This is Volume II of six in a collection on Epistemology. Originally published in 1972, the central concern of this book is the understanding of the nature of the universe. Its field is thus that which until the eighteenth century had been known as philosophia naturalis, the philosophy of nature. The aim of the book is to elucidate and examine the fundamental concepts in terms of which the universe is understood.
This provocative new book attempts to resolve traditional problems of identity over time. It seeks to answer such questions as "How is it that an object can survive change?" and "How much change can an object undergo without being destroyed?" To answer these questions Professor Heller presents a completely new theory about the nature of physical objects and about the relationship between our language and the physical world. According to his theory, the only actually existing physical entities are what the author calls "hunks," four dimensional objects extending across time and space. This is a major new contribution to ontological debate and will be essential reading for all philosophers concerned with metaphysics.
In accordance with the purpose as an introduction for students, the scope of the book is frankly positive and constructive. It attempts to build up an understanding of the matter of ontology in a logical manner, using simple language, illustrating the subjects with copious examples, and extracting the contents of each chapter into compact summaries. Some of the more abstruse problems of ontology, such as the problem of essence and existence, have been omitted; it was felt that the average student would derive little benefit from a lengthy discussion of problems which have taxed the ingenuity and acumen of the most profound intellects. Such problems may be attacked after the student has become acquainted with the ideas and subjects which form the foundation of the science of metaphysics. After all, the student cannot be expected to be a professional philosopher; it should be sufficient if he acquires a thorough grounding in fundamentals, so that he can deepen his knowledge through subsequent reading and study. In a general way we may define metaphysics as the science of the ultimate principles and properties of real beings.
E. L. Grant Watson, an English field naturalist, zoologist, and one of England's best-loved nature writers, spent a lifetime trying to bring nature and consciousness into a unified, holistic vision that would establish meaning in the world without losing wonder. The questions raised by facts of nature inexplicable in terms of conventional theories, together with insights gained from a reading of Jung--as well as by a study of early Christian gnostic literature and the anthroposophy of Rudolf Steiner--brought him to an imaginative perception of living things based on the conviction of the presence in all things of a spiritual reality. "Love is of man, but wisdom is of nature, and there are times when it almost seems that the author's secret--as perhaps it will one day be the secret of a reformed scientific method--is to stand aside and let the wisdom of nature herself speak through him. "-Owen Barfield
Until quite recently, mind-body dualism has been regarded with deep suspicion by both philosophers and scientists. This has largely been due to the widespread identification of dualism in general with one particular version of it: the interactionist substance dualism of RZnZ Descartes. This traditional form of dualism has, ever since its first formulation in the seventeenth century, attracted numerous philosophical objections and is now almost universally rejected in scientific circles as empirically inadequate. During the last few years, however, renewed attention has begun to be paid to the dualistic point of view, as a result of increasing discontent with the prevailing materialism and reductionism of contemporary scientific and philosophical thought. Awareness has grown that dualism need not be restricted to its traditional form and that other varieties of dualism are not subject to the difficulties commonly raised against Descartes' own version of it. Interest in these alternative versions of dualism is growing fast today, because it seems that they are capable of capturing deep-seated philosophical intuitions, while also being fully consistent with the methodological assumptions and empirical findings of modern scientific work on the human mind and brain. The object of this book is to provide philosophers, scientists, their students, and the wider general public with an up-to-date overview of current developments in dualistic conceptions of the mind in contemporary philosophy and science.
The notions of mental representation and intentionality are central to contemporary philosophy of mind and it is usually assumed that these notions, if not originated, at least were made essential to the philosophy of mind by Descartes in the seventeenth century. The authors in this book challenge this assumption and show that the history of these ideas can be traced back to the medieval period. In bringing out the contrasts and similarities between early modern and medieval discussions of mental representation the authors conclude that there is no clear dividing line between western late medieval and early modern philosophy; that they in fact represent one continuous tradition in the philosophy of mind.
Even death is not to be feared by one who lives wisely. Death is inevitable, thing which is born today will perish from the physical world one day without any doubt. But the journey doesn’t end here because there is another dimension or realm unseen by the naked eyes. These dimensions I have thoroughly discussed in this book
Inspired by the work of the philosopher Judith Butler, influenced by Marx’s theory of alienation and intrigued by theories of death, this book develops an anti-methodological approach to studying working lives. Distinctions are drawn between labour (the tasks we do in our jobs) and work (self-making activities that are carried out at the workplace): between the less than human, zombie-like laborer and the working human self. Nancy Harding argues that the experience of being at work is one in which the insistence on practising one’s humanity always provides a counter-point to organisational demands.
