In this book, Joseph G. Morgan examines the career of Wesley Fishel, a political scientist who vigorously supported American intervention in the Vietnam War, which he deemed a "great, and tragic, American experiment.” Morgan demonstrates how Fishel continued to champion the prospect of an independent South Vietnam, even when Vietnamese resistance and infighting among American and Vietnamese leaders undermined this effort. Morgan also analyzes how opponents of the war questioned Fishel’s scholarly integrity and his academic collaboration with the US government in implementing Cold War policies.
Drawing on a wealth of new evidence from all sides, Triumph Forsaken, first published in 2007, overturns most of the historical orthodoxy on the Vietnam War. Through the analysis of international perceptions and power, it shows that South Vietnam was a vital interest of the United States. The book provides many insights into the overthrow of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 and demonstrates that the coup negated the South Vietnamese government's tremendous, and hitherto unappreciated, military and political gains between 1954 and 1963. After Diem's assassination, President Lyndon Johnson had at his disposal several aggressive policy options that could have enabled South Vietnam to continue the war without a massive US troop infusion, but he ruled out these options because of faulty assumptions and inadequate intelligence, making such an infusion the only means of saving the country.
Established in 1955 as a private advocacy group, the American Friends of Vietnam worked to influence U.S. attitudes and policies toward Vietnam for nearly two decades. AFV members wrote articles, gave speeches, sponsored aid drives, and forged ties with journalists, academics, and government officials in an effort to generate American assistance for South Vietnam. In The Vietnam Lobby, Joseph Morgan shifts the focus away from the much-examined antiwar demonstrations that took place in America to concentrate instead on the actions of those who endorsed U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Drawing on a wide range of documentary sources, Morgan presents a comprehensive study of the AFV and its activities. He traces the group's establishment and growth, examines its internal organization and politics, and, ultimately, evaluates its effectiveness in guiding government policy and public opinion. Morgan also assesses the charges of antiwar critics who claimed the AFV exerted an excessive, perhaps disastrous, influence in shaping America's Vietnam policy. Finally, he offers insights into the thinking of those who believed that the United States had the unique ability--even the obligation--to help shape Vietnam's future. Originally published in 1997. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.
In the annals of Vietnam War history, no figure has been more controversial than Ngo Dinh Diem. During the 1950s, U.S. leaders hailed Diem as “the miracle man of Southeast Asia” and funneled huge amounts of aid to his South Vietnamese government. But in 1963 Diem was ousted and assassinated in a coup endorsed by President John F. Kennedy. Diem’s alliance with Washington has long been seen as a Cold War relationship gone bad, undone either by American arrogance or by Diem’s stubbornness. In Misalliance, Edward Miller provides a convincing new explanation for Diem’s downfall and the larger tragedy of South Vietnam. For Diem and U.S. leaders, Miller argues, the alliance was more than just a joint effort to contain communism. It was also a means for each side to pursue its plans for nation building in South Vietnam. Miller’s definitive portrait of Diem—based on extensive research in Vietnamese, French, and American archives—demonstrates that the South Vietnamese leader was neither Washington’s pawn nor a tradition-bound mandarin. Rather, he was a shrewd and ruthless operator with his own vision for Vietnam’s modernization. In 1963, allied clashes over development and reform, combined with rising internal resistance to Diem’s nation building programs, fractured the alliance and changed the course of the Vietnam War. In depicting the rise and fall of the U.S.–Diem partnership, Misalliance shows how America’s fate in Vietnam was written not only on the battlefield but also in Washington’s dealings with its Vietnamese allies.
