Since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has tried to restore its lost status, prestige, and influence in the global political arena. At the same time, internal political challenges and international events – such as the Arab Spring and the colour revolutions in former Soviet republics – have threatened the security and the national interests of the country. Taking these challenges and opportunities into account, The Russian Military Intervention in Syria examines Russia’s assertive foreign policy and its attempts to protect its geostrategic interests in the Middle East and former Soviet territory. Ohannes Geukjian analyzes the history of Russian military presence in the Middle East and the country’s growing frustration with American and Western policy, revealing the objectives behind Russia’s use of military power – namely, to maintain its regional influence in Eurasia and to enhance its status in the world. Geukjian provides a detailed examination of the Geneva and Astana peace processes, the geopolitical objectives of Turkey, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, and how disagreements between Russia and the United States over issues of regime change, global security, and armaments have negative implications for international conflict management. The Russian Military Intervention in Syria is an authoritative overview, based on a wide range of new and updated sources, providing a fresh interpretation and analysis of Russia’s foreign policy goals and Russian diplomacy in handling the Syrian conflict.
"Skillfully lays out Mr. Putin's approach to the Middle East." Wall Street Journal "Detailed and fascinating." Diplomatic Courier Putin intervened in Syria in September 2015, with international critics predicting that Russia would overextend itself and Barack Obama suggesting the country would find itself in a “quagmire” in Syria. Contrary to this, Anna Borshchevskaya argues that in fact Putin achieved significant key domestic and foreign policy objectives without crippling costs, and is well-positioned to direct Syria's future and become a leading power in the Middle East. This outcome has serious implications for Western foreign policy interests both in the Middle East and beyond. This book places Russian intervention in Syria in this broader context, exploring Putin's overall approach to the Middle East – historically Moscow has a special relationship with Damascus – and traces the political, diplomatic, military and domestic aspects of this intervention. Borshchevskaya delves into the Russian military campaign, public opinion within Russia, as well as Russian diplomatic tactics at the United Nations. Crucially, this book illustrates the impact of Western absence in Syria, particularly US absence, and what the role of the West is, and could be, in the Middle East.
In August 2015, the government of the Russian Federation embarked its military forces on an intervention in Syria. Ever since, there has been no end of discussion about Russian military capabilities and intentions - in Syria and beyond. To many, the performance of the Russian military - and especially the Russian Air-Space Force (VKS) - in this war was a clear demonstration of advanced technology, improved training, fearsome firepower, and great mobility. To others, the military operation only experienced limited success and exposed a number of weaknesses. Prominent amongst the latter were aircraft ill-suited to the necessities of expeditionary warfare, and a gross lack of advanced weaponry and equipment.While the military component of their intervention can only be described as having provided clear evidence that the Russian military was in no condition to directly challenge NATO's eastern frontiers, it cannot be denied that through this action Moscow effected a turning point in the Syrian Civil War, and indeed one on a geostrategic level. Organized and conducted in cooperation with very diverse allies - ranging from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran (IRGC), Hezbollah of Lebanon, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and a myriad of local warlords and their armed militias - through the combination of intentional bombardment of insurgent-controlled parts of Syria, and indirect protection for the IRGC's own military intervention in the country from a possible counter-intervention of the West, the Russians succeeded in saving the regime of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.Moscow's Game of Poker provides a unique overview and analysis of Moscow's political aims, strategy, doctrine, target selection process, military technology and tactics, day-by-day operations, and the way the Russian Federation cooperated with local allies. This story is told in combination with exclusive insight into the similar campaign run by what was left of the Syrian Arab Air Force.This revised edition of Moscow's Game of Poker includes over 130 full color photographs, maps and specially commissioned color artworks of vehicles, aircraft and combatants.
This book studies the impact of cultural factors on the course of military innovations. One would expect that countries accustomed to similar technologies would undergo analogous changes in their perception of and approach to warfare. However, the intellectual history of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in Russia, the US, and Israel indicates the opposite. The US developed technology and weaponry for about a decade without reconceptualizing the existing paradigm about the nature of warfare. Soviet 'new theory of victory' represented a conceptualization which chronologically preceded technological procurement. Israel was the first to utilize the weaponry on the battlefield, but was the last to develop a conceptual framework that acknowledged its revolutionary implications. Utilizing primary sources that had previously been completely inaccessible, and borrowing methods of analysis from political science, history, anthropology, and cognitive psychology, this book suggests a cultural explanation for this puzzling transformation in warfare. The Culture of Military Innovation offers a systematic, thorough, and unique analytical approach that may well be applicable in other perplexing strategic situations. Though framed in the context of specific historical experience, the insights of this book reveal important implications related to conventional, subconventional, and nonconventional security issues. It is therefore an ideal reference work for practitioners, scholars, teachers, and students of security studies.
