The official U.S. Army account of Army performance in the Gulf War, Certain Victory was originally published by the Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, in 1993. Brig. Gen. Scales, who headed the Army's Desert Storm Study Project, offers a highly readable and abundantly illustrated chronicle.
The remarkable hardcover success of Triumph Without Victory was evidence of the public's need for a three-dimensional behind-the-scenes account of the Gulf War. Now this acclaimed work is available in trade paperback, published to coincide with the war's second anniversary. 15 maps.
"In Hollow Victory, iconoclastic defense analyst Jeffrey Record targets the conventional view of the Gulf War victory. In his characteristically provocative style, he answers controversial political, military, and strategic questions raised by the war and its aftermath, among them: Were the UN economic sanctions ever really given a chance to work? Could the war have been avoided altogether? Why were assessments of Iraqi strengths and weaknesses so inaccurate? How did the war's operational setting contribute to its outcome? Could a better general than Saddam Hussein have derailed Operation Desert Storm? What were the relative contributions of air, ground, and naval power? Did air power win the war? Were U.S. military planning and operations really free of meddling by civilian authorities? Did the U.S. armed services work together harmoniously?" "If you thought you understood what happened in Desert Storm, Hollow Victory will challenge your conclusions."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved
The Gulf Conflict provides the most authoritative and comprehensive account to date of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, its expulsion by a coalition of Western and Arab forces seven months later, and the aftermath of the war. Blending compelling narrative history with objective analysis, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh inquire into the fundamental issues underlying the dispute and probe the strategic calculations of all the participants.
In a provocative analysis written during the unfolding drama of 1992, Baudrillard draws on his concepts of simulation and the hyperreal to argue that the Gulf War did not take place but was a carefully scripted media event--a "virtual" war. Patton's introduction argues that Baudrillard, more than any other critic of the Gulf War, correctly identified the stakes involved in the gestation of the New World Order.
After a million deaths and twice that number injured, after the destruction of much of the infrastructure of Iran and Iraq, disruption of trade throughout the Gulf and the involvement of the USA and USSR, was the Gulf War a pointless exercise, a futile conflict which achieved nothing and left the combatants at the end of it all back in exactly the same position from which they started in 1980? In this book, first published in 1989, the authors argue that the lack of territorial gain was irrelevant: the real advantages won by each side were far more important, intangible though they were. For Iran, the channelling of the energies of her people away from domestic concerns meant the continuation of the Islamic revolution and ensured the stability of the mullahs. In Iraq, the war propped up the increasingly shaky regime of Saddam Hussein. The outside world, especially the superpowers, was terrified of the spread of Muslim fundamentalism, so made no effort to prevent Iraq from trying to halt this spread. But Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the oil states also had vested interests in promoting the continuation of the war.
When Saddam Hussein's Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, triggering the First Gulf War, a coalition of thirty-five countries led by the United States responded with Operation Desert Storm, which culminated in a one-hundred-hour coordinated air strike and ground assault that repelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Though largely forgotten in descriptions of the war, an eight-day barrage of artillery fire made this seemingly rapid offensive possible. At the forefront of this offensive were the brave field artillerymen known as "redlegs." In Desert Redleg: Artillery Warfare in the First Gulf War, a veteran and former redleg of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery (otherwise known as the "Big Red One"), Col. L. Scott Lingamfelter, recounts the logistical and strategic decisions that led to a coalition victory. Drawing on original battle maps, official reports, and personal journals, Lingamfelter describes the experience of the First Gulf War through a soldier's eyes and attempts to answer the question of whether the United States "got the job done" in its first sustained Middle Eastern conflict. Part military history, part personal memoir, this book provides a boots-on-the-ground perspective on the largest US artillery bombardment since World War II.
An incisive account of the Persian Gulf War, Storm Over Iraq shows how the success of Operation Desert Storm was the product of two decades of profound changes in the American approach to defense, military doctrine, and combat operations. The first detailed analysis of why the Gulf War could be fought the way it was, the book examines the planning and preparation for war. Richard P. Hallion argues that the ascendancy of precision air power in warfare—which fulfilled the promise that air power had held for more than seventy-five years—reflects the revolutionary adaptation of a war strategy that targets things rather than people, allowing one to control an opposing nation without destroying it.