P.S. Atiyah is one of the leading contract theorists of the common law world. These previously published essays, all revised or rewritten for this edition, constitute a comprehensive account of Atiyah's thoughts on the theory and foundation of contractual liability over the last twenty years, and include the author's replies to criticisms previously made of his work.
Recent events in international financial markets have revived the scientific interest in conceivable institutional alternatives to prevailing monetary arrangements. In the essays reprinted in this book, the author critically examines some of the more influential arguments which have been made in favour of decentralization in banking.
A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
These essays carefully show that classic social-contract theory was an ancien regime genre. Far more than is commonly realized, the local horizon was built into Hobbes s and Locke s theories and the genre drew on the absolutism of Bodin and Grotius.
This book of essays champions tort scholarship that puts judges at centre stage: what they do, how they understand their role, the heterogeneous reasons they give for their decisions, and their constitutional responsibility to identify and articulate the 'living' and 'evolving' common law. This is 'reflexive tort scholarship'. Reflexive tort scholars seek dialogue with Bench and Bar. Their approach is very different from the currently fashionable academic search for 'grand theories' that descriptively assert that tort law is fundamentally 'all about one thing', a unifying idea that alone explains and justifies the whole of tort law. This book illustrates the advantages and pay-offs of the reflexive style of scholarship by showing how it illuminates key features of tort law. The first essay contrasts the reflexive approach with the Grand Theory approach, while the second essay identifies a principle of tort law (the 'cooperative principle'), that is latent in the cases and that vindicates the value of collaborative human arrangements. Identifying this principle calls into question, in disputes between commercial parties, the reasoning used to support one of the most entrenched lines of authority in tort law - that based on the famous case of Hedley Byrne v Heller. The final essay deploys the reflexive method to argue that the iconic 'but-for' test of factual causation is inadequate and narrower than the concept actually utilized in the cases. Application of the method also prompts a reassessment of the 'scope of duty' concept and of the appropriate characterisation of the much-discussed decision in SAAMCO. These essays, based on the 2018 Clarendon Law Lectures given at Oxford University, clearly demonstrate the value of scholarship that 'takes the judges seriously'.
This first volume in a three-volume exposition of Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics" explores a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. This is the first volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"--a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy. Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.
Promises and agreements are everywhere; we make, receive, keep, and break them on a daily basis. The quest to understand these social practices is integral to understanding ourselves as social creatures. The study of promises and agreements is enjoying a renaissance in many areas of social philosophy, including philosophy of language, action theory, normative ethics, value theory, and legal philosophy. This volume is the first collection of philosophical papers on promises and agreements, bringing together sixteen original self-standing contributions to the philosophical literature. The contributors highlight some of the more interesting aspects of the ubiquitous social phenomena of promises and agreements from different philosophical perspectives.
Changing Concepts of Contract is a prestigious collection of essays that re-examines the remarkable contributions of Ian Macneil to the study of contract law and contracting behaviour. Ian Macneil, who taught at Cornell University, the University of Virginia and, latterly, at Northwestern University, was the principal architect of relational contract theory, an approach that sought to direct attention to the context in which contracts are made. In this collection, nine leading UK contract law scholars re-consider Macneil's work and examine his theories in light of new social and technological circumstances. In doing so, they reveal relational contract theory to be a pertinent and insightful framework for the study and practice of the subject, one that presents a powerful challenge to the limits of orthodox contract law scholarship. In tandem with his academic life, Ian Macneil was also the 46th Chief of the Clan Macneil. Included in this volume is a Preface by his son Rory Macneil, the 47th Chief, who reflects on the influences on his father's thinking of those experiences outside academia. The collection also includes a Foreword by Stewart Macaulay, Malcolm Pitman Sharp Hilldale Professor Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and an Introduction by Jay M Feinman, Distinguished Professor of Law at Rutgers School of Law.
Part I. The Role of Consent: 1. Transatlantic perspectives: fundamental themes and debates Larry A. DiMatteo, Qi Zhou and Séverine Saintier 2. Competing theories of contract: an emerging consensus? Martin A. Hogg 3. Contracts, courts and the construction of consent Tom W. Joo 4. Are mortgage contracts promises? Curtis Bridgeman Part II. Normative Views of Contract: 5. Naturalistic contract Peter A. Alces 6. Contract in a networked world Roger Brownsword 7. Contract, transactions, and equity T.T. Arvind Part III. Contract Design and Good Faith: 8. Reasonability in contract design Nancy S. Kim 9. Managing change in uncertain times: relational view of good faith Zoe Ollerenshaw Part IV. Implied Terms and Interpretation: 10. Implied terms in English contract law Richard Austen-Baker 11. Contract interpretation: judicial rule, not party choice Juliet Kostritsky Part V. Policing Contracting Behavior: 12. The paradox of the French method of calculating the compensation of commercial agents and the importance of conceptualising the remedial scheme under Directive 86/653 Séverine Saintier 13. Unconscionability in American contract law Chuck Knapp 14. Unfair terms in comparative perspective: software contracts Jean Braucher 15. (D)CFR initiative and consumer unfair terms Mel Kenny Part VI. Misrepresentation, Breach and Remedies: 16. Remedies for misrepresentation: an integrated system David Capper 17. Re-examining damages for fraudulent misrepresentation James Devenney 18. Remedies for documentary breaches: English law and the CISG Djakhongir Saidov Part VII. Harmonizing Contract Law: 19. Harmonisation European contract law: default and mandatory rules Qi Zhou 20. Harmonization and its discontents: a critique of the transaction cost argument for a European contract law David Campbell and Roger Halson 21. Europeanisation of contract law and the proposed common European sales law Hector MacQueen 22. Harmonization of international sales law Larry A. DiMatteo.
