A compact, fully-illustrated guide to a strategic British victory that forced the French troops out of occupied Spain. Despite Wellington's success against Marmont's army at Salamanca in July, the year of 1812 ended in bitter disappointment for the British. However, a year later Wellington's series of brilliant manoeuvres threw the French onto the defensive on all fronts, culminating in the final victory at Vittoria: 90,000 men and 90 guns attacking in four mutually supporting columns. The French centre gave way and both flanks were turned, their army finally breaking in flight towards Pamplona. Any French hopes of maintaining their position in the Peninsular were crushed forever. On 7 October the British set foot on the 'sacred soil' of' Napoleon's France.
This book describes plans to defend Lisbon from invaders during the Peninsular War 1807-1814. Three different nations considered this challenge. First the French after their invasion of 1807. Second, the Portuguese after the French were ejected in 1808 and third, the British after the French were ejected in 1809.
When, in the late summer of 1813, Wellington's troops approached the Pyrenees to enter France, the Peninsular War was far from won. Indeed, with their French adversaries defending their own soil, months of severe, relentless fighting were to follow. In this compelling account of the closing period of the Peninsular War, Ian Robertson records the difficult and brutal fighting which so characterise this phase of a stubborn, six-year conflict. Drawing on eyewitness accounts and official despatches, Ian Robertson outlines the nature of the war as well as tracing the complicated manoeuvring and operations of the British and French armies. He describes in detail such hard-fought actions as at Sorauren, the Nivelle and the last great battle of the war at Toulouse, as well as some less-well-known clashes in the unforgiving terrain of the Pyrenees. For Wellington, as well as his men, the campaign in France was a test of stamina and endurance in hostile territory, and fighting an implacable and energetic foe. Wellington's troops fought hard to win their crown of victories and bring the war to a successful conclusion.
Europe was forged out of the ashes of the Napoleonic wars by means of a collective fight against revolutionary terror. The Allied Council created a culture of in- and exclusion, of people that were persecuted and those who were protected, using secret police, black lists, border controls and fortifications, and financed by European capital holders.
A dual biography of the greatest opposing generals of their age who ultimately became fixated on one another, by a bestselling historian. 'Thoroughly enjoyable, beautifully written and meticulously researched' Observer On the morning of the battle of Waterloo, the Emperor Napoleon declared that the Duke of Wellington was a bad general, the British were bad soldiers and that France could not fail to win an easy victory. Forever afterwards historians have accused him of gross overconfidence, and massively underestimating the calibre of the British commander opposed to him. Andrew Roberts presents an original, highly revisionist view of the relationship between the two greatest captains of their age. Napoleon, who was born in the same year as Wellington - 1769 - fought Wellington by proxy years earlier in the Peninsula War, praising his ruthlessness in private while publicly deriding him as a mere 'sepoy general'. In contrast, Wellington publicly lauded Napoleon, saying that his presence on a battlefield was worth forty thousand men, but privately wrote long memoranda lambasting Napoleon's campaigning techniques. Although Wellington saved Napoleon from execution after Waterloo, Napoleon left money in his will to the man who had tried to assassinate Wellington. Wellington in turn amassed a series of Napoleonic trophies of his great victory, even sleeping with two of the Emperor's mistresses.
Sir Arthur Wellesley's 1808–1814 campaigns against Napoleon's forces in the Iberian Peninsula have drawn the attention of scholars and soldiers for two centuries. Yet, until now, no study has focused on the problems that Wellesley, later known as the Duke of Wellington, encountered on the home front before his eventual triumph beyond the Pyrenees. In Wellington's Two-Front War, Joshua Moon not only surveys Wellington's command of British forces against the French but also describes the battles Wellington fought in England—with an archaic military command structure, bureaucracy, and fickle public opinion. In this detailed and accessible account, Moon traces Wellington's command of British forces during the six years of warfare against the French. Almost immediately upon landing in Portugal in 1808, Wellington was hampered by his government's struggle to plan a strategy for victory. From that point on, Moon argues, the military's outdated promotion system, political maneuvering, and bureaucratic inertia—all subject to public opinion and a hostile press—thwarted Wellington's efforts, almost costing him the victory. Drawing on archival sources in the United Kingdom and at the United States Military Academy, Moon goes well beyond detailing military operations to delve into the larger effects of domestic policies, bureaucracy, and coalition building on strategy. Ultimately, Moon shows, the second front of Wellington's "two-front war" was as difficult as the better-known struggle against Napoleon's troops and harsh conditions abroad. As this book demonstrates, it was only through strategic vision and relentless determination that Wellington attained the hard-fought victory. Moon's multifaceted examination of the commander and his frustrations offers valuable insight into the complexities of fighting faraway battles under the scrutiny at home of government agencies and the press—issues still relevant today.
