Data from the notebooks and diaries of the Nazi commander reveal his brilliant business skills, rivalries with Speer and Goring, and determined efforts to strengthen the German air force.
This book was first published in 1943 by an insider in the Nazi party. It shows how the Luftwaffe was not prepared for a long war. It is a fascinating read and proves that the Germans could never have won the war.
The story of the Luftwaffe from creation to victorious justification in war is vividly told here for the first time in detail. It is a fascinating insight into a unique period of military aviation, as tactics and technology raced each other, set against the background of rearmament and resurgent German militarism before and during World War Two. Here are the secret years up to 1935, when even the German government was misled as to the existence of training programmes, while barely any effort was made to meet the Armistice demands. Hooton also demonstrates that although the Allies were well informed of Luftwaffe development, they failed to use that intelligence correctly.
The plans that Nazi Germany had to raid - and bomb - New York and the eastern seabord are revealed in this book. They were were based on the use of transoceanic aircraft planes, such as the six-engined Ju 390, Me 264 or Ta 400, but the Third Reich was unable to produce such machines in sufficient numbers. If the Soviet Union had been conquered, however, these plans would have become a reality. With the seizure of vital resources from the Soviet Union the Wehrmacht would have had enough fuel and material to mass-produce giant bomber aircraft: it was a near run thing. The collapse of the Wehrmacht infrastructure and the end of the Thousand-Year Reich ensured that plans for long-range remote-controlled missiles never got off the drawing board and were never manufactured. Manfried Griehl makes it clear that until the collapse, numerous secret research laboratories seemed to have worked in parallel seeking nuclear power and explosives. Only classified material held within British, French and American archives can prove whether these groups were close to perfecting small atomic explosives. But, without a shadow of doubt, Germany was far more technologically advanced by the end of 1944 that has been previously suspected.
On 10 May 1940, the French possessed one of the largest air forces in the world. On paper, it was nearly as strong as the RAF. Six weeks later, France had been defeated. For a struggling French Army desperately looking for air support, the skies seemed empty of friendly planes. In the decades that followed, the debate raged. Were there unused stockpiles of planes? Were French aircraft really so inferior? Baughen examines the myths that surround the French defeat. He explains how at the end of the First World War, the French had possessed the most effective air force in the world, only for the lessons learned to be forgotten. Instead, air policy was guided by radical theories that predicted air power alone would decide future wars. Baughen traces some of the problems back to the very earliest days of French aviation. He describes the mistakes and bad luck that dogged the French efforts to modernise their air force in the twenties and thirties. He examines how decisions made just months before the German attack further weakened the air force. Yet defeat was not inevitable. If better use had been made of the planes that were available, the result might have been different.
During World War II, aviation was among the largest industrial branches of the Third Reich. About 40 percent of total German war production, and two million people, were involved in the manufacture of aircraft and air force equipment. Based on German records, Allied intelligence reports, and eyewitness accounts, this study explores the military, political, scientific and social aspects of Germany's wartime aviation industry: production, research and development, Allied attacks, foreign workers and slave labor, and daily life and working conditions in the factories. Testimony from Holocaust survivors who worked in the factories provides a compelling new perspective on the history of the Third Reich.
An extensive history of the rise and fall of Nazi Germany’s air force. In his thoroughly researched study, John Killen examines German air power between 1914 and 1945, from the early days of flying when Immelmann, Boelke, Richtofen, and other First World War aces fought and died to give Germany air supremacy, to the nightmare existence of the Luftwaffe as the Third Reich plunged headlong to destruction. Here are the aircraft: the frail biplanes and triplanes of the Kaiser’s war; the great Lufthansa aircraft and airships of the turbulent Thirties; the monoplanes designed to help Hitler in his conquest of Europe. Here are the generals who forged the air weapon of the Luftwaffe: the swaggering Goering, the playboy Udet, the ebullient Kesselring, and the scapegoat Jeschonnek. Here, too, are the pilots who tried to keep faith with their Fatherland despite overwhelming odds: Adolf Galland, Werner Molders, Joachim Marseille, and Hanna Reitsch. Not least are the actions fought by the Luftwaffe from the Spanish Civil War to the Battle of Britain, through the bloody struggle for Crete, and the siege of Stalingrad to the fearful twilight over Berlin. “A good, readable account of the rise and fall of the Luftwaffe that covers all of the main fronts on which it fought, and examines the reasons for the eventual failure as well as providing a readable narrative.” —History of War
“A wonderful book on the Luftwaffe’s WW2 operations (German Air Force) and its struggle to defend Germany from the Allied bomber attacks.” —FSAddon The Luftwaffe over Germany tells the story of one of the longest and most intense air battles in history. The daylight air struggles over Germany during World War II involved thousands of aircraft, dozens of units, and hundreds of aerial engagements. Until now, there has been no single book that covers the complete story, from the highest levels of air strategy to the individual tales of Fw 190s, Bf 109s and Me 262s in air combat against the American bomber streams. This ground-breaking work explores the detrimental effect of Luftwaffe theory and doctrine on the German air arms ability to defend the homeland once the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive began in earnest. By mid-1944, they had lost the battle—but had exacted a terrible price from the Americans in the process. The product of a ten-year collaboration between two noted Luftwaffe historians, this work fills a major gap in the literature of World War II. The authors have examined original war diaries, logbooks, doctrine manuals, after-action reports, and interviews with many combat veterans to produce a richly detailed account. Illustrated with nearly two hundred photographs, as well as new maps and diagrams, this is the standard work on the subject. “Looking for a better book on the German air defense of the Third Reich in daylight during the war would probably be a useless endeavor.” —A Wargamers Needful Things
"Can it really be true that in 1941 insiders knew the Luftwaffe was a spent force and a failed organization? This remarkable, but little-known book, first published in 1943, argues how pure incompetence in planning and strategy left the Luftwaffe hopelessly stretched and exposed. The Nazi regime designed its airforce for Blitzkreig, and Blitzkreig alone. During the invasion of Poland, 2,500 aircraft were lost on account of a failure to produce any spare parts. When long campaigns set in in Russia, North Africa and Western Europe, the collapse of the Lufwaffe became inevitable. Crammed full of fascinating detail, this prescient book shows how German efficiency was fatally paralyzed by the dead-hand of the corrupt Nazi Party. Herman Goering, the head of the Luftwaffe, was chiefly responsible; his wholesale thefts to fund a lavish lifestyle add particular colour to this picture of woeful neglect."--Publisher description.