Three Essays on Institutional Investors

Three Essays on Institutional Investors

Author: Ligang Zhong

Publisher:

Published: 2012

Total Pages: 436

ISBN-13:

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In this dissertation, I investigate the impact of institutional investors on security prices and corporate policies, and offer a new perspective on the vital role that institutional investors play in the modern capital market. Specifically, on the impact on security price movements, I design a new measure of stock-level sentiment based on mutual fund publically disclosed portfolio information and provide a new dimension to better predict stock returns. A trading strategy based on the new sentiment metrics can generate an annualized alpha of 21.27%. The abnormal returns cannot be explained by the time-varying expected returns and transaction costs, and can be best explained by mutual fund overreactions. Hence, my findings can be interpreted as a new anomaly in a new era-when institutional investors are the marginal traders. On the impact on corporate policy side, I document two pieces of new empirical evidence on the importance of long-term institutional holdings: the entrenchment effect of long-term institutional holdings in the context of corporate financing decisions and the active monitoring role of long-term institutional investors in the context of international firms' accounting qualities. Combined with previous studies which favour a long-term institutional investor, the evidence on the cost side of long-term holding I document here can serve as the first call for an optimal investment horizon for firms operating in the U.S.


Three Essays on Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance

Three Essays on Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance

Author: Rasha Ashraf

Publisher:

Published: 2007

Total Pages:

ISBN-13:

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The first essay analyzes mutual funds' proxy voting records on shareholder proposals. The results indicate that mutual funds support shareholder proposals and vote against management for proposals that are likely to increase shareholders' wealth and rights, in firms with weaker external monitoring mechanisms, in firms with entrenched management, and when funds have longer investment horizon. Mutual funds mostly take management sides on executive compensation related proposals, when they have higher ownership concentration, and when they belong to bigger fund families. The results further indicate that there is a positive reputational effect for the funds undertaking a monitoring role. Moreover, mutual funds reduce holdings when they disapprove of managements' policy, but before doing so they take on an activist role by supporting shareholder proposals. The second essay investigates institutional investors' trading behavior of acquiring firm stocks surrounding merger activities. We label investment companies and independent investment advisors as active institutions and banks, nonbank trusts and insurance companies as passive institutions. We find active institutions increase holdings of acquiring firm stocks for mergers with higher wealth implications. However, active institutions overreact to stock mergers at the announcement, which they appear to correct at the resolution quarter of the merger. The trading behavior of passive institutions suggests that these institutions disregard the market response of merger announcement in trading acquiring firm stocks at the announcement quarter. The passive institutions gradually update their beliefs and trade on the basis of merger wealth effect at the resolution quarter. The third essay examines relation between executive compensation structure with the existing level and changes of takeover defense mechanisms of firms. According to "managerial entrenchment hypothesis," higher managerial power from adoption of takeover defense mechanisms would lead to generating higher rents for executives. "Efficient contracting hypothesis" argue that higher anti-takeover provisions would contribute in achieving efficient contracting by deferring compensation into the future due to the low possibility of hostile takeover. The results support managerial entrenchment hypothesis with regard to existing level of takeover defense mechanisms. With regard to changes in anti-takeover provisions, the existing level of managerial power influence the future pay structure.


The Behavior of Institutional Investors

The Behavior of Institutional Investors

Author: Alexander Pütz

Publisher:

Published: 2012

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9783832531898

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Institutional investors such as mutual funds and hedge funds play an important role in today's financial markets. This thesis consists of three essays which empirically study the behavior of active fund managers. In particular, the first essay investigates whether managers behave rationally or if some of them unconsciously make wrong investment decisions due to behavioral biases. The second essay examines whether some managers intentionally act to solely advance their own interests by strategically valuing the security positions in their portfolio. The third essay analyzes what the managers' education reveals about their investment behavior.