“This is a well-researched, well-written, closely argued and fascinating contribution to the historiography of the Peninsular War.”—The Spectator In 1809 French armies controlled almost every province of Spain and only Wellington’s small force in Portugal stood between Napoleon and the conquest of Iberia. The French invaded Portugal in the summer of 1810, but found their way blocked by the most extensive field fortifications the world had ever seen—the Lines of Torres Vedras. Unable to penetrate the Lines, the French were driven back into Spain having suffered the heaviest defeat yet experienced by Napoleon’s armies. The retreat from Portugal marked the turning point in the Peninsular War and, from the security of the Lines, Wellington was able to mount the offensive campaigns that swept France’s Imperial armies back across the Pyrenees. The Lines of Torres Vedras is an authoritative account of the planning, construction and occupation of the Lines and of the battles, sieges and horrors of the French invasion. It is also an important study of Wellington’s strategy during the crucial years of the war against Napoleon. “Essential reading for every Peninsula enthusiast, this is recommended highly.”—Military Illustrated
Bayonne and Toulouse 1813–14 describes Wellington's invasion of France culminating in the battle of Toulouse in 1814. The news of Wellington's momentous victory at Vitoria on 21 June 1813 reached London in early July. Celebration spawned an expectation of a rapid conclusion to events in the Peninsula. His Majesty's Government gave authority for Wellington to invade France and made noises and plans for the redeployment of the Peninsular Army in support of Russia and Prussia. Wellington, however, did not see things in quite the same way. His army was worn out and there remained sizeable French forces in Spain, so what followed had to be a carefully thought out and planned campaign. The invasion itself commenced with the daring Allied crossing of the Bidassoa estuary in early October 1813 and was followed by an operational pause prior to the Battle of Nivelle in November. The subsequent operations, which commenced early in 1814, provided the aftermath to the invasion and the conclusion to the Peninsular War. These actions focus primarily on the investment of Bayonne and the pursuit of Soult's army east, and include the battles and engagements at Garris, Orthez, Aire, Tarbes and the final showdown at Toulouse in April 1814.
An historic account of the Peninsula War written by the man leading forces against the French, Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington. Though pressed many times to write about his battles and campaigns, the Duke of Wellington always replied that people should refer to his published dispatches. Yet Wellington did, in effect, write a history of the Peninsular War in the form of four lengthy memoranda, summarizing the conduct of the war in 1809, 1810, and 1811 respectively. These lengthy accounts demonstrate Wellington’s unmatched appreciation of the nature of the war in Spain and Portugal, and relate to the operations of the French and Spanish forces as well as the Anglo-Portuguese army under his command. Unlike personal diaries or journals written by individual soldiers, with their inevitably limited knowledge, Wellington was in an unparalleled position to provide a comprehensive overview of the war. Equally, the memoranda were written as the war unfolded, not tainted with the knowledge of hindsight, providing a unique contemporaneous commentary. Brought together by renowned historian Stuart Reid with reports and key dispatches from the other years of the campaign, the result is the story of the Peninsular War told through the writings of the man who knew and understood the conflict in Iberia better than any other. These memoranda and dispatches have never been published before in a single connected narrative. Therefore, Wellington’s History of the Peninsular War 1808-1814 offers a uniquely accessible perspective on the conflict in the own words of Britain’s greatest general.