Although much has been written on the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and the subsequent military action, this study provides fresh perspectives by reflecting the latest research from leading international authorities on the crisis. Drawing on recently released documents, including previously neglected aspects of Suez, and by reassessing its more familiar ones, the volume makes a key contribution to furthering research on, and understanding of, events in Egypt in 1956.
Experiencing a major crisis from different viewpoints, step by step. The Suez crisis of 1956—now little more than dim history for many people—offers a master class in statecraft. It was a potentially explosive Middle East confrontation capped by a surprise move that reshaped the region for years to come. It was a diplomatic crisis that riveted the world's attention. And it was a short but startling war that ended in unexpected ways for every country involved. Six countries, including two superpowers, had major roles, but each saw the situation differently. From one stage to the next, it could be hard to tell which state was really driving the action. As in any good ensemble, all the actors had pivotal parts to play. Like an illustration that uses an exploded view of an object to show how it works, this book uses an unprecedented design to deconstruct the Suez crisis. The story is broken down into three distinct phases. In each phase, the reader sees the issues as they were perceived by each country involved, taking into account different types of information and diverse characteristics of each leader and that leader's unique perspectives. Then, after each phase has been laid out, editorial observations invite the reader to consider the interplay. Developed by an unusual group of veteran policy practitioners and historians working as a team, Suez Deconstructed is not just a fresh way to understand the history of a major world crisis. Whether one's primary interest is statecraft or history, this study provides a fascinating step-by-step experience, repeatedly shifting from one viewpoint to another. At each stage, readers can gain rare experience in the way these very human leaders sized up their situations, defined and redefined their problems, improvised diplomatic or military solutions, sought ways to influence each other, and tried to change the course of history.
In October 1956, Britain, France and Israel launched an attack on Egypt. For each of the contenders there was much more at stake than the future of the Canal. None of the combatants in the Suez campaign emerged in glory which may be why, in recent years, it has been largely relegated to academic studies. But the events surrounding the invasion, while combining the high drama with elements of political farce that make for a compelling story, had a greater impact on world affairs than many more famous conflicts.
This is an analysis, based on newly available evidence, of the Suez crisis of 1956, its origins, and its consequences. The contributors are all leading authorities, and some, like Mordechai Bar-On, Robert Bowie and Adam Watson, were active participants in the events of the time.
This introduction to Suez covers the background to the crisis, the invasion, and its aftermath. The Suez-Crisis provides: * key documents, as primary sources, incorporated in the text * an extensive range of other source material, including images * analysis of the significance of the sources discussed, and their usefulness as historical evidence * commentary on the historical context of the crisis * an analysis of the wider implications of the crisis, particularly for Britain
In July 1956 Egyptian President Gamal Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, causing immediate concern to Britain and France. They already opposed Nasser and were worried at the threat to maritime traffic in the Canal. This book traces the course of subsequent events. Together with Israel, Britain and France hatched a plot to occupy the Canal Zone and overthrow Nasser. Israel attacked Sinai, and Britain and France launched offensives throughout Egypt, but strategic failures overshasdowed tactical success. Finally, Britain, France and Israel bowed to international pressure and withdrew, leaving the Suez Canal, and Egypt, firmly in the hands of President Nasser.
Delving into archival material from six countries, Laron offers a much deeper, nuanced perspective of the Suez Crisis. Origins of the Suez Crisis describes the long run-up to the 1956 Suez Crisis and the crisis itself by focusing on politics, economics, and foreign policy decisions in Egypt, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Based on Arabic source material, as well as multilingual documents from Israeli, Soviet, Czech, American, Indian, and British archives, this is the first historical narrative to discuss the interaction among all of the players involved—rather than simply British and U.S. perspectives. Guy Laron highlights the agency of smaller players and shows how they used Cold War rivalries to advance their own economic circumstances and, ultimately, their status in the global order. He argues that, for developing countries and the superpowers alike, more was at stake than U.S.-USSR one-upmanship; the question of Third World industrialization was seen as crucial to their economies.
In a bold reinterpretation of history, Ike's Gamble shows how the 1956 Suez Crisis taught President Eisenhower that Israel, not Egypt, would have to be America's ally in the region. In 1956 President Nasser of Egypt moved to take possession of the Suez Canal, bringing the Middle East to the brink of war. Distinguished Middle East expert Michael Doran shows how Nasser played the United States, invoking America's opposition to European colonialism to his own benefit. At the same time Nasser made weapons deals with the USSR and destabilized other Arab countries that the United States had been courting. In time, Eisenhower would realize that Nasser had duped him and that the Arab countries were too fractious to anchor America's interests in the Middle East. Affording deep insight into Eisenhower and his foreign policy, this fascinating and provocative history provides a rich new understanding of the tangled path by which the United States became the power broker in the Middle East. -- Back cover.
