Whatever the casualties, the Battle of the Thukela Heights was, until the Second World War, arguably the biggest fought by the British in Africa, and until the Falklands war of 1982, the biggest battle fought by the British in the Southern Hemisphere. This battle paved the way for the development of new battle tactics, which were subsequently used in the great battles in Europe during the First World War.
The second Boer War is the most important war in South African history; indeed, without it, South Africa would likely have not existed. But itÕs also one of the least understood conflicts of the era. Over a century of Leftist bleating and insidious, self-serving revisionism, first by Afrikaner nationalists and then by the apartheid regime, has left the layman with a completely skewed view of the war. Incredibly, most people will tell you that the British attacked the Boers to steal their gold, and that when the clueless, red-jacketed Tommies advanced under orders of bumptious, incompetent British generals they were mowed down in their thousands. Others think of the conflict in terms of ÔBritain against South AfricaÕ and many believe that the Boers actually won the war; the marginally more enlightened explain away the Boer defeat by claiming it took millions of British troops to beat them, or that it was only the ÔgenocideÕ of the concentration camps which forced the plucky Boers to throw in the towel. Ê ItÕs all bosh. This book will take everything you thought you ÔknewÕ about the war and turn it on its head. From KrugerÕs expansionist dream of an Afrikaans empire Ôfrom the Zambesi to the CapeÕ, to the murder and devastation wrought on Natal by his invading commandos, to the savage massacres of thousands of blacks committed by the ÔgallantÕ bitter-einders, the reader will have his eyes opened to the brutal realities of the conflict, and be forced to reassess previously held notions of the rights and wrongs of the war. Hard-hitting and uncomfortable reading for those who do not want their bubble of ignorance burst, Kruger, Kommandos & Kak exposes that side of the Boer War which the apartheid propaganda machine didnÕt want you to know about.
In the following pages I have endeavoured to give a brief description of the various actions the names of which are emblazoned on the colours and appointments of the regiments in the British army. So far as I have been able, I have shown the part that each individual corps has played in every engagement, by appending to the account a return of the losses suffered. Unfortunately, in some cases casualty rolls are not obtainable; in others, owing to the returns having been hurriedly prepared, and later corrections neglected, the true losses of regiments do not appear. The whole question of the award of battle honours abounds in anomalies. Paltry skirmishes have been immortalized, and many gallant fights have been left unrecorded. In some cases certain corps have been singled out for honour; others which bore an equal share in the same day's doings have been denied the privilege of assuming the battle honour. In some campaigns every skirmish has been handed down to posterity; in others one word has covered long years of fighting. Mysore, with its one honour, and Persia, with four, are cases in point. In some instances honours have been refused on the plea that the headquarters of the regiment was not present in the action; in others the honour has been granted when but a single troop or company has shared in the fight. There are regiments whose colours bear the names of battles in which they did not lose a single man; others have suffered heavy losses in historic battles which are as yet unrecorded. At Schellenberg, for example, Marlborough's earliest victory, and one unaccountably absent from our colours, the losses of the fifteen regiments engaged exceeded the total casualties of the whole army in the campaign in Afghanistan from 1879 to 1881, for which no less than seven battle honours were granted. Esprit de corps is the keystone of the discipline of the British army, and the regimental colours are the living symbol of that esprit de corps. It is to their colours that men look as the emblems of their regimental history, and on those colours are—or should be—emblazoned the names of all historic battles in which the regiment has been engaged. A soldier knows—or ought to know—the history of his own regiment, but the moment arrives when his curiosity is piqued, and he wishes to learn something about a corps which has fought side by side with his own. Perchance curiosity may be excited as to the reason why Copenhagen appears on the appointments of the Rifle Brigade, and Arabia on the colours of the York and Lancaster; or how it comes about that Dominica is alone borne by the Cornwalls and Pondicherry by the Dublin Fusiliers. I have made no attempt to deal exhaustively with the subject; that would be beyond my powers and would open up too wide a field. I have therefore touched but lightly on those campaigns, such as the Peninsular and Waterloo, which are familiar to everyone in the least conversant with the history of his country, and have dwelt in more detail with those wars which are less well known. Memories are short. Already the South African War has been effaced by that titanic struggle between Russia and Japan. How, then, can the ordinary man be expected to carry in his mind even the rough outline of the Defence of Chitral, an episode which rivals Arcot in the heroism of its few defenders, or of Mangalore and Corygaum, which were in no way inferior in point of steadfast gallantry. When I read of the efforts made to insure the regular supply of jam during the South African War, my mind turns to Chitral, where the daily ration for six long weeks was one pound of flour a day, rice and meat being issued only on the doctors' orders, the one antiseptic available being carbolic tooth-powder! Or I think of Mangalore, which capitulated after Campbell had cut up his last horse and served out his last ration of flour. To be continue in this ebook...
After the unsuccessful Jameson Raid of 1896 the Kruger government realized how vulnerable the South African Republic was. Four forts were therefore built around Pretoria. For each fort a 155-mm gun was bought from the firm Schneider et Cie in Le Creusot, France. When the Anglo-Boer War erupted in 1899 these guns were taken from Pretoria to be used against the British at the sieges of Ladysmith, Mafeking and Kimberley. After the relief of these towns and especially after the Boers adopted guerrilla tactics, the Long Toms became a burden, because they could not easily be moved about. The result was that the Boers destroyed the Long Toms to prevent the guns being taken by the enemy. Several myths and legends about these four guns had their origin during the war. And, as is so typical with folklore, it is often difficult to distinguish between what is fact and what is fiction about the Long Toms, especially as accounts have come to us through the years by means of oral tradition. Were they really as formidable as the Boers made them out to be? Did they really outclass the British guns - in range as well as in accuracy and effectiveness? And what happened to them eventually? Why are there today no Long Toms to be seen anywhere? How did they disappear? Were they destroyed by the Boers themselves and, if not, what happened to them after the war? Is there, as rumor has it, one lying somewhere in a hidden kloof where it was dumped by the Boers - still waiting to be found? What happened to their remains? Why are the remains nowhere to be seen? Is there still a complete Long Tom somewhere in England?
