After a precipitate reunification (1975), the Hanoi leadership imposed upon the South the Stalinist-Maoist strategy of economic development which had been until then applied in the North. This "Northernization" resulted in an economic crisis for the whole country during the last years of the Second Five-Year Plan. Despite some partial reforms, the country was again plunged into a more serious economic and financial crisis at the end of the Third Five-Year Plan, particularly after the ill-conceived monetary reform in September 1985. At the time of its Sixth National Congress (December 1986) the Party's new leadership advocated a strategic shift in its overall economic policy under the banner of Doi Moi (Renovation).
An examination of political, social and cultural developments in the Soviet Union. The book identifies the social tensions and political inconsistencies that spurred radical change in the government of Russia, from the turn of the century to the revolution of 1917. Kenez envisions that revolution as a crisis of authority that posed the question, 'Who shall govern Russia?' This question was resolved with the creation of the Soviet Union. Kenez traces the development of the Soviet Union from the Revolution, through the 1920s, the years of the New Economic Policies and into the Stalinist order. He shows how post-Stalin Soviet leaders struggled to find ways to rule the country without using Stalin's methods but also without openly repudiating the past, and to negotiate a peaceful but antipathetic coexistence with the capitalist West. In this second edition, he also examines the post-Soviet period, tracing Russia's development up to the time of publication.
#1 NEW YORK TIMES BEST SELLER • At last, a book that shows you how to build—design—a life you can thrive in, at any age or stage • “Life has questions. They have answers.” —The New York Times Designers create worlds and solve problems using design thinking. Look around your office or home—at the tablet or smartphone you may be holding or the chair you are sitting in. Everything in our lives was designed by someone. And every design starts with a problem that a designer or team of designers seeks to solve. In this book, Bill Burnett and Dave Evans show us how design thinking can help us create a life that is both meaningful and fulfilling, regardless of who or where we are, what we do or have done for a living, or how young or old we are. The same design thinking responsible for amazing technology, products, and spaces can be used to design and build your career and your life, a life of fulfillment and joy, constantly creative and productive, one that always holds the possibility of surprise.
In recent years historians and political observers have vilified Mao Tse-tung and placed him in a class with tyrants like Hitler and Stalin. But, as Lee Feigon points out in his startling revision of Mao, the Chinese leader has been tainted by the actions and policies of the same Soviet-style Communist bureaucrats he came to hate and attempted to eliminate. Mr. Feigon argues that the movements for which Mao is almost universally condemned today—the Great Leap Forward and especially the Cultural Revolution—were in many ways beneficial for the Chinese people. They forced China to break with its Stalinist past and paved the way for its great economic and political strides in recent years. While not glossing over Mao’s mistakes, some of which had heinous consequences, Mr. Feigon contends that Mao should be largely praised for many of his later efforts—such as the attacks he began to level in the late 1950s on those bureaucrats responsible for many of the problems that continue to plague China today. In reevaluating Mao’s contributions, this interpretive study reverses the recent curve of criticism, seeing Mao’s late-in-life contributions to the Chinese revolution more favorably while taking a more critical view of his earlier efforts. Whereas most studies praise the Mao of the 1930s and 1940s as an original and independent thinker, Mr. Feigon contends that during this period his ideas and actions were fairly ordinary—but that he depended much more on Stalin’s help than has been acknowledged. Mao: A Reinterpretation seeks a more informed perspective on one of the most important political leaders of the twentieth century.
A critical edition of the text that defined communist party ideology in Stalin's Soviet Union The Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) defined Stalinist ideology both at home and abroad. It was quite literally the the master narrative of the USSR--a hegemonic statement on history, politics, and Marxism-Leninism that scripted Soviet society for a generation. This study exposes the enormous role that Stalin played in the development of this all-important text, as well as the unparalleled influence that he wielded over the Soviet historical imagination.
Chronicles the events of 1929 to 1933 in the Ukraine when Stalin's Soviet Communist Party killed or deported millions of peasants; abolished privately held land and forced the remaining peasantry into "collective" farms; and inflicted impossible grain quotas on the peasants that resulted in mass starvation.
Once Joseph Stalin took the lead of the Soviet Bolshevists after the death of Vladimir Lenin, he quickly turned away from Lenin’s New Economic Policy, with its many concessions to capitalism, to a policy of one-country socialism, driven by his first Five Year Plan (1928) and a plan that other Bolsheviks like Lenin and Trotsky thought impossible. That shift, radical, forced Stalin to “urbanize” the USSR’s vast rural areas—that is, to impose a factory-like model on the Soviet countryside to maximize its efficiency. That required collectivizing the numerous Soviet farms—making large farms of the numerous small farms. Ukraine was to be the model republic due to its vastness and black, fertile lands. Not only were the republics to be collectivized, they were also to be Russified for the sake of model efficiency and centralization of control. And so, while Stalin, early in his political life, preached respect for the cultural diversity of its many republics and the right of secession of any republic, the need to collectivize the Soviet farms for the sake of one-country socialism demanded compliance. Ukrainian peasant-farmers were non-compliant, for they readily saw that the State was asking them for everything and giving back nothing but the pledge of efficient farms to benefit the State, and non-compliance forced Stalin’s authoritarian hand. He imposed laws that brutally punished non-compliant peasants, called “kulaks.” The plan was dekulakization. The intransigents were dispossessed of their property, alienated from other villagers, exiled, and exterminated. The result in Ukraine was the gross inefficiency of both collective and individual farms. That led to intolerance of Ukrainian culture and theft of Ukrainian grain, and even all other findable foodstuffs, to punish Ukrainians. The end was a great famine in 1932 and 1933 in which some four million Ukrainians died. Did Stalin believe that he could urbanize the Soviet countryside? Did Stalin think that socialism could take root in the backwater Soviet Union without the aid of Western succor? Did Stalin hate Ukrainians because many pressed for a cultural identity separate from that of Russia? Had Stalin’s plan of dekulakization from the beginning been a policy of political genocide? Those are some of the many questions I aim to answer in this book. I focus much on Stalin’s writings in the efforts to ascertain his mindset as a dictator.
