This book analyses the foreign policy of the United States towards Cambodia by examining the belief system of the key players. It covers the invasion of Cambodia by the Vietnamese during the Carter administration, their occupation of Cambodia through both Reagan administrations and their eventual withdrawal during Bush's tenure. It concludes on the brink of the UN sponsored elections of 1993 and provides a short epilogue which brings the story up to 1997. As an examination of US foreign policy within decision-making elites it makes a contribution to decision-making theory and foreign policy analysis as well as providing insights into regional politics.
From the beginnings in 1870, American relations with Cambodia were rarely easy. In this abridged and updated version of his definitive history, Clymer examines the effects of U.S. interactions with Cambodia, tracing the disruptions that climaxed during the Vietnam War when U.S. planes bombed perceived enemy strongholds within Cambodia. The attacks led to Cambodia s involvement in the war and to civil war, from which the Khmer Rouge emerged victorious. Nearly one third of Cambodia s population died under the Khmer Rouge s genocidal rule. Clymer shows how diplomatic neglect, misperceptions, misunderstandings, and poorly conceived policies contributed to these tragic events. In the 1990s, the United States finally worked with the United Nations to broker the settlement of conflict in Cambodia.
A thoroughly revised, updated, and newly illustrated version of the Gaddis Smith called "the best book on the totality of the Carter presidency." The new edition includes more on the former president's foreign and environmental policies and expands coverage of the "personal" Carter as well as his wife Rosalyn's activist role during his administration.
Beginning with the restoration of diplomatic relations between the US and Cambodia in 1969, this book is the first to systematically explore the controversial issues and events surrounding the relationship between the two countries in the latter half of the 20th century. It traces how the secret bombing of Cambodia, the coup which overthrew Prince Sihanouk and the American invasion of Cambodia in 1970 led to a brutal civil war. Based on extensive archival research in the United States, Australia and Cambodia, this is the most comprehensive account of the United States' troubled relationship with Cambodia.
United States foreign policy toward Cambodia has been a disaster. Based on interviews with more than 100 public officials, evidence is presented that Washington created the Khmer Rouge, sustained the Khmer Rouge with more than $70 million in and nonlethal aid and more in military assistance--a Faustian Pact based on neorealist realpolitik strategy based on Cold War thinking even after the end of the Cold War. Under pressure nationally and internationally, Washington stopped supporting the Khmer Rouge and agreed to a peace agreement developed by Australia, France, and other countries. The first edition of the book provides a detailed description of exactly who and what happened, including a discussion of an alternative strategy--pluralist foreign policy based on the "Asian Way" of diplomacy. The second edition, written three decades later, demonstrates how American foreign policy tried to cultivate democracy in Cambodia but failed because China was able to provide more aid and investment--but with strings attached. The new Faustian pact binds Phnom Penh with Beijing. In both editions the alternative foreign policies are examined quantitatively by Options Analysis. In the first edition, the analysis demonstrates why calculations were so wrongheaded. The second edition evaluations options for current policymaking by Washington toward Cambodia, with surprising conclusions regarding how to promote democracy in a country that has been a one-party state that violates democratic norms and prefers the prosperity that China has brought despite the consequences of deterioration of the environment, new health problems, increased slumdwellers, and a debt that Phnom Penh may never repay to Beijing. Both editions provide a sobering account of the failure of American policy to achieve democratic goals.
American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam examines the influence of the belief in American exceptionalism on the history of U.S. foreign policy since the Vietnam War. Trevor B. McCrisken analyzes attempts by each post-Vietnam U.S. administration to revive the popular belief in exceptionalism both rhetorically and by pursuing foreign policy supposedly grounded in traditional American principles. He argues that exceptionalism consistently provided the framework for foreign policy discourse but that the conduct of foreign affairs was limited by the Vietnam syndrome.
This important study of the shifting diplomatic efforts around the response to and resolution of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia is based on the records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, a key player in the complex diplomacy in the region at the end of the Cold War. The study provides a detailed account of the policies and decision-making of Singapore, as well as the diplomatic maneuverings of the other major parties and powers involved in the Cambodia conflict. It details one member country's input into the process of defining and developing a collective ASEAN position, a process which was formative for future diplomatic efforts by the regional grouping. Ang makes use of a variety of sources contemporary to the period under study, as well as records which have become available post-1991. The use of detailed records from one of the Southeast Asian players is a first for the study of the region's diplomacy. The book describes Singapore's role and illustrate how Singapore's management of the Cambodian issue was shaped by the fundamentals of Singapore's foreign policy. The account also reveals the dynamics of intra-ASEAN relations, as well as ASEAN's foreign relations in the context of the Cambodia problem.
This volume deals with aspects of genocide in Rwanda and Cambodia that have been largely unexplored to date, including the impact of regional politics and the role played by social institutions in perpetrating genocide. Although the "story" of the Cambodian genocide of 1975-1979 and that of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 have been written about in detail, most have focused on how the genocides took place, what the ideas and motives were that led extremist factions to attempt to kill whole sections of their country's population, and who their victims were. This volume builds on our understanding of genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda by bringing new issues, sources, and approaches into focus. The chapters in this book are grouped so that a single theme is explored in both the Cambodian and Rwandan contexts; their ordering is designed to facilitate comparative analysis. The first three chapters emphasize the importance of political discourse in the genocidal process. Chapters 4 and 5 examine social institutions and explore their role in the genocidal process. Chapters 6 and 7 describe the military trajectories of the genocidal regimes in Cambodia and Rwanda after their overthrow, showing that genocide and genocidal intents as a political program do not cease the moment the massacres subside. The final chapters deal with private and public efforts to memorialize the genocides in the months and years following the killing. Drawing on ten years of genocide studies at Yale, this excellent anthology assembles high-quality new research from a variety of continents, disciplines, and languages. It will be an important addition to ongoing research on genocide.
