"The book advances the radical proposition that the field in which architecture and philosophy operate includes linguistic and spatial practices. It develops innovative forms of interdisciplinary analyses to demonstrate that the philosophical positions put forth by Wittgenstein's two main works are literally unthinkable outside of their respective conceptions of space: the view from above in the early work and the view from within constructed by the later work."--BOOK JACKET.
Mysticism and Architecture: Wittgenstein and the Palais Stonborough is a multi-disciplinary study of the Viennese palais that the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein helped design and build for his sister shortly after he abandoned philosophy for more practical activities and during the period that supposedly separates his 'early' from his 'late' philosophy. Weaving together discussions of a number of social, political, and cultural developments that helped to give fin-de-si_cle Vienna its character -- including the late modernization of Austrian society, industry, and economy; the construction of Vienna's Ringstrasse; the slow decay of the Hapsburg monarchy; and the failure of Austrian liberalism; as well as Tolstoy's religiously-based ethical views; Adolf Loos's critique of architectural ornament; Karl Kraus's analysis of Vienna's decadence; Kierkegaard's and Nestroy's views on the importance of indirect communication; Otto Weininger's theory of the nature and duty of genius; Camillo Sitte and Otto Wagner's dispute over good urban form; Schopenhauer's aesthetic theories and his 'Eastern' philosophy of life; and Russell and Frege's philosophical and logical theories -- the book presents a philosophical biography of Wittgenstein reminiscent of, but substantially different from, Janik and Toulmin's Wittgenstein's Vienna. This philosophical biography underpins a new interpretation of the house which argues that the house belongs to neither architectural Modernism, nor Postmodernism, but is instead caught between those two movements. This analysis of the house, in turn, grounds a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophical works that emphasizes their mystical nature and practical purpose. Finally, this interpretation shows the unity of these works while simultaneously suggesting an underlying flaw; namely, that they arise from two fundamentally-opposed worldviews present in Vienna during Wittgenstein's youth, 'aesthetic modernism' and 'critical modernism.'
Wittgenstein's Mistress is a novel unlike anything David Markson or anyone else has ever written before. It is the story of a woman who is convinced and, astonishingly, will ultimately convince the reader as well that she is the only person left on earth.
Exploring the rupture between Wittgenstein's early and late phases, Michael Smith provides an original re-assessment of the metaphysical consistencies that exist throughout his divergent texts. Smith shows how Wittgenstein's criticism of metaphysics typically invoked the very thing he was seeking to erase. Taking an alternative approach to the inherent contradiction in his work, the 'problem of metaphysics', as Smith terms it, becomes the organizing principle of Wittgenstein's thought rather than something to overcome. This metaphysical thread enables further reflection on the poetic nature of Wittgenstein's philosophy as well as his preoccupation with ethics and aesthetics as important factors mostly absent from the secondary literature. The turn to aesthetics is crucial to a re-assessment of Wittgenstein's legacy, and is done in conjunction with an innovative analysis of Nietzsche's critique of Kantian aesthetics and Kant's 'judgments of taste'. The result is a unique discussion of the limits and possibilities of metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics and the task of the philosopher more generally.
Bringing together for the first time many of the finest published and unpublished papers by Ludwig Wittgenstein, this text illuminates his philosophy by placing it in its biographical, cultural and historical context.
Wittgenstein's Metaphysics offers a radical new interpretation of the fundamental ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It takes issue with the conventional view that after 1930 Wittgenstein rejected the philosophy of the Tractatus and developed a wholly new conception of philosophy. By tracing the evolution of Wittgenstein's ideas, Cook shows that they are neither as original nor as difficult as is often supposed. Wittgenstein was essentially an empiricist, and the difference between his early views (as set forth in the Tractatus) and the later views (as expounded in the Philosophical Investigations) lies chiefly in the fact that after 1930 he replaced his early version of reductionism with a subtler version. So he ended where he began, as an empiricist armed with a theory of meaning. This iconoclastic interpretation is sure to influence all future study of Wittgenstein and will provoke a reassessment of the nature of his contribution to philosophy.