Bernard Salanié studies situations where competitive markets fail to achieve a collective optimum and the interventions used to remedy these so-called market failures. In this book Bernard Salanié studies situations where competitive markets fail to achieve a collective optimum and the interventions used to remedy these so-called market failures. He includes discussions of theories of collective decision making, as well as elementary models of public economics and industrial organization. Although public economics is traditionally defined as the positive and normative study of government action over the economy, Salanié confines himself to microeconomic aspects of welfare economics; he considers taxation and the effects of public spending only as potential remedies for market failures. He concludes with a discussion of the theory of general equilibrium in incomplete markets.
Assertions of market failure are usually based on Paul Samuelson's theory of public goods and externalities. This book both develops that theory and challenges the conclusion of many economists and policy-makers that market failures cannot be corrected by market forces. The volume includes major case studies of private provision of public goods. Among the goods considered are lighthouse services, education, municipal services, and environmental conservation.
A global wave of reform is fundamentally reshaping the role of the state in national economies. This book provides a fresh and accessible perspective on the political economy of this megatrend. It traces the theoretical roots of the reforms to developments in public economics which emphasize problems of government rather than market failure. It then breaks new ground in developing an economic theory of leadership to explain how policy leadership networks can strive to influence the direction of reform processes.
In this collection of provocative essays, Joseph Heath provides a compelling new framework for thinking about the moral obligations that private actors in a market economy have toward each other and to society. In a sharp break with traditional approaches to business ethics, Heath argues that the basic principles of corporate social responsibility are already implicit in the institutional norms that structure both marketplace competition and the modern business corporation. In four new and nine previously published essays, Heath articulates the foundations of a "market failures" approach to business ethics. Rather than bringing moral concerns to bear upon economic activity as a set of foreign or externally imposed constraints, this approach seeks to articulate a robust conception of business ethics derived solely from the basic normative justification for capitalism. The result is a unified theory of business ethics, corporate law, economic regulation, and the welfare state, which offers a reconstruction of the central normative preoccupations in each area that is consistent across all four domains. Beyond the core theory, Heath offers new insights on a wide range of topics in economics and philosophy, from agency theory and risk management to social cooperation and the transaction cost theory of the firm.
Provides a formal theory of nonmarket failure, analyzing such problems as redundant costs, monopoly, frequency of unanticipated externalities, and bureaucracy in such nonmarket institutions as foundations, universities, and government. A theory of market failures is well established in economics, but the same has not been true for the study of nonmarket failures. Markets or Governments remedies this situation by providing a formal theory of nonmarket failure, analyzing such problems as redundant costs, monopoly, frequency of unanticipated externalities, and bureaucracy in such nonmarket institutions as foundations, universities, and government. This new edition updates the data and results contained in the first edition and includes references and applications of the theory to the ongoing process of system transformation in Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe. The discussion of earlier literature that is relevant to the theory of nonmarket failure has been expanded.
After two generations of emphasis on governmental inefficiency and the need for deregulation, we now see growing interest in the possibility of constructive governance, alongside public calls for new, smarter regulation. Yet there is a real danger that regulatory reforms will be rooted in outdated ideas. As the financial crisis has shown, neither traditional market failure models nor public choice theory, by themselves, sufficiently inform or explain our current regulatory challenges. Regulatory studies, long neglected in an atmosphere focused on deregulatory work, is in critical need of new models and theories that can guide effective policy-making. This interdisciplinary volume points the way toward the modernization of regulatory theory. Its essays by leading scholars move past predominant approaches, integrating the latest research about the interplay between human behavior, societal needs, and regulatory institutions. The book concludes by setting out a potential research agenda for the social sciences.
(2) Do existing estimates of the no-regret potential stand up to are-evaluation within this framework? As a result of this analysis the size of previous estimates for no-regret potentials may be modified - in terms ofenergy savings or in financial terms. On the basis of these findings, we will approach the overriding third research question: (3) How large is the no-regret potential and what determines its size? The following chapter will provide a fuller account of the debate on no-regret potentials. This will be complemented by a detailed theory-based definition of no regret potentials in Chapter 2. The thesis will focus mostly on the micro-level of analysis. But we will also address the implications ofour findings for the analysis ofenergy saving measures and policies at more aggregate levels, notably within a feasibility study for adapting a model which represents the level of the national economy. The debate on no-regret potentials 1 origin, context, issues The term "no-regret potentials" was coined during the debate on climate change. It designates opportunities for the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions ". . . that are worth undertaking whether or not there are climate-related reasons for doing so. " (IPCC 1996, p. 271). In the IPCC's Third Assessment Report (TAR), no regret potentials are increasingly equated with GHG emission reduction potentials at negative (net) costs (lPCC 2001, p. 21).
How did we get to where we are? John Cassidy shows that the roots of our most recent financial failure lie not with individuals, but with an idea - the idea that markets are inherently rational. He gives us the big picture behind the financial headlines, tracing the rise and fall of free market ideology from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman and Alan Greenspan. Full of wit, sense and, above all, a deeper understanding, How Markets Fail argues for the end of 'utopian' economics, and the beginning of a pragmatic, reality-based way of thinking. A very good history of economic thought Economist How Markets Fail offers a brilliant intellectual framework . . . fine work New York Times An essential, grittily intellectual, yet compelling guide to the financial debacle of 2009 Geordie Greig, Evening Standard A powerful argument . . . Cassidy makes a compelling case that a return to hands-off economics would be a disaster BusinessWeek This book is a well constructed, thoughtful and cogent account of how capitalism evolved to its current form Telegraph Books of the Year recommendation John Cassidy ... describe[s] that mix of insight and madness that brought the world's system to its knees FT, Book of the Year recommendation Anyone who enjoys a good read can safely embark on this tour with Cassidy as their guide . . . Like his colleague Malcolm Gladwell [at the New Yorker], Cassidy is able to lead us with beguiling lucidity through unfamiliar territory New Statesman John Cassidy has covered economics and finance at The New Yorker magazine since 1995, writing on topics ranging from Alan Greenspan to the Iraqi oil industry and English journalism. He is also now a Contributing Editor at Portfolio where he writes the monthly Economics column. Two of his articles have been nominated for National Magazine Awards: an essay on Karl Marx, which appeared in October, 1997, and an account of the death of the British weapons scientist David Kelly, which was published in December, 2003. He has previously written for Sunday Times in as well as the New York Post, where he edited the Business section and then served as the deputy editor. In 2002, Cassidy published his first book, Dot.Con. He lives in New York.
When should government intervene in market activity? When is it best to let market forces simply take their natural course? How does existing empirical evidence about government performance inform those decisions? Brookings economist Clifford Winston uses these questions to frame a frank empirical assessment of government economic intervention in Government Failure vs.
This book offers a fresh perspective on the history of welfare economics in Britain, arguing that it needs to be considered alongside the movement toward a welfare state. It is argued that there were two competing approaches to welfare economics, associated with the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford, based on different philosophical foundations.
