This book considers the common human predicament that we often choose an action other than the one we perceive to be best. Philosophers know this problem as akrasia. The author develops a nuanced understanding of the nature and causes of akrasia by integrating the best insights of Socrates, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas, and several contemporary philosophers.
A critical discussion of Aristotle's thoughts on moral weakness, or Akrasia, with a look at the contributions of other philosophers, such as, Socrates and Plato on this subject.
In thirteen original essays, eminent scholars of the history of philosophy and of contemporary philosophy examine weakness of will, or incontinence--the phenomenon of acting contrary to one's better judgment.
This text functions as a collection of primary source materials for researches and students of moral weakness. It is tailor-made for upper-division courses on Moral Weakness, Praise and Blame, Action Explanation, and other such topics. It can function as the text for Ethics, Moral Issues, Moral Decision, and other such topics. It can also function as a text for an Introduction to Philosophy, when augmented with other texts. In some contexts the text can stand-alone, but it functions especially well when augmented by secondary sources. By strategically pairing secondary texts with the primary texts, a professor can focus on different epochs, or selections, as personal taste directs. (From internet site "Linus Publications")
The question of why people act against their better judgment has always been prominent in philosophy. Risto Saarinen presents the first study of ideas about weakness of the will between 1350 and 1650. He shows how the understanding of human conduct and free will changed in this formative period between medieval times and modernity.
What does pleasure have to do with morality? What role, if any, should intuition have in the formation of moral theory? If something is ‘simulated’, can it be immoral? This accessible and wide-ranging textbook explores these questions and many more. Key ideas in the fields of normative ethics, metaethics and applied ethics are explained rigorously and systematically, with a vivid writing style that enlivens the topics with energy and wit. Individual theories are discussed in detail in the first part of the book, before these positions are applied to a wide range of contemporary situations including business ethics, sexual ethics, and the acceptability of eating animals. A wealth of real-life examples, set out with depth and care, illuminate the complexities of different ethical approaches while conveying their modern-day relevance. This concise and highly engaging resource is tailored to the Ethics components of AQA Philosophy and OCR Religious Studies, with a clear and practical layout that includes end-of-chapter summaries, key terms, and common mistakes to avoid. It should also be of practical use for those teaching Philosophy as part of the International Baccalaureate. Ethics for A-Level is of particular value to students and teachers, but Fisher and Dimmock’s precise and scholarly approach will appeal to anyone seeking a rigorous and lively introduction to the challenging subject of ethics. Tailored to the Ethics components of AQA Philosophy and OCR Religious Studies.
Presents the Nicomachean Ethics as a work of political philosophy, emphasizing the interplay between its practical political concerns and its underlying philosophic perspective and arguing that it is rhetorical in the precise Aristotelian meaning of the term.
Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. The also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. Because these questions cut across philosophy of mind and ethics, the collection will be essential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates in both these fields.
