Ludwig Wittgenstein once said: 'I am not a religious man, but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view.' This study, the last work of the distinguished philosopher Norman Malcolm, is a discussion of what Wittgenstein may have meant by this and its significance for philosophy. The book concludes with a critical discussion of Malcolm's essay by Peter Winch.
In the preface to his Philosophical Investigations Ludwig Wittgenstein expresses pessimism about the culture of his time and doubts as to whether his ideas would be understood in such a time: 'I make them public with doubtful feelings. It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one brain or another - but, of course, it is not likely'. In this book William James DeAngelis develops a deeper understanding of Wittgenstein's remark and argues that it is an expression of a significant cultural component in Wittgenstein's later thought which, while latent, is very much intended. DeAngelis focuses on the fascinating connection between Wittgenstein and Oswald Spengler and in particular the acknowledged influence of Spengler's Decline of the West. His book shows in meticulous detail how Spengler's dark conception of an ongoing cultural decline resonated deeply for Wittgenstein and influenced his later work. In so doing, the work takes into account discussions of these matters by major commentators such as Malcolm, Von Wright, Cavell, Winch, and Clack among others. A noteworthy feature of this book is its attempt to link Wittgenstein's cultural concerns with his views on religion and religious language. DeAngelis offers a fresh and original interpretation of the latter.
In Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy, Oskari Kuusela examines Wittgenstein's early and late philosophies of logic, situating their philosophical significance in early and middle analytic philosophy with particular reference to Frege, Russell, Carnap, and Strawson. He argues that not only the early but also the later Wittgenstein sought to further develop the logical-philosophical approaches of his contemporaries. Throughout his career Wittgenstein's aim was to resolve problems with and address the limitations of Frege's and Russell's accounts of logic and their logical methodologies so as to achieve the philosophical progress that originally motivated the logical-philosophical approach. By re-examining the roots and development of analytic philosophy, Kuusela seeks to open up covered up paths for the further development of analytic philosophy. Offering a novel interpretation of the philosopher, he explains how Wittgenstein extends logical methodology beyond calculus-based logical methods and how his novel account of the status of logic enables one to do justice to the complexity and richness of language use and thought while retaining rigour and ideals of logic such as simplicity and exactness. In addition, this volume outlines the new kind of non-empiricist naturalism developed in Wittgenstein's later work and explaining how his account of logic can be used to dissolve the long-standing methodological dispute between the ideal and ordinary language schools of analytic philosophy. It is of interest to scholars, researchers, and advance students of philosophy interested in engaging with a number of scholarly debates.
Frankfurt/M., Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien. Undoubtedly, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) is considered one of the most famous philosophers. In contrast to other 20th century philosophers, who arranged to have their complete works published while still alive or after their deaths, Wittgenstein's works are still incompletely published with only part of them being in print. He wasn't concerned with the issue of notoriety nor was he concerned with fame. However, his lectures and publications would very early be recognized by his Spanish colleagues and were reviewed as early as in 1933. This volume is designed to present new ideas and approaches to analysis to open up a new perspective in the reception of Wittgenstein's works. This volume of essays has a unity and bears throughout the imprint of Wittgenstein's powerful and original mind. The authors have published most of their contributions in international journals. They are willing to present their results to debate and would welcome constructive feedback. Contents: Jesus Padilla-Galvez: Introduction - Norberto Abreu/Silva Neto: Wittgenstein's Philosophy throughout the Corners of Brazil: Data for the Study of Its Reception - Axel Arturo Barcelo Aspeitia: Grammatical Necessity in Wittgenstein's Middle Period - Jesus Padilla-Galvez: Metamathematics Does Not Exist - Wittgenstein's Criticism of Metamathematics - Francisco Rodriguez-Consuegra: Wittgenstein and Russell on Propositions and Forms - Josep-Maria Terricabras: (Theology as Grammar) - Wittgenstein in Brackets - Alejandro Tomasini Bassols: Wittgensteinian Considerations about Time - Jesus Padilla-Galvez: Spanish Wittgenstein Bibliography (1986-2001).
