When there are collection lags in the tax system, inflation reduces the real revenues. This is often offered as an argument for less reliance on the inflation tax. But the optimal rates of other taxes should also be reconsidered in the light of collection lags. When this is done, the focus shifts from the revenues (which can be recouped by changing the rates of these taxes), to the associated costs of collection. In a benchmark case where the average costs of collection are constant, the optimal inflation tax is independent of the collection lag.
When there are collection lags in the tax system, inflation reduces the real revenues. This is often offered as an argument for less reliance on the inflation tax. But the optimal rates of other taxes should also be reconsidered in the light of collection lags. When this is done, the focus shifts from the revenues (which can be recouped by changing the rates of these taxes), to the associated costs of collection. In a benchmark case where the average costs of collection are constant, the optimal inflation tax is independent of the collection lag.
The observation that collection lags combine with inflation to erode fiscal revenues has long been a strong argument against seigniorage (Tanzi (1978)). However, with the exception of Dixit (1991), who used a general equilibrium model to reject this argument, the optimal tax literature has not analyzed how collection lags affect desired tax structures. In this paper, this issue is re-examined using an overlapping generations version of Dixit’s model. It is shown that depending on the specification of the collection cost function and the size of government spending in GDP, collection lags may increase, leave unchanged, or reduce the desired rate of inflation.
This paper analyzes the optimal rate of monetary expansion when government resorts to inflationary finance to generate additional investment for enhancing growth. If there are lags in tax collection, an increase in inflation erodes real fiscal revenue, thereby worsening the current balance while reducing government investment. This impedes capital accumulation as well as increases the welfare cost of inflation. As such, the optimal rate of monetary expansion, equilibrium capital-labor ratio and output are lower while the marginal cost of inflationary finance is higher than they would be without collection lags. Simulations are performed to highlight empirical implications.
Trade liberalization in developing countries is frequently opposed on the grounds that, because it is likely to cause a deterioration in the external balance, it may not be a viable policy option for countries facing foreign exchange constraints. Recent literature suggests, however, an ambiguous relationship between tariff changes and the current account. This paper shows that if liberalization involves reducing tariffs on imported intermediate inputs (a reform that has figured prominently in developing countries), then the current account may improve or deteriorate, depending on the level of initial trade distortions and the structure of the economy.[JEL F13, F32, F41]
The purpose of the present study is to review these concepts and to estimate consistent series of potential output in manufacturing for Canada, the United States, Japan, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Sweden for the period 1955–1975. Potential output series are also projected for the medium term (1976–1978) based on forecasts of available resources. The production function method is selected as the best approach to derive potential output series. The function used in the paper is a modified Cobb–Douglas function that allows for economies of scale and cyclical variations in the intensity of use of employed labor and of the capital stock. The study concludes that the rate of growth of potential output in manufacturing is now lower in most industrial countries than it was in the late 1960s. However, the fall is not as large as is often claimed, so that the output gaps early in 1976 were extremely high in all the major industrial countries. The principal reasons for the slowdown in the rate of growth of potential output are the lower rate of capital accumulation and the reduction of the normal workweek, rather than the direct effect of the increase in the price of energy.
The global financial crisis triggered severe shocks for developing countries, whose embrace of greater commercial and financial openness has increased their exposure to external shocks, both real and financial. This new edition of Development Macroeconomics has been fully revised to address the more open and less stable environment in which developing countries operate today. Describing the latest advances in this rapidly changing field, the book features expanded coverage of public debt and the management of capital inflows as well as new material on fiscal discipline, monetary policy regimes, currency, banking and sovereign debt crises, currency unions, and the choice of an exchange-rate regime. A new chapter on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with financial frictions has been added to reflect how the financial crisis has reshaped our thinking on the role of such frictions in generating and propagating real and financial shocks. The book also discusses the role of macroprudential regulation, both independently and through its interactions with monetary policy, in preserving financial and macroeconomic stability. Now in its fourth edition, Development Macroeconomics remains the definitive textbook on the macroeconomics of developing countries. The most authoritative book on the subject—now fully revised and expanded Features new material on fiscal discipline, monetary policy regimes, currency, banking and sovereign debt crises, and much more Comes with online supplements on informal financial markets, stabilization programs, the solution of DSGE models with financial frictions, and exchange rate crises
In a recent paper Professor Dixit criticized the argument that when collection lags characterize tax systems, recourse to inflationary finance should be minimized. He argued that, in such case, rather than minimizing recourse to inflationary finance, the rates of the commodity taxes should be adjusted to maintain them at an optimal level and, thus, to minimize welfare costs. This paper shows that the requirements for following Dixit’s policy prescription are almost impossible to meet. The paper argues that more attention should be paid by tax theorists to the constraints under which tax reforms are made.
