This book emphasizes change over continuity in Japanese policymaking. It argues that Japan's Big Bang financial reforms emerged out of a policymaking process that deviated radically from past patterns. Performance failures, scandals and fluidity in party politics led the Ministry of Finance to promote reforms that otherwise would have been opposed.
Henry Laurence traces financial market reform in Britain and Japan over the last two decades, charting the movement of the Anglo-Saxon and Japanese styles of capitalism toward a new, hybrid form of economic organization. He explains what these two stories reveal about changes in the nature of business-government relations in an age of convergence.The package of reforms known in Britain as the "Big Bang" and in Japan as "Biggu Bangu" decontrolled prices, liberalized the number and nature of financial instruments that could be traded, opened both countries' markets to foreigners, and introduced a much greater degree of competition than would have been believed possible twenty years earlier. At the same time, Britain and Japan have undertaken stringent measures to improve the transparency and fairness of their markets.Why did two countries with traditionally very different regulatory styles adopt such strikingly similar reforms, and why did these reforms result in a mixture of deregulation in some areas and tighter control in others? In explaining these apparent contradictions, Laurence invokes the powerful domestic political impact of international capital mobility.Money Rules challenges the view that bureaucracy is the most powerful actor in the policymaking process. Using extensive interviews with more than one hundred policymakers and financial professionals in both countries, the author rebuts conventional wisdom. He argues that the events in Britain and Japan demonstrate striking crossnational convergence of political and economic institutions.
This book analyzes how the bank-dominated financial system—a key element of the oft-heralded "Japanese economic model"—broke down in the 1990s and spawned sweeping reforms. Japan's financial institutions and policy underwent remarkable change in the past decade. The country began the 1990s with a heavily regulated financial system managed by an unchallenged Ministry of Finance and ended the decade with a Big Bang financial market reform, a complete restructuring of its regulatory financial institutions, and an independent central bank. These reforms have taken place amid recession and rising unemployment, collapsing asset prices, a looming banking crisis, and the lowest interest rates in the industrial world. This book analyzes how the bank-dominated financial system—a key element of the oft-heralded "Japanese economic model"—broke down in the 1990s and spawned sweeping reforms. It documents the sources of the Japanese economic stagnation of the 1990s, the causes of the financial crisis, the slow and initially limited policy response to banking problems, and the reform program that followed. It also evaluates the new financial structure and reforms at the Bank of Japan in light of the challenges facing the Japanese economy. These challenges range from conducting monetary policy in a zero-interest rate environment characterized by a "liquidity trap" to managing consolidation in the Japanese banking sector against the backdrop of increasing international competition.
This book investigates why the convergence of Japan’s bank-centered financial system to an American-style capital market-based model has lost steam since the mid-2000s, despite financial deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s. Examining the ideational conflict within Japanese elites between the market liberalization and anti-free market camps, it scrutinizes the American and Japanese credit rating agencies operating in Tokyo and explores the differences between the two major industrial associations, Keidanren and Doyukai, which have played a key role as "ideational platforms" for Japanese corporate society. The book emphasizes the concept of "systemic support", whose broadened definition incorporates dominant elites’ support and protection of subordinates in exchange for the latter’s obedience and loyalty. It argues that Japanese society’s anti-liberal, anti-free market norms centered on systemic support are a form of counter-hegemony, and this has resisted American financial hegemony, promoting international capital mobility and capital markets, and prevented capitalist dominance from severing long-term social ties such as management-labor cooperation and corporate group alliances. Yet this resistance has generated growing problems for Japan. With a focus on social norms, bureaucracy, credit rating agencies, industrial associations and corporate governance, this book will provide useful insights for scholars and students of international political economy, sociology, cultural studies, and business studies.
