In this book we have introduced the basics of the federal budget process, provided an historical background on the foundation and development of the budget process, indicated how defense spending may be measured and how it impacts the economy, described and analyzed how Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) operates and should function to produce the annual defense budget proposal to Congress, analyzed the role of Congress in debating and deciding on defense appropriations and the politics of the budgetary process including the use of supplemental appropriations to fund national defense, analyzed budget execution dynamics, identified the principal participants in the defense budget process in the Pentagon and military commands, assessed federal and Department of Defense (DoD) financial management and business process challenges and issues, and described the processes used to resource acquisition of defense war fighting assets, including reforms in acquisition and linkages between PPBES and the defense acquisition process.
DOD acquires new weapons for its warfighters through a management process known as the Defense Acquisition System. Chapter 1 contains GAOs 16th annual assessment of the Department of Defenses (DOD) $1.66 trillion portfolio of 86 major weapon systems acquisition programs. It examines changes in the portfolio since 2016, including DODs progress implementing acquisition reforms. The Department of Defense (DOD) faces mounting challenges in protecting its weapon systems from increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. Chapter 2 addresses (1) factors that contribute to the current state of DOD weapon systems cybersecurity, (2) vulnerabilities in weapons that are under development, and (3) steps DOD is taking to develop more cyber resilient weapon systems.
Americans spend more than $100 billion a year to buy weapons, but no one likes the process that brings these weapons into existence. The problem, McNaugher shows, is that the technical needs of engineers and military planners clash sharply with the political demands of Congress. McNaugher examines weapons procurement since World War II and shows how repeated efforts to improve weapons acquisition have instead increased the harmful intrusion of political pressures into that technical development and procurement process. Today's weapons are more complicated than their predecessors. So are the nation's military forces. The design of new systems and their integration into the force structure demand more care, time, and flexibility. Yet time and flexibility are precisely what political pressures remove from the acquisitions process. In a series of case studies and conceptual discussions, McNaugher tackles concerns at the heart of the debate about acquisition—the slow and heavily bureaucratic approach to development, the preference for ultimate weapons over well-organized and trained forces, and the counterproductive incentives facing the nation's defense firms. He calls for changes that run against the current fashion—less centralization or procurement, less haste in developing new weapons, and greater use of competition as a means of removing the development process from political oversight. Above all, McNaugher shows how the United States tries to buy research and development on the cheap, and how costly this has been. The nation can improve its acquisition process, he concludes, only when it recognizes the need to pay for the full exploration of new technology.
Center of Military History Publication 51-3-1. By J. Ronald Fox, et al. Discusses reform initiatives from 1960 to the present and concludes with prescriptions for future changes to the acquisition culture of the services, DoD, and industry.
“His collection of nine essays offers a comprehensive and insightful assessment of the Chinese defense science and technology (S&T).” —Pacific Affairs Among the most important issues in international security today are the nature and the global implications of China’s emergence as a world-class defense technology power. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Chinese defense industry has reinvented itself by emphasizing technological innovation and technology. This reinvention and its potential effects, both positive and negative, are attracting global scrutiny. Drawing insights from a range of disciplines, including history, social science, business, and strategic studies, Tai Ming Cheung and the contributors to Forging China’s Military Might develop an analytical framework to evaluate the nature, dimensions, and spectrum of Chinese innovation in the military and broader defense spheres. Forging China’s Military Might provides an overview of the current state of the Chinese defense industry and then focuses on subjects critical to understanding short- and long-term developments, including the relationship among defense contractors, regulators, and end-users; civil-military integration; China’s defense innovation system; and China’s place in the global defense economy. Case studies look in detail at the Chinese space and missile industry. “Constitutes high-quality, cutting-edge research on China’s defense industries. It should enjoy broad appeal—among academics, policy makers, security analysts, and business people in countries around the world.” —Andrew Scobell, RAND Corporation “Forging China’s Military Might belongs in any political science shelf interested in China’s issues and international security and considers the nature of China’s emergence as a world power.” —Midwest Book Review
Trillions for Military Technology explains why the weapons purchased by the U.S. Department of Defense cost so much, why it takes decades to get them into production even as innovation in the civilian economy becomes ever more frenetic, and why some of those weapons don't work very well despite expenditures of many billions of dollars. It also explains what do about these problems. The author argues that the internal politics of the armed services make weapons acquisition almost unmanageable. Solutions require empowering civilian officials and reforms that will bring choice of weapons "into the sunshine" of public debate.
" For the past 3 years, DOD has been implementing the Reform Act requirements which are aimed at helping weapon acquisition programs establish a solid foundation from the start. This helps to prevent cost growth, thus helping the Defense dollar go further. This is the third in a series of GAO reports on the Reform Act. GAO was asked to determine (1) DOD's progress in implementing Reform Act provisions; (2) the impact the Reform Act has had on specific acquisition programs; and (3) challenges remaining. To do this, GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from the four OSD offices created as a result of the Reform Act, other DOD offices, the military services, and 11 weapon acquisition programs we chose as case studies. Case study programs were selected based on their development status and interaction with the four OSD offices. Results cannot be generalized to all DOD weapon acquisition programs. "