This book offers insight into the motives behind Moscow’s behaviour in the Persian Gulf (with a specific focus on the GCC member states and Iran), considering Russia’s growing role in the Middle East and its desire to protect national interests using a wide range of means. The book explores the drivers and motivations of the Russian foreign policy in the Gulf region, thus, helping the audience to generate informed prognosis about Moscow’s moves in this area over the next years. In contrast to most studies of Russia’s presence in the region, this book considers the Russian involvement in the Gulf from two standpoints – the Russian and foreign. The idea of the book is to take several key problems of Moscow’s presence in the Gulf, each of these to be covered by two authors—Russian and non-Russian scholars, in order to offer the readers alternative visions of Moscow’s policies towards Iran and the GCC countries
The eyes of the world are on the Middle East. Today, more than ever, this deeply-troubled region is the focus of power games between major global players vying for international influence. Absent from this scene for the past quarter century, Russia is now back with gusto. Yet its motivations, decision-making processes and strategic objectives remain hard to pin down. So just what is Russia up to in the Middle East? In this hard-hitting essay, leading analyst of Russian affairs Dmitri Trenin cuts through the hyperbole to offer a clear and nuanced analysis of Russia's involvement in the Middle East and its regional and global ramifications. Russia, he argues, cannot and will not supplant the U.S. as the leading external power in the region, but its actions are accelerating changes which will fundamentally remake the international system in the next two decades.
The Syrian civil war, now in its seventh year, continues to present new challenges for U.S. policymakers. Following a deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria on April 4, 2017, and subsequent U.S. strikes against Syrian military infrastructure and pro-regime forces, Members of Congress have called on the President to consult with Congress about Syria strategy. Other Members have questioned the President's authority to launch strikes against Syria in the absence of specific prior authorization from Congress. In the past, some in Congress have expressed concern about the international and domestic authorizations for such strikes, their potential unintended consequences, and the possibility of undesirable or unavoidable escalation. Since taking office in January 2017, President Trump has stated his intention to "destroy" the Syria- and Iraq-based insurgent terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh), and the President has ordered actions to "accelerate" U.S. military efforts against the group in both countries. In late March, senior U.S. officials signaled that the United States would prioritize the fight against the Islamic State and said that Syrian President Bashar al Asad's future would be determined by the Syrian people. Nevertheless, following the April 4 attack, President Trump and senior members of his Administration have spoken more critically of Asad's leadership, and it remains to be seen whether the United States will more directly seek to compel Asad's departure from power while pursuing the ongoing campaign against the Islamic State. Since late 2015, Asad and his government have leveraged military, financial, and diplomatic support from Russia and Iran to improve and consolidate their position relative to the range of antigovernment insurgents arrayed against them. These insurgents include members of the Islamic State, Islamist and secular fighters, and Al Qaeda-linked networks. While Islamic State forces have lost territory to the Syrian government, to Turkey-backed Syrian opposition groups, and to U.S.-backed Syrian Kurdish and Arab fighters since early 2016, they remain capable and dangerous. The IS "capital" at Raqqah has been isolated, but large areas of central and eastern Syria remain under the group's control. The presence and activities of Russian military forces and Iranian personnel in Syria create complications for U.S. officials and military planners, and raise the prospect of inadvertent confrontation with possible regional or global implications. Since March 2011, the conflict has driven more than 5 million Syrians into neighboring countries as refugees (out of a total prewar population of more than 22 million). More than 6.3 million other Syrians are internally displaced and are among more than 13.5 million Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance. The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to the Syria crisis (which includes assistance to neighboring countries hosting refugees), and since FY2012 has allocated more than $6.5 billion to meet humanitarian needs. In addition, the United States has allocated more than $500 million to date for bilateral assistance programs in Syria, including the provision of nonlethal equipment to select opposition groups. President Trump has requested $191.5 million in FY2018 funding for such assistance and $500 million in FY2018 defense funds to train and equip anti-IS forces in Syria. U.S. officials and Members of Congress continue to debate how best to pursue U.S. regional security and counterterrorism goals in Syria without inadvertently strengthening U.S. adversaries or alienating U.S. partners. The Trump Administration and Members of the 115th Congress-like their predecessors-face challenges inherent to the simultaneous pursuit of U.S. nonproliferation, counterterrorism, civilian protection, and stabilization goals in a complex, evolving conflict.
Moscow's use of its military abroad in recent years has radically reshaped perceptions of Russia as an international actor. With the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the invasion of eastern Ukraine and sustainment of an insurgency there, and (in particular) the 2015 intervention in Syria, Russia repeatedly surprised U.S. policymakers with its willingness and ability to use its military to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Despite Russia's relatively small global economic footprint, it has engaged in more interventions than any other U.S. competitor since the end of the Cold War. In this report, the authors assess when, where, and why Russia conducts military interventions by analyzing the 25 interventions that Russia has undertaken since 1991, including detailed case studies of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War and Moscow's involvement in the ongoing Syrian civil war. The authors suggest that Russia is most likely to intervene to prevent erosion of its influence in its neighborhood, particularly following a shock that portends such an erosion occurring rapidly. If there were to be a regime change in a core Russian regional ally, such as Belarus or Armenia, that brought to power a government hostile to Moscow's interests, it is possible (if not likely) that a military intervention could ensue.
