With the 2011 TSR laying out a wide ranging agenda for surveillance reform, the 2014 review will take a more narrowly focused approach and be mindful of the need to make cost-neutral recommendations. The themes and associated outputs will cover areas that address the IMF’s core mandate of ensuring the stability of the international monetary system, provide the most value-added for the membership, and leverage the Fund’s comparative advantages. The review will be based on: (i) a review and analysis of Article IV reports and multilateral surveillance products; (ii) guidance from an External Advisory Group at key stages of the exercise; (iii) background studies; and (iv) surveys and interviews with country authorities, staff, and other stakeholders. A review of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) will be conducted separately but concurrently with the TSR, with close coordination between the relevant authoring teams. The TSR will also take into account the findings of other recent work, including the progress report on the implementation of the Financial Surveillance Strategy, the range of papers on debt issues, the LIC pilot on financial depth and macroeconomic policy, the set of Board papers on the experience with unconventional monetary policies and the challenges of exit from these policies, and the planned discussion of communication issues with the Executive Board.
A fascinating insight into the work of the WTO's Trade Policy Review Mechanism, this book examines its findings, its evolution, and proposed modifications, to conclude that it could, and should, do better.
The framework guiding the IMF’s communications—established by the Executive Board in 2007—has enabled the institution to respond flexibly to the changing global context. The framework is based on four guiding principles: (i) deepening understanding and support for the Fund’s role and policies; (ii) better integrating communications into the IMF’s daily operations; (iii) raising the impact of new communications materials and technologies; and (iv) rebalancing outreach efforts to take account of different audiences. In addition, greater emphasis has been placed on strengthening internal communications to help ensure institutional coherence in the Fund’s outreach activities. Continued efforts are needed to strengthen communications going forward. Several issues deserve particular attention. First, taking further steps to ensure clarity and consistency in communication in a world where demand for Fund services continues to rise. Second, doing more to assess the impact of IMF communications and thus better inform efforts going forward. Third, engaging strategically and prudently with new media—including social media.
This note provides country teams with guidance on bilateral and multilateral surveillance in the context of Article IV consultations. It covers the following issues: Focus on stability. Stability is the organizing principle of surveillance. Article IV consultations should focus on the conduct of economic and financial policies pursued by members to promote present and prospective domestic and balance of payments stability, as well as global economic and financial stability. For the latter, Article IV consultations should discuss spillovers from members’ economic and financial policies that may significantly affect global stability, including alternative policy options that would minimize their adverse impact. Operational guidance. The note provides detailed guidance, suggestions and references in areas covered in surveillance including risks and spillovers, fiscal policy, macrofinancial and monetary policy, BOP stability, structural policies and data issues. Communication and Engagement. Effective two-way communication is key to surveillance, including with the authorities (to help staff’s advice get traction), the Executive Board (to support effective peer review), and the public and other stakeholders (to gain support for necessary policy adjustments). Surveillance messages need to be clear, concise, and focused. The Fund needs to be evenhanded, in line with the principle of uniformity of treatment, for surveillance to command the confidence of the membership. Process and formal requirements. A number of procedures, rules, and requirements are summarized in this note.
The coverage of risks has become more systematic since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC): staff reports now regularly identify major risks and provide an assessment of their likelihood and economic impact, summarized in Risk Assessment Matrices (RAM). But still limited attention is paid to the range of possible outcomes. Also, risk identification is useful only so much as to inform policy design to preemptively respond to relevant risks and/or better prepare for them. In this regard, policy recommendations in surveillance could be richer in considering various risk management approaches. To this end, progress is needed on two dimensions: • Increasing emphasis on the range of potential outcomes to improve policy design. • Encouraging more proactive policy advice on how to manage risks. Efforts should continue to leverage internal and external resources to support risk analysis and advice in surveillance.
In response to the Global Financial Crisis, the IMF launched many initiatives to strengthen financial surveillance and better advise member countries of vulnerabilities and risks. While these initiatives have not yet been tested by a major crisis, the efforts have delivered a substantial upgrade of the Fund’s financial surveillance, including giving the IMF clearer responsibilities over financial sector stability and cross-country spillovers; making periodic financial stability assessments mandatory for jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors; invigorating efforts to integrate financial and macroeconomic analysis in bilateral and multilateral surveillance; enhancing cooperation with the Financial Stability Board and standard setting bodies to promote reforms and monitor agreed standards; and taking steps to recruit and train greater financial expertise. While recognizing these achievements, this evaluation finds that the quality and impact of the IMF’s financial surveillance has been uneven. The expansion of products and activities has presented the Fund with difficult trade-offs between bilateral and multilateral surveillance; between countries with systemically important financial sectors and other member countries; and between financial surveillance and other activities. Moreover, resource constraints have slowed the needed build-up of financial and macrofinancial expertise. These are critical issues, given the IMF’s position as the only international financial institution with the mandate and ability to conduct financial and macrofinancial surveillance over the full range of countries as well as the global economy, and given that these issues are at the core of the IMF’s responsibilities. Thus, to further strengthen financial surveillance, the evaluation recommends devoting greater resources to financial surveillance overall; further strengthening financial and macrofinancial analysis in Article IV surveillance; refining resource allocation for FSAPs; enhancing rigor and transparency in multilateral surveillance; intensifying efforts to be a global center of excellence on financial and macrofinancial research; and extending efforts to develop financial expertise among IMF staff.
Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) practice periodic surveillance of members to ensure that countries are adopting appropriate economic policies. Despite the importance of these procedures, they remain understudied by scholars. The global economic crisis has tested both organizations and brought surveillance to the forefront of policy debates. Understanding how surveillance works, then, contributes to both theoretical and policy concerns. The world is paying increasing attention to issues of transparency and accountability, questioning whether these organizations are in part responsible for the global economic crisis, as well as assessing their responsiveness to the crisis. This comparative analysis of surveillance at the IMF and WTO fills a significant gap in the existing literature, drawing together a large range of empirical data and offering an extended critical analysis of this key issue. Examining how and in what contexts surveillance is influential and how variations in institutional design shape the effectiveness of surveillance, Edwards moves on to offer recommendations of how surveillance can be designed differently to make it more effective in the future. This work will be of great interest to students and scholars of international organizations, international political economy and global governance.
This volume documents decisions, interpretations, and resolutions of the Executive Board and Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund, as well as documents relating to the United Nations and other international organizations.