In March 2012, the government of Mali, one of the most touted symbols of Africa's democratic potential, fell in a military-executed coup. At the same time, a 4-decades old rebellion among Tuaregs seeking autonomy or independence reached new heights fueled by weapons from Libya and the belief that the Arab Spring could extend to northern Mali. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and their allies were quick to capitalize on the increasing chaos in a territory characterized by lack of government control and poverty and seized the major cities in the north. While French-led military intervention restored security to cities in the north, the underlying social, economic and political issues of the crisis remain.
In March 2012, the government of Mali, one of the most touted symbols of Africa's democratic potential, fell in a military-executed coup. At the same time, a 4-decades old rebellion among Tuaregs seeking autonomy or independence reached new heights fueled by weapons from Libya and the belief that the Arab Spring could extend to northern Mali. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and their allies were quick to capitalize on the increasing chaos in a territory characterized by lack of government control and poverty and seized the major cities in the north. While French-led military intervention restored security to cities in the north, the underlying social, economic and political issues of the crisis remain.
In March 2012, the government of Mali, one of the most touted symbols of Africa's democratic potential, fell in a military-executed coup. At the same time, a 4-decades old rebellion among Tuaregs seeking autonomy or independence reached new heights fueled by weapons from Libya and the belief that the Arab Spring could extend to northern Mali. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and their allies were quick to capitalize on the increasing chaos in a territory characterized by lack of government control and poverty and seized the major cities in the north. While French-led military intervention restored security to cities in the north, the underlying social, economic and political issues of the crisis remain.
In March 2012, the government of Mali, one of the most touted symbols of Africa's democratic potential fell in a military-executed coup. At the same time, a 4-decade-old rebellion among Tuaregs seeking autonomy or independence reached new heights, fueled by weapons from Muammar Gadaffi's fallen government and perhaps the belief that the Arab Spring could extend to northern Mali. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and their allies were quick to capitalize on the increasing chaos in a territory characterized by lack of government control and poverty and seized the major cities in the north. The imposition of a severe form of Islamic law and a growing food crisis sent the population fleeing south across Mali's international borders. The French-led military intervention, Operation SERVAL, ousted the militants from the main cities in the north, but did not address the crisis' underlying issues including the grievances that feed the Tuareg nationalist movement, the establishment of a civilianled government in Mali, and the near- and long-term threats to food security. The eruption of this crisis also demands a critical look at the Sahel's regional security framework, and the U.S. role in it.In Part I, Background to the Crisis, the author explores the deeper background to the crisis and sets it within Mali's historical and geographical context. Though it was a major world power in the Middle Ages the former Malian Empire had long lost its economic strength by the time the European countries colonized Africa. To control their territory, the French used military means to try to bring the pastoralists in the Sahel, such as the Tuareg, under control. Independent since 1960, Mali struggled to develop political institutions and achieve economic growth. After years of dictatorial rule, Mali transitioned to democracy in 1992. Despite considerable economic aid from the United States, it remained one of the poorest countries in the region. Indeed, the neighborhood, the Sahel zone that runs east to west through the continent, is a zone of poor, ungoverned spaces, sometimes referred to as the “arc of instability.”In Part II: The Crisis Unfolds, the author examines the recent events that created the volatile conditions leading to the crisis. The Tuareg nationalist movement has existed for over 40 years; there have been at least four periods of rebellion, and military force has been the primary response from the central government. Gadaffi had long been a supporter of the Tuareg, employing them in trusted positions within his military. The fall of his regime sent many Tuaregs home, laden with heavy weaponry, escalating the rebellion to new heights. Due to a steady expansion into the Sahel zone over the last decade, AQIM was well poised to capitalize on the anarchy and seize the north's major cities.The fall of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal to AQIM illustrates the need for a critical examination of the U.S.- led regional security framework, which is the focus of Part III: The Regional Security Framework in the Sahel. Numerous factors hindered the effectiveness of this framework, including the newness of the military partnerships with regional governments, their differing strategic level interests, and the wide range of capabilities among their armed forces. Building partner counterterrorism capability to meet the transnational al-Qaeda threat was the primary focus of the security framework through programs such as the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) and the Trans Sahel Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). However, it was ill-prepared for a complex crisis that included a largely secular nationalist rebellion, the overthrow of a civilian government by U.S.-trained soldiers, and a large-scale humanitarian crisis.