In 1996, the Japanese government introduced a policy package initiating massive deregulation and liberalization in the nation's financial sector, referred to as Japan's financial 'Big Bang.' This book argues that the emergence of the Big Bang Initiative poses numerous challenges to conventional interpretations of Japanese politics and represents a clear case of institutional change in Japanese finance. Whereas many observers stress continuity in Japanese politics, this book argues that the emergence in the 1990s of performance failures and scandals attributed to the bureaucracy, as well as the increase in the likelihood of a change in government in this period, led policymaking patterns surrounding the Big Bang to differ radically from those dominating public policymaking in the past. These developments led to change in the nature of the alliance between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), to a shift in priorities within the MOF, and to a heightened role for the public in policymaking. The result was that the MOF, long perceived as 'entrenched' and seeking to maximize tangible tokens of organizational power, became more than willing to launch the Big Bang, despite the fact that these reforms would strip the ministry of many of its regulatory tools and sever the ministry's close ties with the financial sector. The book also argues that these new developments prevented financial industry actors from forestalling these reforms, as they had done in the past with other reforms similarly threatening the viability of weaker firms. The findings reveal that not only politicians, but also bureaucrats and interest groups, have reasons to pursue public support to enhance their respective political influence. Consequently, well-organized groups do not always prevail over the unorganized public.
Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.
Japan's national economy: understanding the history of the current crisis and proposing a path forward The consistent failure of the Japanese bureaucracy and business establishment to meet proper management and regulatory standards has made America's premier ally in Asia a major source of financial instability in today's world. Japan has the world's biggest everbad–debt burden Japan has allowed organized crime to systematically infiltrate its financial institutions Japan's national pension system faces imminent bankruptcy Japan's banks, brokerages, and insurance houses are near insolvency and welded to obsolete practices that hold the entire country and region back Japan's Big Bang traces the hurdles Japan must overcome to once again reign as one of the world's preeminent financial powerhouses. With an academic's analytical eye and the tenacity of a financial beat reporter, Declan Hayes explores the tangled mess that was and is Japan's economy, and explores the remedial action Japan must follow to regain and sustain its position as the economic engine of Asia.
As the Japanese economy languished in the 1990s Japanese government officials, business executives, and opinion leaders concluded that their economic model had gone terribly wrong. They questioned the very institutions that had been credited with Japan's past success: a powerful bureaucracy guiding the economy, close government-industry ties, "lifetime" employment, the main bank system, and dense interfirm networks. Many of these leaders turned to the U.S. model for lessons, urging the government to liberate the economy and companies to sever long-term ties with workers, banks, suppliers, and other firms.Despite popular perceptions to the contrary, Japanese government and industry have in fact enacted substantial reforms. Yet Japan never emulated the American model. As government officials and industry leaders scrutinized their options, they selected reforms to modify or reinforce preexisting institutions rather than to abandon them. In Japan Remodeled, Steven Vogel explains the nature and extent of these reforms and why they were enacted.Vogel demonstrates how government and industry have devised innovative solutions. The cumulative result of many small adjustments is, he argues, an emerging Japan that has a substantially redesigned economic model characterized by more selectivity in business partnerships, more differentiation across sectors and companies, and more openness to foreign players.
Contrary to all expectations, Japan's long-term recession has provoked no sustained political movement to replace the nation's malfunctioning economic structure. The country's basic social contract has so far proved resistant to reform, even in the face of persistently adverse conditions. In Race for the Exits, Leonard J. Schoppa explains why it has endured and how long it can last. The postwar Japanese system of "convoy capitalism" traded lifetime employment for male workers against government support for industry and the private (female) provision of care for children and the elderly. Two social groups bore a particularly heavy burden in providing for the social protection of the weak and dependent: large firms, which committed to keeping their core workforce on the payroll even in slow times, and women, who stayed home to care for their homes and families. Using the exit-voice framework made famous by Albert Hirschman, Schoppa argues that both groups have chosen "exit" rather than "voice," depriving the political process of the energy needed to propel necessary reforms in the system. Instead of fighting for reform, firms slowly shift jobs overseas, and many women abandon hopes of accommodating both family and career. Over time, however, these trends have placed growing economic and demographic pressures on the social contract. As industries reduce their domestic operations, the Japanese economy is further diminished. Japan has also experienced a "baby bust" as women opt out of motherhood. Schoppa suggests that a radical break with the Japanese social contract of the past is becoming inevitable as the system slowly and quietly unravels.
