The central thesis of this book is that the semantic conception is a logical methodologically and heuristically richer and more accurate account of scientific theorizing, and in particular of theorizing in evolutionary biology, than the more widely adhered to syntactic conception. In this book, the author outlines both the conceptions indicating the significant problems with the syntactic conception; explains and criticizes two influential syntactic-conception accounts of the structure of evolutionary theorizing. Thompson also argues that the semantic conception provides a richer and more accurate understanding than the syntactic conception of sociobiological explanation, of the testability of sociobiology, and of the role of culture and cognition in evolutionary explanations of human behavior.
The central thesis of this book is that the semantic conception is a logical methodologically and heuristically richer and more accurate account of scientific theorizing, and in particular of theorizing in evolutionary biology, than the more widely adhered to syntactic conception. In this book, the author outlines both the conceptions indicating the significant problems with the syntactic conception; explains and criticizes two influential syntactic-conception accounts of the structure of evolutionary theorizing. Thompson also argues that the semantic conception provides a richer and more accurate understanding than the syntactic conception of sociobiological explanation, of the testability of sociobiology, and of the role of culture and cognition in evolutionary explanations of human behavior.
The world’s most revered and eloquent interpreter of evolutionary ideas offers here a work of explanatory force unprecedented in our time—a landmark publication, both for its historical sweep and for its scientific vision. With characteristic attention to detail, Stephen Jay Gould first describes the content and discusses the history and origins of the three core commitments of classical Darwinism: that natural selection works on organisms, not genes or species; that it is almost exclusively the mechanism of adaptive evolutionary change; and that these changes are incremental, not drastic. Next, he examines the three critiques that currently challenge this classic Darwinian edifice: that selection operates on multiple levels, from the gene to the group; that evolution proceeds by a variety of mechanisms, not just natural selection; and that causes operating at broader scales, including catastrophes, have figured prominently in the course of evolution. Then, in a stunning tour de force that will likely stimulate discussion and debate for decades, Gould proposes his own system for integrating these classical commitments and contemporary critiques into a new structure of evolutionary thought. In 2001 the Library of Congress named Stephen Jay Gould one of America’s eighty-three Living Legends—people who embody the “quintessentially American ideal of individual creativity, conviction, dedication, and exuberance.” Each of these qualities finds full expression in this peerless work, the likes of which the scientific world has not seen—and may not see again—for well over a century.
Our brain is a fractal structure that can grow thanks to some genes that contain a code, a formula that generates this structure. The basis of evolutionary sociology is that our brain will prompt behavior that is to the benefit of the spreading of our genes. Although people are unaware of it, they generally behave in ways that optimize the reproduction of their genes. Because they need resources from their environment (in the broadest sense of the word), they will show behavior that is conducive to procuring or securing as many resources as possible. To accomplish this mis-sion, people, being social animals, work together. The older parts of our brain (older in an evolutionary sense) make cooperation possible by means of emotion. The younger parts make it possible to formulate rules that reflect these emotions. In other words, these rules derive from factual, biological mechanisms. People experience these rules as “normative,” and as “ethical,” but even so, these rules are products of evolution. We, that is our brains, formulate them because they help our genes to spread. This, in a nutshell, is the biological theory of law as described in this book. Although philosophers of law and even sociobiologists are reluctant to concur that norms can be justified by biological mechanisms, this is what it takes to make a major step forward in the integration of biology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and law.This book is a legalist's implicit answer to the ideas of Charles Darwin, Richard Dawkins, Richard Alexander, James Q. Wilson, Daniel Dennet, Matt Ridley, Frans de Waal, and other sociobiologists. By introducing fractals and important aspects of law, it further enhances our insights in human behavior. Free riders by heart use law to improve their reproduction, and thus feel happy.