Introduction: building South Vietnam -- "The Virgin Mary is going south": refugee resettlement in South Vietnam -- Civil servants and cold warriors: technical assistance in public administration -- Sowing the seeds of discontent: American agricultural-development programs in South Vietnam -- Policing the insurgency: police administration and internal security in South Vietnam -- Teaching loyalty: Educational development and the strategic hamlet program -- Conclusion: "Ears of stone
This book demonstrates how colleges and universities have played a vital role during times of great crisis in American history, responding actively and helpfully to all the major challenges confronting their country. The colleges of the land became politicized repeatedly by such momentous developments as the American Revolution, the Civil War between the North and the South, the two vast global conflicts of the twentieth century, and America's controversial involvement in Southeast Asia. Campus life became intensely fractious during these difficult and turbulent periods. Violence sometimes accompanied the campus activism. While there were significant differences in the response of groups on the campuses - students and professors reacted differently, for example - to the crises of earlier times as compared to those in more recent years, there is an element of continuity. That thread of continuity from the Revolutionary era to Vietnam was the fact that time after time, the members of the academic communities sought to resolve the nation's crises constructively. They rallied to the cause of colonial rights and, ultimately, political independence. They supported the aims of their embattled sections, North and South. They sought to influence their nation's responses to the global crises of the twentieth century. And they campaigned to extricate the nation from an increasingly costly military entanglement in Southeast Asia. In all five of these tests of national purpose, the colleges and universities, while not the ultimate decision makers, helped shape the eventual patterns of America's response in an important way.
"Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century provides a good short course in the major popular revolutions of our century--in Russia, Mexico, China, Algeria, Cuba, and Viet Nam--not from the perspective of governments or parties or leaders, but from the perspective of the peasant peoples whose lives and ways of living were destroyed by the depredations of the imperial powers, including American imperial power."-New York Times Book Review "Eric Wolf's study of the six great peasant-based revolutions of the century demonstrates a mastery of his field and the methods required to negotiate it that evokes respect and admiration. In six crisp essays, and a brilliant conclusion, he extends our understanding of the nature of peasant reactions to social change appreciably by his skill in isolating and analyzing those factors, which, by a magnification of the anthropologist's techniques, can be shown to be crucial in linking local grievances and protest to larger movements of political transformation."--American Political Science Review "An intellectual tour de force."--Comparative Politics
In the brief biographical essays of The Human Tradition in America since 1945, students will meet a wide range of diverse individuals-both men and women, rich and poor, powerful and vulnerable-who represent key elements of post-World War II America.
America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam rethinks the motivations behind one of the most ruinous foreign-policy decisions of the postwar era: America’s commitment to preserve an independent South Vietnam under the premiership of Ngo Dinh Diem. The so-called Diem experiment is usually ascribed to U.S. anticommunism and an absence of other candidates for South Vietnam’s highest office. Challenging those explanations, Seth Jacobs utilizes religion and race as categories of analysis to argue that the alliance with Diem cannot be understood apart from America’s mid-century religious revival and policymakers’ perceptions of Asians. Jacobs contends that Diem’s Catholicism and the extent to which he violated American notions of “Oriental” passivity and moral laxity made him a more attractive ally to Washington than many non-Christian South Vietnamese with greater administrative experience and popular support. A diplomatic and cultural history, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam draws on government archives, presidential libraries, private papers, novels, newspapers, magazines, movies, and television and radio broadcasts. Jacobs shows in detail how, in the 1950s, U.S. policymakers conceived of Cold War anticommunism as a crusade in which Americans needed to combine with fellow Judeo-Christians against an adversary dangerous as much for its atheism as for its military might. He describes how racist assumptions that Asians were culturally unready for democratic self-government predisposed Americans to excuse Diem’s dictatorship as necessary in “the Orient.” By focusing attention on the role of American religious and racial ideologies, Jacobs makes a crucial contribution to our understanding of the disastrous commitment of the United States to “sink or swim with Ngo Dinh Diem.”
Now available in a completely revised and updated second edition,Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War is anaward-winning historiography of one of the 20thcentury’s seminal conflicts. Looks at many facets of Vietnam War, examining centralarguments of scholars, journalists, and participants and providingevidence on both sides of controversies around this event Addresses key debates about the Vietnam War, asking whether thewar was necessary for US security; whether President Kennedy wouldhave avoided the war had he lived beyond November 1963; whethernegotiation would have been a feasible alternative to war; andmore Assesses the lessons learned from this war, and how theselessons have affected American national security policy since Written by a well-respected scholar in the field in anaccessible style for students and scholars
