In the future, if the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control agendas are to advance, they will likely become increasingly seen as parallel undertakings with the objective of cradle-to-grave controls over nuclear warheads and/or materials. The pursuit of such an agenda was difficult enough at the outset of the nuclear age; it will be more difficult in the future with relatively wide-spread military and civil nuclear programs. This agenda will require both verification and transparency. To address emerging nuclear dangers, we may expect hybrid verification-transparency regimes to be seen as acceptable. Such regimes would have intrusive but much more limited verification provisions than Cold War accords, and have extensive transparency provisions designed in part to augment the verification measures, to fill in the ''gaps'' of the verification regime, and the like.
This book strives to take stock of current achievements and existing challenges in nuclear verification, identify the available information and gaps that can act as drivers for exploring new approaches to verification strategies and technologies. With the practical application of the systems concept to nuclear disarmament scenarios and other, non-nuclear verification fields, it investigates, where greater transparency and confidence could be achieved in pursuit of new national or international nonproliferation and arms reduction efforts. A final discussion looks at how, in the absence of formal government-to-government negotiations, experts can take practical steps to advance the technical development of these concepts.
Verification in an Age of Insecurity takes the reader into some of the most urgent arms control issues facing the world community, including the nuclear activities of rogue states and threats from sophisticated non-state actors. In the book, national security expert Philip D. O'Neill, Jr. identifies and addresses issues from the resuscitated disarmament agenda, from the comprehensive test ban to fissile material and biological weapons. O'Neill examines the need for shifts in verification standards and policy suitable for our volatile era and beyond it. He surveys recent history to show how established verification procedures fail to produce the certainty necessary to meet today's threats. Verification in an Age of Insecurity goes beyond a discussion of rogue states like North Korea to offer suggestions on how best to bring compliance policy up to date with modern threats.
The President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda is still evolving and the details of initiatives supporting it remain undefined. This means that DOE, NNSA, NA-20, NA-24 and the national laboratories can help define the agenda, and the policies and the initiatives to support it. This will require effective internal and interagency coordination. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda is broad and includes the path-breaking goal of creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for various elements of the agenda will be widely scattered across the interagency. Therefore an interagency mapping exercise should be performed to identify the key points of engagement within NNSA and other agencies for creating effective policy coordination mechanisms. These can include informal networks, working groups, coordinating committees, interagency task forces, etc. It will be important for NA-20 and NA-24 to get a seat at the table and a functional role in many of these coordinating bodies. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda comprises both mature and developing policy initiatives. The more mature elements such as CTBT ratification and a follow-on strategic nuclear arms treaty with Russia have defined milestones. However, recent press reports indicate that even the START follow-on strategic arms pact that is planned to be complete by the end of 2009 may take significantly longer and be more expansive in scope. The Russians called for proposals to count non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Other elements of the agenda such as FMCT, future bilateral nuclear arms reductions following a START follow-on treaty, nuclear posture changes, preparations for an international nuclear security summit, strengthened international safeguards and multilateral verification are in much earlier stages of development. For this reason any survey of arms control capabilities within the USG should be structured to address potential needs across the near-term (1-4) years and longer-term (5-10) years planning horizons. Some final observations include acknowledging the enduring nature of several key objectives on the Obama Administration's arms control and nonproliferation agenda. The CTBT, FMCT, bilateral nuclear arms reductions and strengthening the NPT have been sought by successive U.S. Administrations for nearly thirty years. Efforts towards negotiated arms control, although de-emphasized by the G.W. Bush Administration, have remained a pillar of U.S. national security strategy for decades and are likely to be of enduring if not increasing importance for decades to come. Therefore revitalization and expansion of USG capabilities in this area can be a positive legacy no matter what near-term arms control goals are achieved over the next four years. This is why it is important to reconstruct integrated bureaucratic, legislative, budgetary and diplomatic strategies to sustain the arms control and nonproliferation agenda. In this endeavor some past lessons must be taken to heart to avoid bureaucratic overkill and keep interagency policy-making and implementation structures lean and effective. On the Technical side a serious, sustained multilateral program to develop, down select and performance test nuclear weapons dismantlement verification technologies and procedures should be immediately initiated. In order to make this happen the United States and Russia should join with the UK and other interested states in creating a sustained, full-scale research and development program for verification at their respective nuc1ear weapons and defense establishments. The goals include development of effective technologies and procedures for: (1) Attribute measurement systems to certify nuclear warheads and military fissile materials; (2) Chain-of-custody methods to track items after they are authenticated and enter accountability; (3) Transportation monitoring; (4) Storage monitoring; (5) Fissile materials conversion verification. The remainder of this paper focuses on transparency and verification for nuclear arms and fissile material reductions.
