In this startlingly counterintuitive book, a leading authority on Islamic movements demonstrates that terrorist groups are thoroughly marginal in the Muslim world. Charles Kurzman draws on government sources, public opinion surveys, election results, and in-depth interviews with Muslims in the Middle East and around the world, finding that while young Muslims are indeed angry at the West, they are simply not attracted to terrorist methods. This revised edition, updated to include the self-proclaimed "Islamic State," concludes that fear of terrorism should be brought into alignment with the actual level of threat, and that government policies and public opinion should be based on evidence rather than alarmist hyperbole.
Why there are so few Muslim terrorists -- Radical sheik -- Thoroughly modern mujahidin -- Liberal Islam vs. revolutionary Islamism -- Uncle Sam versus Uncle Usama -- Predicting the next attacks.
This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Examines terrorists¿ involvement in a variety of crimes ranging from motor vehicle violations, immigration fraud, and mfg. illegal firearms to counterfeiting, armed bank robbery, and smuggling weapons of mass destruction. There are 3 parts: (1) Compares the criminality of internat. jihad groups with domestic right-wing groups. (2) Six case studies of crimes includes trial transcripts, official reports, previous scholarship, and interviews with law enforce. officials and former terrorists are used to explore skills that made crimes possible; or events and lack of skill that the prevented crimes. Includes brief bio. of the terrorists along with descriptions of their org., strategies, and plots. (3) Analysis of the themes in closing arguments of the transcripts in Part 2. Illus.
Since 9/11, "homegrown terrorists" have planned or implemented terrorist activities, supported others' terrorist activities, or become radicalized in the United States and traveled abroad to conduct activities against other countries or the United States. This paper examines the cases of homegrown terrorism, highlights lessons learned from those cases that suggest future actions, and includes a chronology of terrorist events in the United States.
examines theoretical discourses on the specificity, origin, and function of 'religion' in antiquity, broadly defined here as the period from the 6th century BCE to the 4th century CE.
In the third of Martin Laird's best-selling books on Christian contemplative life, Laird considers the deepening dynamics of contemplation for those who have settled into a maturing practice of meditation. Drawing on the works of writers ranging from St. Augustine and St. Teresa of Avila to Flannery O'Connor and David Foster Wallace, Laird grounds his methodology in both ancient practice and contemporary language. With characteristic lyricism and gentleness, he guides readers through new challenges of contemplative life, such as the danger of using a spiritual practice as a strategy for personal gain; making ourselves the focus of our own contemplative project; dealing with old pain; and transforming the isolation of loneliness and depression into a place of liberating solidarity with all who suffer.
In addition to the important breaking points of the last century – such as the abolition of the Caliphate, the World Wars, the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Iranian Revolution and the foundation of a ‘New World Order’ which directly affected Muslim societies – the new conjuncture formed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks brought about various structural problems and changes in the Muslim world. Political and economic developments in the last ten years in particular have brought many Muslim countries to the edge of crisis. Along with political, economic and social issues, the fact that modernisation and secularisation have become dominant in Muslim societies shows that the outcomes of these changes are of great importance. In this respect, this book offers a significant contribution to debates on the processes of change and transformation in the Muslim world. In addition to theoretical debates, the main dynamics of political and social change in Muslim societies are discussed here using specific examples from each country. As such, this volume will provide the reader with a practical understanding of the historical turning points in the Muslim world over recent years.
By observing the current crisis of identity among ordinary Muslims, this book explores why, and in what circumstances Muslims speak of jihad. In the end, jihad is what Muslims say it is. Marranci offers us a nuanced and anthropolitical understanding of Muslims' lives beyond the predictable clichés.
The shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, would remain on the throne for the foreseeable future: This was the firm conclusion of a top-secret CIA analysis issued in October 1978. One hundred days later the shah--despite his massive military, fearsome security police, and superpower support was overthrown by a popular and largely peaceful revolution. But the CIA was not alone in its myopia, as Charles Kurzman reveals in this penetrating work; Iranians themselves, except for a tiny minority, considered a revolution inconceivable until it actually occurred. Revisiting the circumstances surrounding the fall of the shah, Kurzman offers rare insight into the nature and evolution of the Iranian revolution and into the ultimate unpredictability of protest movements in general. As one Iranian recalls, The future was up in the air. Through interviews and eyewitness accounts, declassified security documents and underground pamphlets, Kurzman documents the overwhelming sense of confusion that gripped pre-revolutionary Iran, and that characterizes major protest movements. His book provides a striking picture of the chaotic conditions under which Iranians acted, participating in protest only when they expected others to do so too, the process approaching critical mass in unforeseen and unforeseeable ways. Only when large numbers of Iranians began to think the unthinkable, in the words of the U.S. ambassador, did revolutionary expectations become a self-fulfilling prophecy. A corrective to 20-20 hindsight, this book reveals shortcomings of analyses that make the Iranian revolution or any major protest movement seem inevitable in retrospect.