The limit of language is one of the most pervasive notions found in Wittgenstein’s work, both in his early Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and his later writings. Moreover, the idea of a limit of language is intimately related to important scholarly debates on Wittgenstein’s philosophy, such as the debate between the so-called traditional and resolute interpretations, Wittgenstein’s stance on transcendental idealism, and the philosophical import of Wittgenstein’s latest work On Certainty. This collection includes thirteen original essays that provide a comprehensive overview of the various ways in which Wittgenstein appeals to the limit of language at different stages of his philosophical development. The essays connect the idea of a limit of language to the most important themes discussed by Wittgenstein—his conception of logic and grammar, the method of philosophy, the nature of the subject, and the foundations of knowledge—as well as his views on ethics, aesthetics, and religion. The essays also relate Wittgenstein’s thought to his contemporaries, including Carnap, Frege, Heidegger, Levinas, and Moore.
In this book, Rupert Read offers the first outline of a resolute reading, following the highly influential New Wittgenstein ‘school’, of the Philosophical Investigations. He argues that the key to understanding Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is to understand its liberatory purport. Read contends that a resolute reading coincides in its fundaments with what, building on ideas in the later Gordon Baker, he calls a liberatory reading. Liberatory philosophy is philosophy that can liberate the user from compulsive (and destructive) patterns of thought, freeing one for possibilities that were previously obscured. Such liberation is our prime goal in philosophy. This book consists in a sequential reading, along these lines, of what Read considers the most important and controversial passages in the Philosophical Investigations: 1, 16, 43, 95 & 116 & 122, 130–3, 149–151, 186, 198–201, 217, and 284–6. Read claims that this liberatory conception is simultaneously an ethical conception. The PI should be considered a work of ethics in that its central concern becomes our relation with others. Wittgensteinian liberations challenge widespread assumptions about how we allegedly are independent of and separate from others. Wittgenstein’s Liberatory Philosophy will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein, and to scholars of the political philosophy of liberation and the ethics of relation.
Wittgenstein once said, 'I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view'. However, since he never advocated any one religion many people have wondered just what this religious point of view could be. This book answers this question by clarifying the overall nature(s) of his philosophies (the early and the later) and then by exploring the idea of a religious point of view as an analogy for a philosophy. As a result, the author reveals the concordance between the later Wittgenstein and central aspects of Hebraic thought. Although perhaps this ought not to be surprising (Wittgenstein himself described his thought as 'one hundred per cent Hebraic'), the truth of the matter has been obscured by popular supposition that Wittgenstein was anti-Semitic.
Ludwig Wittgenstein changed everything. To understand how, we need to understand what he did to the subject of critical reasoning. Wittgenstein didn’t leave us “philosophy”; he left a pathway for a more perspicuous intellect. This was caused by a psychological condition that made him meticulous and hypersensitive. He could abnormally perceive three natural phenomena: (a) the social traits implicated in word use; (b) the task-functions signified in communication; and (c) the pictures that flash before the mind’s eye. With this unique acuity, he showed us how post-analytic thinking was to occur. And this discovery changes everything. It revolutionizes how we must argue with one another and what we believe is “true.” Instead of focusing primarily upon premises or facts, we must point people to how their intellect behaves during a speech act—something called “therapy.” And this has radical implications for analysis, conceptual investigation, value judgments, political ideology, ethics and even religion. This book is both an explanation of, and a blueprint for, the new critical thinking. Written for both a lay and special audience, and for all fields of study, it shows what Wittgenstein invented and how it affects us all.
Wittgenstein's notebooks included reflections on all kinds of topics alongside the more strictly philosophical work - on the nature of art, religion, culture, and the nature of philosophical activity.Culture and Value is a selection from these reflections. The new edition contains supplementary material which enhances the intelligibility of some of the entries in the original edition. It also includes all the variant versions to be found in the original manuscript sources (which are now given in detail). The original English translation has been extensively revised to suit the different editorial principles on which the revised edition has been produced.
