This illustrated history covers the history of the U.S. Navy in the Middle East. America's interests in the Middle East, southwest Asia, and eastern Africa date almost to the founding of the nation. Since World War II, the Navy has been the first line of defense for these interests. From the establishment of the Middle East Force (MEF) in 1949 through the beginning of the 21st century, the U.S. Navy served as a force for stability and peace in the region.
The U.S. Navy is currently designing the next generation aircraft carrier, the CVN 21. This class of carriers will use the same basic hull form as the current Nimitz class but will include a substantial redesign of the interior of the ship for improved weapons handling and stores management functions. It will also incorporate several new technologies including a new propulsion system and new aircraft launch and recovery systems. These improvements not only will increase the operational capability of the ship but also are anticipated to lower the ship's manpower requirements and maintenance costs. Under current force modernization plans, new ships of the CVN 21 class will be introduced every four or five years as the ships of the Nimitz class reach the end of their planned 50-year operational life. Under this strategy, Nimitz class carriers will be operating for over 50 more years and it will take decades to transform the aircraft carrier fleet to ships of the new class.On the basis of some preliminary calculations that appeared promising, RAND proposed to the Program Executive Office (PEO) for Aircraft Carriers an examination of a way to accelerate the transformation of the carrier force: replacing Nimitz-class carriers as they reach mid-life instead of refueling them. In this report we identify specific fleet management options for building new instead of refueling, and we evaluate their advantages and disadvantages. This report should be of interest to Navy and Office of Secretary of Defense planners examining fleet modernization options, especially those organizations addressing the costs of alternative force structure options.
During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed thousands of 'nonstrategic' nuclear weapons that were intended to be used in support of troops in the field during a conflict. These included nuclear mines; artillery; short, medium, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range 'strategic' nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations. At the end of the 1980s, before the demise of the Soviet Union, each nation still had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft. In 1991, both the United States and Soviet Union announced that they would withdraw most and eliminate many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States now retains approximately 1,100 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with a few hundred deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the United States. Estimates vary, but experts believe Russia still has between 2,000 and 6,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The Bush Administration indicated that nuclear weapons remained essential to U.S. national security interests, but it did quietly redeploy and remove some of the nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. In addition, Russia has increased its reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security concept. Some analysts argue that Russia has backed away from its commitments from 1991 and may develop and deploy new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security of Russia's weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group; questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy, and the likelihood that either nation might use these weapons in a regional contingency with a non-nuclear nation; questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a continuing need for the United States to deploy these weapons at bases overseas; and questions about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy, particularly whether a U.S. policy that views these weapons as a militarily useful tool might encourage other nations to acquire their own nuclear weapons, or at least complicate U.S. policy to discourage such acquisition. Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter its policy. Others, however, argue that the United States should reduce its reliance on these weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have suggested that the United States and Russia expand efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of these weapons, possibly by negotiating an arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and allow for increased transparency in monitoring their deployment and elimination. Others have suggested that any potential new U.S.-Russian arms control treaty count both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This might encourage reductions or the elimination of these weapons. The 111th Congress may review some of these proposals.
Narrative summary of the USS CORAL SEA CV-42, CVA-43, CVB-43 and CV-43 history and a tour of duty of a young sailor serving as the Operations Departmental Yeoman onboard Cv-43 for 3-years (August 1977-February 1983) CONSTRUCTION to LAUNCHING and EARLY JET AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT (10 July 1944-2 April 1946).
An aircraft carrier adrift with a crew the size of a small town. A killer in their midst. And the disgraced Navy SEAL who must track him down . . . The high-octane debut thriller from New York Times bestselling writing team Webb & Mann—combat-decorated Navy SEAL Brandon Webb and award-winning author John David Mann. A BARRY AWARD NOMINEE • “Sensationally good—an instant classic, maybe an instant legend.”—Lee Child The moment Navy SEAL sniper Finn sets foot on the USS Abraham Lincolnto hitch a ride home from the Persian Gulf, it’s clear something is deeply wrong. Leadership is weak. Morale is low. And when crew members start disappearing one by one, what at first seems like a random string of suicides soon reveals something far more sinister: There’s a serial killer on board. Suspicion falls on Finn, the newcomer to the ship. After all, he’s being sent home in disgrace, recalled from the field under the dark cloud of a mission gone horribly wrong. He’s also a lone wolf, haunted by gaps in his memory and the elusive sense that something he missed may have contributed to civilian deaths on his last assignment. Finding the killer offers a chance at redemption . . . if he can stay alive long enough to prove it isn’t him. NAMED ONE OF THE BEST BOOKS OF THE YEAR BY PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
The manual describes the general strategy for the U.S. Marines but it is beneficial for not only every Marine to read but concepts on leadership can be gathered to lead a business to a family. If you want to see what make Marines so effective this book is a good place to start.
The U.S. Navy is ready to execute the Nation's tasks at sea, from prompt and sustained combat operations to every-day forward-presence, diplomacy and relief efforts. We operate worldwide, in space, cyberspace, and throughout the maritime domain. The United States is and will remain a maritime nation, and our security and prosperity are inextricably linked to our ability to operate naval forces on, under and above the seas and oceans of the world. To that end, the Navy executes programs that enable our Sailors, Marines, civilians, and forces to meet existing and emerging challenges at sea with confidence. Six priorities guide today's planning, programming, and budgeting decisions: (1) maintain a credible, modern, and survivable sea based strategic deterrent; (2) sustain forward presence, distributed globally in places that matter; (3) develop the capability and capacity to win decisively; (4) focus on critical afloat and ashore readiness to ensure the Navy is adequately funded and ready; (5) enhance the Navy's asymmetric capabilities in the physical domains as well as in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum; and (6) sustain a relevant industrial base, particularly in shipbuilding.