"This report examines Mali's counterterrorism requirements in light of recent evolutions in the country's security environment. In spite of the achievements of France, the United Nations, and the European Union, the terrorist threat in Mali is growing, but Mali's military remains largely ineffective. Part of the challenge is the interconnected nature of Mali's terrorist problem and the political strife that afflicts Mali's northern half, which the peace agreement signed in Algiers in June 2015 only somewhat addresses. Moreover, Bamako's response remains focused to an inappropriate degree on acquiring the military capabilities it hopes will help redress the balance of power in the North while leveraging proxy ethnic militias. These militias, though more effective on the battlefield than Mali's own forces, have the potential to further aggravate northern Mali's instability. The report argues that it is not possible to strengthen Mali's counterterrorism capabilities in isolation from its general military capabilities, which are in need of fundamental reforms. Such reforms should include making the armed forces more inclusive of minority groups and more attentive to relations with northern communities, improving the effectiveness and accountability of defense institutions, building human capital and leadership, and enhancing operational capabilities. In all cases, the United States must coordinate its efforts with the other actors on the ground in Mali, especially the French and the European Union, to ensure complementarity."--Publisher's web site.
This report examines the prospects for stabilization in Mali following the political and military crisis that began in 2012. To this end, it examines Mali’s peace settlements since the early 1990s to identify flaws and successes. The report also explores whether Mali’s neighbor Niger owes its current stability to a more favorable context, shrewd policies, or sheer luck, and whether it might offer a model of resilience for Mali.
The 2013 elections helped to restore constitutional order in Mali and marked the start of a period of hope for peace, stability and development. The challenge is now to respond to the Malian people's desire for improved governance. The new government must, therefore, strive to ensure equitable development, increase citizen participation, in particular women's political participation, while improving access to justice and promoting reconciliation.
Up to 2012, Mali was a poster child of African democracy, despite multiple signs of growing dissatisfaction with the democratic experiment. Then disaster struck, bringing many of the nation's unresolved contradictions to international attention. A military coup carved off the country's south. A revolt by a coalition of Tuareg and extremist Islamist forces shook the north. The events, so violent and unexpected, forced experts to reassess Mali's democratic institutions and the neoliberal economic reforms enacted in conjunction with the move toward democracy. Rosa De Jorio's detailed study of cultural heritage and its transformations provides a key to understanding the impasse that confronts Malian democracy. As she shows, postcolonial Mali privileged its cultural heritage to display itself on the regional and international scene. The neoliberal reforms both intensified and altered this trend. Profiling heritage sites ranging from statues of colonial leaders to women's museums to historic Timbuktu, De Jorio portrays how various actors have deployed and contested notions of heritage. These actors include not just Malian administrators and politicians but UNESCO, and non-state NGOs. She also delves into the intricacies of heritage politics from the perspective of Malian actors and groups, as producers and receivers--but always highly informed and critically engaged--of international, national and local cultural initiatives.
Mali, a country rich with history and culture, but one of the poorest in the world, emerged in the 1990s as one of Africa's most vibrant democracies. Strengthened by bold political and economic reforms at home, Mali has emerged as a leader in African peace keeping efforts. How has such a transition taken place? How have these changes built on Mali's rich heritage? These are the questions that the contributors to this volume have addressed. During the past twenty-five years, the scholarly research and applied development work of Michigan State University faculty and students in Mali represents the most significant combined, long-term, and continuing contribution of any group of university faculty in the United States or Europe to the study of Malian society, economy, and politics. The applied nature of much of this work has resulted in a significant number of working papers, reports, and conference presentations. This volume represents a coherent and connected set of essays from one American university with a widely known and highly respected role in African development. While the essays identify and review Mali's unique historical and contemporary path to democracy and development, they also contribute to the advancement of theoretical knowledge about African development.