The debate about appropriate purposes and policies for U.S. nuclear weapons has been under way since the beginning of the nuclear age. With the end of the Cold War, the debate has entered a new phase, propelled by the post-Cold War transformations of the international political landscape. This volumeâ€"based on an exhaustive reexamination of issues addressed in The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship (NRC, 1991)â€"describes the state to which U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and policies have evolved since the Cold War ended. The book evaluates a regime of progressive constraints for future U.S. nuclear weapons policy that includes further reductions in nuclear forces, changes in nuclear operations to preserve deterrence but enhance operational safety, and measures to help prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, it examines the conditions and means by which comprehensive nuclear disarmament could become feasible and desirable.
Ten expert contributors present a blueprint for actions future government leaders will need to guide policy making to reduce nuclear dangers. The authors identify the key technical, political, and diplomatic challenges associated with verifying, monitoring, and enforcing a world free of nuclear weapons and provide potential solutions to those challenges.
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report outlined the Administration's approach to promoting the agenda put forward by President Obama in Prague on April 5, 2009. The NPR calls for a national monitoring and verification R & D program to meet future challenges arising from the Administration's nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament agenda. Verification of a follow-on to New START could have to address warheads and possibly components along with delivery capabilities. Deeper cuts and disarmament would need to address all of these elements along with nuclear weapon testing, nuclear material and weapon production facilities, virtual capabilities from old weapon and existing energy programs and undeclared capabilities. We only know how to address some elements of these challenges today, and the requirements may be more rigorous in the context of deeper cuts as well as disarmament. Moreover, there is a critical need for multiple options to sensitive problems and to address other challenges. There will be other verification challenges in a world of deeper cuts and disarmament, some of which we are already facing. At some point, if the reductions process is progressing, uncertainties about past nuclear materials and weapons production will have to be addressed. IAEA safeguards will need to continue to evolve to meet current and future challenges, and to take advantage of new technologies and approaches. Transparency/verification of nuclear and dual-use exports will also have to be addressed, and there will be a need to make nonproliferation measures more watertight and transparent. In this context, and recognizing we will face all of these challenges even if disarmament is not achieved, this paper will explore possible agreements and arrangements; verification challenges; gaps in monitoring and verification technologies and approaches; and the R & D required to address these gaps and other monitoring and verification challenges.
This open access book examines key aspects of international cooperation to enhance nuclear safety, security, safeguards, and nonproliferation, thereby assisting in development and maintenance of the verification regime and fostering progress toward a nuclear weapon-free world. Current challenges are discussed and attempts made to identify possible solutions and future improvements, considering scientific developments that have the potential to increase the effectiveness of implementation of international regimes, particularly in critical areas, technology foresight, and the ongoing evaluation of current capabilities.
The contributors to this book describe, discuss, and evaluate the normative reframing brought about by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (the Ban Treaty), taking you on a journey through its genesis and negotiation history to the shape of the emerging global nuclear order. Adopted by the United Nations on 7 July 2017, the Ban Treaty came into effect on 22 January 2021. For advocates and supporters, weapons that were always immoral are now also illegal. To critics, it represents a profound threat to the stability of the existing global nuclear order with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as the normative anchor. As the most significant leap in nuclear disarmament in fifty years and a rare case study of successful state-civil society partnership in multilateral diplomacy, the Ban Treaty challenges the established order. The book’s contributors are leading experts on the Ban Treaty, including senior scholars, policymakers and civil society activists. A vital guide to the Ban Treaty for students of nuclear disarmament, arms control and diplomacy as well as for policymakers in those fields.
Organized by SIPRI, the Nobel Symposium on A Future Arms Control Agenda considered how arms control contributes to a cooperative security system based on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the gradual demilitarization of international relations. This book documents the proceedings, including comprehensive discussions of new elements of the post-Cold War global security system and objectives and limitations of arms control within that evolving system. Special attention is given to the changing roles and responsibilities of the major powers in arms control efforts.
