Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations
Despite its good intentions, mismanagement and corruption plagued the UN's Oil-for-Food Program: More than 2,200 companies paid 1.8 billion in illegal surcharges and kickbacks to the Iraqi regime The UN Security Council stood by as the Iraqi regime outright smuggled about 8.4 billion of oil during the Program years in violation of UN sanctions The Iraqi regime steered oil contracts for political advantage by giving rights to buy oil to dozens of global political figures sympathetic to Iraq's goal to loosen or overturn the UN sanctions The Iraqi regime provided Benon Sevan, the UN's chief administrator of the Program, with rights to buy more than 7 million barrels of oil UN-related humanitarian agencies collected tens of millions of dollars for costs they never incurred, and some built factories in Iraq that weren't needed or that never worked at all. Even UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was tainted by it But the whole story has never been told in one place.
""In this sober and impressive study, Sponeck reminds us of the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907 that bar any penalty inflicted on people for actions for which they are not responsible...he demonstrates with care and precision that the UN Security Council...radically violated these minimal conditions of civilized behavior in their sanctions program directed against the tortured population of Iraq...It is necessary reading...And immensely sad"". - Noam Chomsky ""This is one of the most important books I can remember. Hans von Sponeck, one of the UN's most senior and respected officials, who resigned rather than carry out inhuman US Administration-driven policies against the ordinary people of Iraq, has blown the whistle on one of the greatest acts of aggression...you will understand the danger the world faces from an imperialist power."" - John Pilger H. C. von Sponeck, the former "UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq," explores the UN's sanction policies against Iraq, their consequences, and the domestic conditions during this period. His extensive research is based on previously unpublished internal UN documents and discussions with UN decision makers (such as General Secretary Kofi Annan), Iraqi officials and politicians (including Saddam Hussein), and ordinary Iraqis. The author's findings question who really benefited from the program, what role the UN Security Council and its various member states played, and whether there were then and are today alternatives to the UN's Iraq policies. H. C. von Sponeck worked for the United Nations for more than 30 years and in 1998 was appointed UN Assistant Secretary General. During his service he worked for the UN Development program in Ghana, Turkey, Botswana, Pakistan and India. Since his resignation he has served as a member of the board of trustees of various non-governmental organizations, as an adviser for multilateral issues, and as a consultant for personnel development in international organizations.
The economic sanctions imposed on Iraq from 1990 to 2003 were the most comprehensive and devastating of any established in the name of international governance. In a sharp indictment of U.S. policy, Gordon examines the key role the nation played in shaping the sanctions.
Since the end of the Cold War, economic sanctions have been a frequent instrument of UN authority. Based on more than 200 interviews with officials from both sides, this book aims to provide a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of UN sanctions in the 1990s.
Economic Sanctions are increasingly used as a legal, non-military technique of combating abusers of international peace. However it remains unclear how the success or failure of these sanctions is measured. This book examines the seldom-explored United Nations’ economic sanctions deliberation process and exposes systematic problems in the measurement of the success or failure of these sanctions. Centering on the key concepts of "peace and security," the author brings the reader’s attention to the discrepancies that exist in the process of decision-making, implementation, and evaluation of UN imposed economic sanctions. She engages international law and development methods to provide proof for the lack of consensus in measures of success and failure, which in turn suggests that sanction implementation on a uniform domestic front are unattainable. This thorough analysis concludes with suggestions for improving the sanctions process, only to clear the path for negating them as a whole and suggest alternative non-coercive measures for mitigating conflict situations and threats to peace and security.
The use of sanctions is increasing in the post-Cold War world. Along with this increase, the international community must ask itself whether sanctions 'work, ' in the sense that they incite citizens to change or overthrow an offending government, and whether sanctions are really less damaging than the alternative of war. Here for the first time, sanctions and humanitarian aid experts converge on these questions and consider the humanitarian impacts of sanctions along with their potential political benefits. The results show that often the most vulnerable members of targeted societies pay the price of sanctions, and that in addition, the international system is called upon to compensate the victims for the undeniable pain they have suffered. Well-chosen case studies of South Africa, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti illustrate how much pain the community of states is willing to inflict upon civilians in the quest for political gains. Together with an analytical framework and policy conclusions, this important book seeks to clarify the range of options and strategies to policymakers who impose sanctions and to humanitarian officials who operate in sanctioned environments