American state and Canadian provincial governments have dealt with rapidly rising auto insurance rates in different ways over the last two decades, a difference many attribute to variances in political pressure exerted by interest groups such as trial attorneys and insurance companies. Edward L. Lascher, Jr., argues that we must consider two additional factors: the importance of politicians’ beliefs about the potential success of various solutions and the role of governmental institutions. Using case studies from both sides of the border, Lascher shows how different explanations of the problem and different political structures affect insurance reform. In his conclusion, Lascher moves beyond auto insurance to draw implications for regulation and policymaking in other areas.
This comprehensive paperback contains thorough and practical discussions of such important issues as the changes in personal injury protection under the 1990 amendments to the PIP law, the interplay of PIP, health insurance and workman's compensation coverage, the litigation implications of the differing tort threshold provisions, the rules for determining whether a motorist is uninsured or underinsured under the UM/UIM clauses, the rights and remedies of insurers and insureds when multiple uninsured / underinsured policies are potentially involved in a claim, and much more. The easy-to-carry and easy-to-use text includes: Current statutory provisions regulating no fault, uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, including the "Fair Automobile Insurance Reform Act of 1990". Practical tips on prosecuting, defending and arbitrating claims for personal injury and property Up-to-the-minute guide for all the case law interpreting and applying the legislative enactments. damage under the statutory scheme. With Full Text of Relevant Statutory and Regulatory Provisions
No-fault regimes, a formerly popular alternative to the tort compensation system for auto-accident victims, have gradually lost support. Over time, premiums and claim costs have grown in no-fault states relative to other states, primarily driven by explosive medical cost increases. No-fault and tort states have also converged across many domains affecting costs, including excess claiming, litigation patterns, and noneconomic-damage payments.
In recent years, choice no-fault has emerged as a popular but controversial proposal for addressing the problem of high automobile insurance rates. Choice plans offer consumers the option of a lower-cost insurance policy with restrictions on filing lawsuits or a higher-cost policy with full tort rights. Some American states have implemented choice programs, and major federal choice legislation is now pending in the United States Congress. Choice no-fault has caught the attention of policy makers, the insurance industry, and academics. Until now, however, no single book has pulled together the available research on the topic. The Economics and Politics of Choice No-Fault Insurance fills that gap. Edited by scholars from different disciplines, each of whom has written extensively on automobile insurance issues, the book includes some of the best work in the area. Former Massachusetts Governor and presidential candidate Michael S. Dukakis wrote the foreword. Contributors include University of Virginia Law Professor Jeffrey O'Connell, widely considered the `father of no-fault,' as well as authors of the influential RAND study of the potential effects of choice no-fault on insurance rates. The book chapters, most of which were written especially for this volume, cover topics ranging from the impact of choice no-fault on accidents and driving behavior, to the effects of choice on medical care usage, to alternative approaches for resolving accidents involving both `no-fault' and `tort' electors, to the political feasibility of choice legislative proposals. Emphasis on the potential advantages of choice no-fault is balanced by consideration of possible ill effects.
Over the past two decades, the United States has successfully deregulated prices and restrictions on most previously-regulated industries, including airlines, trucking, railroads, telecommunications, and banking. Only a few industries remain regulated, the largest being the property-liability insurance business. In light of recent sweeping financial modernization legislation in other sectors of the insurance industry, this timely volume examines the basis for continued regulation of rates and forms of the U.S. property-liability insurance market. The book focuses on private passenger automobile insurance—the most important personal line of property-liability coverage, with annual premiums of about $120 billion. The authors analyze five state case studies: California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey—three of the most heavily regulated states—as well as Illinois, which has been deregulated for about 30 years, and South Carolina, which began to deregulate in 1997. The study also includes an econometric analysis based on all fifty states over a 25-year period that gauges the impact of regulation on insurance price levels, price volatility, and the proportion of automobiles insured in residual markets. The authors conclude that regulation does not significantly reduce long-run prices for consumers, and generally limits availability of coverage, reduces the quality and variety of services available in the market, inhibits productivity growth, and increases price volatility. Contributors include Dwight Jaffee (University of California, Berkeley), Thomas Russell (Santa Clara University ), Laureen Regan (Temple University), Sharon Tennyson (Cornell University), Mary Weiss (Temple University), John Worrall (Rutgers University), Stephen D'Arcy (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign), Martin Grace (Georgia State University), Robert Klein (Georgia State University), Richard Phillips (Georgia State University), Georges Dionne (University of Montreal), and Richard Butler (Brigham Young University).
