recommend that the United States offer a wide range of security cooperation activities to compatible future governments in Kabul and Baghdad but should also plan to hedge against less-favorable contingencies. They emphasize that the U.S. Air Force should expect to remain heavily tasked for the foreseeable future.
