The external sector assessments use a wide range of methods, including the External Balance Assessment (EBA) developed by the IMF’s Research Department to estimate desired current account balances and real exchange rates (see IMF Working Paper WP/13/272 for a complete description of the EBA methodology and Annex I of the 2015 External Sector Report for a discussion of more recent refinements). In all cases, the overall assessment is based on the judgment of IMF staff drawing on the inputs provided by these model estimates and other analysis. Since estimates are subject to uncertainty, overall assessments are presented in ranges. The external sector assessments are based on data and IMF staff projections as of June 15th, 2017. The external assessments discuss a broad range of external indicators: the current account, the real effective exchange rate, capital and financial accounts flows and measures, FX intervention and reserves and the foreign asset or liability position.[1] The individual economy assessments are discussed with the respective authorities as a part of bilateral surveillance.
Global current account imbalances were broadly unchanged in 2016, with minor shifts adding to the reconfiguration under way since 2013. The fall in commodity prices, uneven cyclical recoveries in systemic economies, and differences in policy responses contributed to the rotation of imbalances. Current account surpluses of oil-exporting economies, as a group, shifted from large surpluses to small deficits, while deficits in emerging and developing economies narrowed markedly. At the same time, surpluses and deficits in key advanced economies widened. These trends were generally supported by real exchange rate movements. Overall excess current account imbalances (i.e., deficits or surpluses that deviate from desirable levels) represented about one-third of total global imbalances in 2016, remaining broadly unchanged since 2013, although increasingly concentrated in advanced economies. In particular, excess imbalances narrowed in emerging and developing economies, led by a smaller excess surplus in China and smaller excess deficits in others (Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey). This narrowing, however, was accompanied by a widening of excess imbalances in some advanced economies. The persistence of large excess surpluses in several advanced economies (e.g. Germany, Korea, the Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden) remains a distinguishing feature of the constellation of imbalances, an issue that is explored in greater detail in this year’s report. Persistent global excess imbalances suggest that automatic adjustment mechanisms are weak. While the rotation of excess imbalances toward advanced economies—with deficits increasingly concentrated in the United States and United Kingdom—likely entails lower deficit-financing risks in the near term, the increased concentration of deficits in a few economies carries greater risks of disruptive trade policy actions. Diverging stock positions coupled with continued overreliance on demand from debtor countries could also pose risks to global growth and raise the likelihood of disruptive adjustments down the road. With nearly-closed output gaps in most systemic economies, addressing external imbalances in a growth-friendly fashion requires a recalibration of the policy mix in deficit and surplus economies alike. Excess deficit countries should move forward with fiscal consolidation, while gradually normalizing monetary policy in tandem with inflation developments. Excess surplus economies with fiscal space should reduce their reliance on easy monetary policy and allow for greater fiscal stimulus. Where monetary policy is constrained from playing a role, as in individual euro area members, fiscal and structural policies to facilitate relative price adjustments should take priority. Meanwhile, structural policies in excess surplus countries should focus on lifting distortions that constrain domestic demand or limit trade competition; while in excess deficit economies, policies should be directed to improving external competitiveness and overall saving. Protectionist and mercantilist policies should be avoided as they are detrimental to global growth.
The External Balance Assessment (EBA) methodology has been developed by the IMF’s Research Department as a successor to the CGER methodology for assessing current accounts and exchange rates in a multilaterally consistent manner. Compared to other approaches, EBA emphasizes distinguishing between the positive empirical analysis and the normative assessment of current accounts and exchange rates, and highlights the roles of policies and policy distortions. This paper provides a comprehensive description and discussion of the 2013 version (“2.0”) of the EBA methodology, including areas for its further development.
During the past financial year, the IMF’s 189 member countries faced a number of pressing challenges. IMF work on these challenges - slower trade, declining productivity, gender inequality, inclusive growth, and debt management - is a central focus of this 2017 Annual Report.
The external sector assessments use a wide range of methods, including the External Balance Assessment (EBA) developed by the IMF’s Research Department to estimate desired current account balances and real exchange rates (see Annex I of the 2015 External Sector Report, also IMF Working Paper WP/13/272 for a complete description of the EBA methodology). In all cases, the overall assessment is based on the judgment of IMF staff drawing on the inputs provided by these model estimates and other analysis and the estimates are subject to uncertainty. The assessments discuss a broad range of external indicators: the current account, the real effective exchange rate, capital and financial accounts flows and measures, FX intervention and reserves and the foreign asset or liability position. The individual economy assessments are discussed with the respective authorities as a part of bilateral surveillance.
The external sector assessments use a wide range of methods, including the External Balance Assessment developed by the IMF’s Research Department to estimate desired current account balances and real exchange rates (Boxes 6, 7 and Annex III of the Pilot Report describe the methodology and challenges). In all cases, the overall assessment is based on the judgment of IMF staff drawing on the inputs provided by these model estimates and other analysis and the estimates are subject to uncertainty. The assessments were initially based on the Spring 2013 WEO and an exchange rate reference period of the average of 2012. Potential policy responses are those which would work to reduce imbalances.
The External Sector Report presents a methodologically consistent assessment of the exchange rates, current accounts, reserves, capital flows, and external balance sheets of the world’s largest economies. The 2018 edition includes an analytical assessment of how trade costs and related policy barriers drive excess global imbalances.
A recovery is underway, but the economic fallout from the global pandemic could be with us for years to come. With the crisis exacerbating prepandemic vulnerabilities, country prospects are diverging. Nearly half of emerging market and developing economies and some middle-income countries are now at risk of falling further behind, undoing much of the progress made toward achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
China’s exchange rate regime has undergone gradual reform since the move away from a fixed exchange rate in 2005. The renminbi has become more flexible over time but is still carefully managed, and depth and liquidity in the onshore FX market is relatively low compared to other countries with de jure floating currencies. Allowing a greater role for market forces within the existing regime, and greater two-way flexibility of the exchange rate, are important steps to build on the progress already made. This should be complemented by further steps to develop the FX market, improve FX risk management, and modernize the monetary policy framework.