Essays in Institutional Investor Behavior

Essays in Institutional Investor Behavior

Author: Viktoriya Lantushenko

Publisher:

Published: 2016

Total Pages: 226

ISBN-13:

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This dissertation consists of one chapter studying mutual fund active management and two chapters examining institutional trading in various settings. The three essays in my dissertation explore institutional investor behavior. My first paper titled "Innovation in mutual fund portfolios: Implications for fund alpha" introduces a new measure of portfolio holdings that has power to explain future fund abnormal returns. This measure is defined as "return on portfolio innovation." It is constructed as the return on completely new portfolio positions that a fund has not held before. I evaluate the return on newly added positions because their performance can signal the quality of managerial effort. On average, a one-standard deviation increase in the return on innovation increases the Carhart (1997) four-factor fund alpha by approximately 0.34 to 0.52 percent per year. The results have important implications for fund performance and manager behavior. The second essay titled "Institutional property-type herding in real estate investment trusts," with Edward Nelling, explores whether institutional investors exhibit herding behavior by property type in real estate investment trusts (REITs). Our analysis of changes in institutional portfolio holdings suggests strong evidence of this behavior. We analyze the autocorrelation in aggregate institutional demand, and find that most of it is driven by institutional investor following the trades of others. Although momentum trading explains a small amount of this herding, institutional property type demand is more strongly associated with lagged institutional demand than lagged returns. The results suggest that correlated information signals drive herding in REITs. In addition, we examine the extent to which herding in REIT property types affects price performance in the private real estate market. We find that information transmission resulting from institutional herding in REITs occurs faster in public real estate markets than in private markets. The final essay titled "Investing in innovation: Evidence from institutional trading around patent publications," with Edward Nelling, examines institutional trading activity around patent publication dates. Unlike previous studies that use the future citations count to proxy for patent value, we measure the value of innovation by the three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around announcements. We find an increase in institutional demand for a firm's shares around patent announcements, and this increase is correlated with announcement returns. In addition, the increase in demand is greater when the firm's shareholder base consists of a higher percentage of long-term institutions. We find no correlation between patent announcement returns and the future number of citations. Patent announcements are also associated with increases in liquidity and analyst coverage, indicating that innovation may reduce information uncertainty between a firm and its investors. In addition, firms that announce patents outperform those in a control sample over a long-run. Overall, our results suggest that both investors and firms benefit from innovation.


Three Essays on Institutional Investment

Three Essays on Institutional Investment

Author: Nida Abdioglu

Publisher:

Published: 2012

Total Pages: 171

ISBN-13:

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This thesis investigates the investment preferences of institutional investors in the United States (US). In the second chapter, I analyse the impact of both firm and country-level determinants of foreign institutional investment. I find that the governance quality in a foreign institutional investor's (FII) home country is a determinant of their decision to invest in the US market. My findings indicate that investors who come from countries with governance setups similar to that of the US invest more in the United States. The investment levels though, are more pronounced for countries with governance setups just below that of the US. My results are consistent with both the 'flight to quality' and 'familiarity' arguments, and help reconcile prior contradictory empirical evidence. At the firm level, I present unequivocal evidence in favour of the familiarity argument. FII domiciled in countries with high governance quality prefer to invest in US firms with high corporate governance quality. In the third chapter, I investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on foreign institutional investment in the United States. I find that, post-SOX, FII increase their equity holdings in US listed firms. This result is mainly driven by passive, non-monitoring FII, who have the most to gain from the SOX-led reduction in firm information asymmetry, and the consequent reduction in the value of private information. The enactment of SOX appears to have changed the firm-level investment preferences of FII towards firms that would not be their traditional investment targets based on prudent man rules, e.g., smaller and riskier firms. In contrast to the extant literature, which mostly documents a negative SOX effect for the US markets, my chapter provides evidence of a positive SOX effect, namely the increase in foreign investment. In the fourth chapter, I examine the effect of SOX on the relation between firm innovation and institutional ownership. I find that US firms investing in innovation attract more institutional capital post-SOX. Prior literature highlights two SOX effects that could cause this result: a decreased level of information asymmetry (direct effect) and increased market liquidity (indirect effect). My findings support the direct effect, as I find that the positive relation between innovation and institutional ownership is driven by passive and dedicated institutional investors. A reduction in firms' information asymmetry is beneficial for these investors while they gain less from increased market liquidity. Overall, my results indicate that SOX is an important policy that has strengthened the institutional investor's support for firm innovation.