This book focuses on the right to privacy in the digital age with a view to see how it is implemented across the globe in different jurisdictions. The right to privacy is one of the rights enshrined in international human rights law. It has been a topic of interest for both academic and non-academic audiences around the world. However, with the increasing digitalisation of modern life, protecting one’s privacy has become more complicated. Both state and non-state organisations make frequent interventions in citizens’ private lives. This edited volume aims to provide an overview of recent development pertaining to the protection of the right to privacy in the different judicial systems such as the European, South Asian, African and Inter-American legal systems. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of The International Journal of Human Rights.
Privacy Revisited articulates the legal meanings of privacy and dignity through the lens of comparative law, and argues that the concept of privacy requires a more systematic approach if it is to be useful in framing and protecting certain fundamental autonomy interests.
Never before in our networked societies has the subject of personal privacy protection been so hotly debated. And never have so many methods been employed to capture and use personal data. Never have there been so many that have published so much about themselves on line... Paradox ? Lack of awareness ? Hypocrisy ? Or emergence of a new way to defend and exercise freedom, which we protect only in order to better project ourselves towards others, to the world ? This book offers new keys to understanding the relationship between computer science, freedom, privacy and identity. It proposes to replace a defensive approach to identity and privacy with a strategic approach. The aim is to share powerful technology, and equip individuals to the same degree as the services and organizations that want to learn more about them. The book explores new avenues, new tools, sometimes new rights, to grant privacy its true value: the ability to choose and control one's public life.
Over the last thirty years, the field of disability studies has emerged from the political activism of disabled people. In this challenging review of the field, leading disability academic and activist Tom Shakespeare argues that the social model theory has reached a dead end. Drawing on a critical realist perspective, Shakespeare promotes a pluralist, engaged and nuanced approach to disability. Key topics discussed include: dichotomies - the dangerous polarizations of medical model versus social model, impairment versus disability and disabled people versus non-disabled people identity - the drawbacks of the disability movement's emphasis on identity politics bioethics in disability - choices at the beginning and end of life and in the field of genetic and stem cell therapies care and social relationships - questions of intimacy and friendship. This stimulating and accessible book challenges orthodoxies in British disability studies, promoting a new conceptualization of disability and fresh research agenda. It is an invaluable resource for researchers and students in disability studies and sociology, as well as professionals, policy makers and activists.
This powerfully argued appraisal of judicial review may change the face of American law. Written for layman and scholar alike, the book addresses one of the most important issues facing Americans today: within what guidelines shall the Supreme Court apply the strictures of the Constitution to the complexities of modern life? Until now legal experts have proposed two basic approaches to the Constitution. The first, “interpretivism,” maintains that we should stick as closely as possible to what is explicit in the document itself. The second, predominant in recent academic theorizing, argues that the courts should be guided by what they see as the fundamental values of American society. John Hart Ely demonstrates that both of these approaches are inherently incomplete and inadequate. Democracy and Distrust sets forth a new and persuasive basis for determining the role of the Supreme Court today. Ely’s proposal is centered on the view that the Court should devote itself to assuring majority governance while protecting minority rights. “The Constitution,” he writes, “has proceeded from the sensible assumption that an effective majority will not unreasonably threaten its own rights, and has sought to assure that such a majority not systematically treat others less well than it treats itself. It has done so by structuring decision processes at all levels in an attempt to ensure, first, that everyone’s interests will be represented when decisions are made, and second, that the application of those decisions will not be manipulated so as to reintroduce in practice the sort of discrimination that is impermissible in theory.” Thus, Ely’s emphasis is on the procedural side of due process, on the preservation of governmental structure rather than on the recognition of elusive social values. At the same time, his approach is free of interpretivism’s rigidity because it is fully responsive to the changing wishes of a popular majority. Consequently, his book will have a profound impact on legal opinion at all levels—from experts in constitutional law, to lawyers with general practices, to concerned citizens watching the bewildering changes in American law.
Journalism and the Debate Over Privacy situates the discussion of issues of privacy in the landscape of professional journalism. Privacy problems present the widest gap between what journalism ethics suggest and what the law allows. This edited volume examines these problems in the context of both free expression theory and newsroom practice. Including essays by some of the country's foremost First Amendment scholars, the volume starts off in Part I with an examination of privacy in theoretical terms, intended to start the reader thinking broadly about conceptual problems in discussions about journalism and privacy. Part II builds on the theoretical underpinnings and looks at privacy problems as they are experienced by working journalists. This volume features discussion of: *privacy as a socially-constructed right--a moving target that changes with technology, social norms, national experience, and journalistic practice; *privacy as both a property and a commercial right; *privacy in terms of journalism ethics and journalistic codes; *privacy as an attribute of press independence from government; and *Bartnicki v. Vopper and its implications for journalism. With this volume, editor Craig L. LaMay provides a concise, intellectually provocative overview of a topic that is of growing importance to journalists, both legally and ethically. The work is intended for scholars and advanced students in communication law, ethics, and First Amendment rights, and is also appropriate for First Amendment and media law classes in law schools.
This book consists of two parts: “The Law of Peoples,” a major reworking of a much shorter article by the same name published in 1993, and the essay “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” first published in 1997. Taken together, they are the culmination of more than fifty years of reflection on liberalism and on some of the most pressing problems of our times by John Rawls. “The Law of Peoples” extends the idea of a social contract to the Society of Peoples and lays out the general principles that can and should be accepted by both liberal and non-liberal societies as the standard for regulating their behavior toward one another. In particular, it draws a crucial distinction between basic human rights and the rights of each citizen of a liberal constitutional democracy. It explores the terms under which such a society may appropriately wage war against an “outlaw society” and discusses the moral grounds for rendering assistance to non-liberal societies burdened by unfavorable political and economic conditions. “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” explains why the constraints of public reason, a concept first discussed in Political Liberalism (1993), are ones that holders of both religious and non-religious comprehensive views can reasonably endorse. It is Rawls’s most detailed account of how a modern constitutional democracy, based on a liberal political conception, could and would be viewed as legitimate by reasonable citizens who on religious, philosophical, or moral grounds do not themselves accept a liberal comprehensive doctrine—such as that of Kant, or Mill, or Rawls’s own “Justice as Fairness,” presented in A Theory of Justice (1971).
