Developing an effective framework for cross-border resolution is a key priority in international regulatory reform. Large bank failures during the global financial crisis brought home the lack of adequate tools for resolving “too-big-to-fail” institutions. In cross-border cases, misaligned incentives and lack of robust mechanisms for resolution and cross-border cooperation left some country authorities with little choice but to take unilateral actions, which contributed to the high fiscal costs of the crisis and resulted in disorderly resolution in some cases
This report argues that policy reforms in micro- and macro-prudential regulation and macroeconomic policies are needed for Europe to reap the important diversification and efficiency benefits from cross-border banking, while reducing the risks stemming from large cross-border banks.Available online as pdf at: http: //www.cepr.org/pubs/books/CEPR/cross-border_banking.pd
Any policy aimed at resolution of a banking crisis determines which constituents - depositors, creditors, shareholders, the banking industry, and society as a whole - eventually bear the costs associated with a banking crisis, thus giving rise to legitimacy and accountability concerns. Rather than what the recent financial crisis has engendered - mostly ad hoc reactions that socialize losses but not profits - what is required, this incisive analysis shows, is an equitable and viable resolution framework, based on burden sharing, enshrined in law, and designed to deal with bank failures in a way that balances private and public interests. The author explores the design, institutional framework, and practical functioning of such a legal regime under EU law. In the process she discusses such issues as the following: the systemic risk of bank failure; exit regimes for failing banks and banking groups; difficulties produced by the increasing cross-border activities and interconnectedness of the banking sector; resolution tools to minimize the losses of the official sector; the role of various authorities in resolving failing banks; the need for resolution authorities to have robust rules and a certain level of discretion; the potential sources of resolution financing; overcoming resistance to burden-sharing arrangements; the integration potential and political drawbacks of the emerging Banking Union; the deposit insurance responsibilities of Member States; European Central Bank monetary policy operations as a burden-sharing mechanism; and the geographic scope of resolution and burden-sharing regimes and implications for non-participating Member States and third countries.
This paper reviews empirical and theoretical work on the links between banks and their governments (the bank-sovereign nexus). How significant is this nexus? What do we know about it? To what extent is it a source of concern? What is the role of policy intervention? The paper concludes with a review of recent policy proposals.
The SDN elaborates the case for, and the design of, a banking union for the euro area. It discusses the benefits and costs of a banking union, presents a steady state view of the banking union, elaborates difficult transition issues, and briefly discusses broader EU issues. As such, it assesses current plans and provides advice. It is accompanied by three background technical notes that analyze in depth the various elements of the banking union: a single supervisory framework; a single resolution and common safety net; and urgent issues related to repair of weak banks in Europe.
This new work provides timely analysis of the cross-border exercise of banking activity in the EU and its supervision, from the perspective of the 'home-host rule'. It examines the current system and the efficacy of recent reforms considering whether the centralisation of decision making and a more effective mutualisation of financing tools could increase the efficiency of the EU banking system and reduce the asymmetry of information between home and host authorities.0This book analyses how far recent reforms under the banking union regime have addressed these issues to ensure the integrity and stability of the European integration project. It utilises data to illustrate the cross border exposures between member states and how they influence home and host decision making. But it equally explores those areas that still remain within the national discretion such as non-performing loans, insolvency-liquidation of banks and deposit protection arrangements, to0mention a few.0The book analyses the main pillars of the banking union: the single supervisory mechanism (SSM); and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the proposed European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); and the related tools designed to provide crisis management under the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). As such the work considers the impact of the Single Rulebook. In considering these pieces of regulation and mechanisms the book analyses how international standards and EU requirements undertake to divide responsibilities between the home and host state and the extent to which they align interests between the home and host and minimise potential conflicts of interests. In this analysis examples from a set of EU cross-border banks are used to illustrate the workings of home and host relationship between Member States and Third Countries, and the benefits of participating in centralisation of decision making and mutualisation of financing in resolution and depositor protection.0.
The global financial crisis has demonstrated weaknesses in resolution regimes for financial institutions around the globe, including in the European Union (EU). This paper considers the principles underlying resolution regimes for financial institutions, and draws out how a well-designed resolution regime can expand the toolset available for crisis management. Introducing, or in some cases expanding the scope, of these regimes is pressing to achieve more effective responses to ongoing financial sector weaknesses across the EU.
The 4th Special Report in the Geneva Reports on the World Economy series reviews the current status of bail-ins and bank resolution in Europe. It first provides a critical comparison of the US and EU bank resolution rules, including the underlying similarities, differences and enhancement points of both frameworks. It then goes on to focus on European banking failures, providing estimates of taxpayer costs and considering the hypothetical application of stronger private sector bail-in consistent with the spirit of the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive. The report ends with a number of policy recommendations concerning governance, stress testing, cross-border issues and resolution of financial contracts.
This paper documents the features of a new database that focuses on changes in the intensity in the usage of several widely used prudential tools, taking into account both macro-prudential and micro-prudential objectives. The database coverage is broad, spanning 64 countries, and with quarterly data for the period 2000Q1 through 2014Q4. The five types of prudential instruments in the database are: capital buffers, interbank exposure limits, concentration limits, loan to value (LTV) ratio limits, and reserve requirements. A total of nine prudential tools are constructed since some useful further decompositions are presented, with capital buffers divided into four subindices: general capital requirements, real state credit specific capital buffers, consumer credit specific capital buffers, and other specific capital buffers; and with reserve requirements divided into two sub-indices: domestic currency capital requirements and foreign currency capital requirements. While general capital requirements have the most changes from the cross-country perspective, LTV ratio limits and reserve requirements have the largest number of tightening and loosening episodes. We also analyze the instruments’ usage in relation to the evolution of key variables such as credit, policy rates, and house prices, finding substantial differences in the patterns of loosening or tightening of instruments in relation to business and financial cycles.
Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) are measures that indicate the current financial health and soundness of a country's financial institutions, and their corporate and household counterparts. FSIs include both aggregated individual institution data and indicators that are representative of the markets in which the financial institutions operate. FSIs are calculated and disseminated for the purpose of supporting macroprudential analysis--the assessment and surveillance of the strengths and vulnerabilities of financial systems--with a view to strengthening financial stability and limiting the likelihood of financial crises. Financial Soundness Indicators: Compilation Guide is intended to give guidance on the concepts, sources, and compilation and dissemination techniques underlying FSIs; to encourage the use and cross-country comparison of these data; and, thereby, to support national and international surveillance of financial systems.