Preface p. ix Chapter 1 Biology and Its Philosophy p. 2 1.1 The Rise of Logical Positivism p. 2 1.2 The Consequences for Philosophy p. 4 1.3 Problems of Falsifiability p. 6 1.4 Philosophy of Science Without Positivism p. 8 1.5 Speculation and Science p. 10 Introduction to the Literature p. 11 Chapter 2 Autonomy and Provincialism p. 13 2.1 Philosophical Agendas versus Biological Agendas p. 13 2.2 Motives for Provincialism and Autonomy p. 18 2.3 Biological Philosophies p. 21 2.4 Tertium Datur? p. 25 2.5 The Issues in Dispute p. 30 2.6 Steps in the Argument p. 34 Introduction to the Literature p. 35 Chapter 3 Teleology and the Roots of Autonomy p. 37 3.1 Functional Explanations in Molecular Biology p. 39 3.2 The Search for Functions p. 43 3.3 Functional Laws p. 47 3.4 Directively Organized Systems p. 52 3.5 The Autonomy of Teleological Laws p. 59 3.6 The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Functional Explanation p. 62 3.7 Functional Explanation Will Always Be with Us p. 65 Introduction to the Literature p. 67 Chapter 4 Reductionism and the Temptation of Provincialism p. 69 4.1 Motives for Reductionism p. 69 4.2 A Triumph of Reductionism p. 73 4.3 Reductionism and Recombinant DNA p. 84 4.4 Antireductionism and Molecular Genetics p. 88 4.5 Mendel's Genes and Benzer's Cistrons p. 93 4.6 Reduction Obstructed p. 97 4.7 Qualifying Reductionism p. 106 4.8 The Supervenience of Mendelian Genetics p. 11 4.9 Levels of Organization p. 117 Introduction to the Literature p. 119 Chapter 5 The Structure of Evolutionary Theory p. 121 5.1 Is There an Evolutionary Theory? p. 122 5.2 The Charge of Tautology p. 126 5.3 Population Genetics and Evolution p. 130 5.4 Williams's Axiomatization of Evolutionary Theory p. 136 5.5 Adequacy of the Axiomatization p. 144 Introduction to the Literature p. 152 Chapter 6 Fitness p. 154 6.1 Fitness Is Measured by Its Effects p. 154 6.2 Fitness As a Statistical Propensity p. 160 6.3 The Supervenience of Fitness p. 164 6.4 The Evidence for Evolution p. 169 6.5 The Scientific Context of Evolutionary Theory p. 174 Introduction to the Literature p. 179 Chapter 7 Species p. 180 7.1 Operationalism and Theory in Taxonomy p. 182 7.2 Essentialism--For and Against p. 187 7.3 The Biological Species Notion p. 191 7.4 Evolutionary and Ecological Species p. 197 7.5 Species Are Not Natural Kinds p. 201 7.6 Species As Individuals p. 204 7.7 The Theoretical Hierarchy of Biology p. 212 7.8 The Statistical Character of Evolutionary Theory p. 216 7.9 Universal Theories and Case Studies p. 219 Introduction to the Literature p. 225 Chapter 8 New Problems of Functionalism p. 226 8.1 Functionalism in Molecular Biology p. 228 8.2 The Panglossian Paradigm p. 235 8.3 Aptations, Exaptations, and Adaptations p. 243 8.4 Information and Action Among the Macromolecules p. 246 8.5 Metaphors and Molecules p. 255 Bibliography p. 266 Index p. 273.
Systems biology is a vigorous and expanding discipline, in many ways a successor to genomics and perhaps unprecedented in its combination of biology with a great many other sciences, from physics to ecology, from mathematics to medicine, and from philosophy to chemistry. Studying the philosophical foundations of systems biology may resolve a longer standing issue, i.e., the extent to which Biology is entitled to its own scientific foundations rather than being dominated by existing philosophies.* Answers the question of what distinguishes the living from the non-living* An in-depth look to a vigorous and expanding discipline, from molecule to system* Explores the region between individual components and the system
This volume, the third in this Springer series, contains selected papers from the four workshops organized by the ESF Research Networking Programme "The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective" (PSE) in 2010: Pluralism in the Foundations of Statistics Points of Contact between the Philosophy of Physics and the Philosophy of Biology The Debate on Mathematical Modeling in the Social Sciences Historical Debates about Logic, Probability and Statistics The volume is accordingly divided in four sections, each of them containing papers coming from the workshop focussing on one of these themes. While the programme's core topic for the year 2010 was probability and statistics, the organizers of the workshops embraced the opportunity of building bridges to more or less closely connected issues in general philosophy of science, philosophy of physics and philosophy of the special sciences. However, papers that analyze the concept of probability for various philosophical purposes are clearly a major theme in this volume, as it was in the previous volumes of the same series. This reflects the impressive productivity of probabilistic approaches in the philosophy of science, which form an important part of what has become known as formal epistemology - although, of course, there are non-probabilistic approaches in formal epistemology as well. It is probably fair to say that Europe has been particularly strong in this area of philosophy in recent years.
Is it possible to explain and predict the development of living things? What is development? Articulate answers to these seemingly innocuous questions are far from straightforward. To date, no systematic, targeted effort has been made to construct a unifying theory of development. This novel work offers a unique exploration of the foundations of ontogeny by asking how the development of living things should be understood. It explores the key concepts of developmental biology, asks whether general principles of development can be discovered, and examines the role of models and theories. The two editors (one a biologist with long interest in the theoretical aspects of his discipline, the other a philosopher of science who has mainly worked on biological systems) have assembled a team of leading contributors who are representative of the scientific and philosophical community within which a diversity of thoughts are growing, and out of which a theory of development may eventually emerge. They analyse a wealth of approaches to concepts, models and theories of development, such as gene regulatory networks, accounts based on systems biology and on physics of soft matter, the different articulations of evolution and development, symbiont-induced development, as well as the widely discussed concepts of positional information and morphogenetic field, the idea of a 'programme' of development and its critiques, and the long-standing opposition between preformationist and epigenetic conceptions of development. Towards a Theory of Development is primarily aimed at students and researchers in the fields of 'evo-devo', developmental biology, theoretical biology, systems biology, biophysics, and the philosophy of science.
