This is an account of the fall of Singapore and Japan's 1941 military campaign in Malaya through the eys of Japanese soldiers who took part, based on interviews, memoirs, war diaries and other Japanese-language sources.
Discover the remarkable history of the Malayan Campaign...Prior to December 1941, Great Britain commanded an empire that stretched across the globe. However, after the Malayan Campaign, which began on December 8, 1941 and ended on January 31, 1942, the world order was up for grabs as the Empire of Japan contested British rule and American military might in the Pacific in the early years of World War II. Influenced by racial stereotypes, the West initially failed to perceive the full expanse of Japan's growing power in Asia. That ignorance enabled the Japanese to begin the war in the Pacific against the Western Allied Powers, invading the British colony of Malaya after Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. From the beginning, the Japanese commanded both air and sea, while the British, Malayan, Indian, and Australian forces struggled to defend Malaya. By the end of January 1941, the Allies were retreating to Singapore, and Malaya was under Japanese control after nearly 50,000 troops belonging to the Commonwealth had been killed or captured. Discover a plethora of topics such as The ABCD Line The Empire on Which the Sun Never Sets December 8, 1941: A Day of Infamy The Battle of Jitra Retreating to Singapore And much more! So if you want a concise and informative book on the Malayan Campaign, simply scroll up and click the "Buy now" button for instant access!
The struggle with Communist terrorists in Malaya known as The Emergency became a textbook example of how to fight a guerrilla war, based on political as much as military means. This book deals with both the campaign fought by British, Commonwealth and other security forces in Malaya against Communist insurgents, between 1948 and 1960, and also the security action in North Borneo during the period of Confrontation with Indonesia from 1962 to 1966. Both campaigns provided invaluable experience in the development of anti-guerrilla tactics, and are relevant to the conduct of similar actions which have been fought against insurgent elements since then. The book written with the full co-operation of various departments of the UK Ministry of Defence contains material that untilrecently remained classified.This is the first full study to cover the role of airpower in these conflicts. It will be of relevance to students at military colleges, and those studying military history, as well as having a more general appeal, particularly to those servicemen and women who were involved in both campaigns.
In just 10 weeks from 8 December 1941 to mid February 1942, British and Imperial forces were utterly defeated by the numerically inferior Japanese under General Yamashita. British units fought hard on the Malayan mainland but the Japanese showed greater mobility, cunning and tactical superiority. Morale was badly affected by the loss of HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse to Japanese aircraft on 19 December as they sought out enemy shipping. Panic set in as military and civilians withdrew south to Singapore. Thought to be an impregnable fortress, its defences against land attacks were shockingly deficient. General Percival's leadership was at best uninspired and at worst incompetent. Once the Allied troops withdrew to Singapore it was only a matter of time before surrender became inevitable. To make matters worse reinforcements arrived but only in time to be made POWs. The whole catastrophe is brilliantly described in this highly illustrated book.
In June 1948 Communist insurgent forces commenced a guerrilla war to end British rule in Malaya. During the ensuing 12 years of conflict there were 8750 reported 'contacts' between units of the Security Forces and the Communist enemy. Eventually Malaya was made independent, and the British and their Commonwealth allies emerged victorious. Written and illustrated by infantry veterans of the campaign, this book examines the Malayan Emergency, detailing the forces involved and the harsh jungle conditions in which they fought. The text is complete with firsthand accounts from the contributors themselves and numerous illustrations depicting the forces' uniforms.
Japan's December 1941-February 1942 invasion of Malaya and culminating conquest of Singapore is analyzed from an operational perspective. Although overshadowed by better known Pacific Theater actions in World War II, the campaign was Japan's most successful example of joint warfare and replete with lessons for the modern operational commander. Approached from the level of the commander and staff, the background and decision making processes are reviewed, with applicable areas identified for today's leaders. The need for aggressive leadership, accurate intelligence, flexible application of power, adjustment of force based on environmental conditions, and the value of logistics are the major lessons from the Japanese victory. Poor leadership and futility of trying to defend too much are among those lessons from the defeated British.
For the British Empire it was a military disaster, but for Imperial Japan the conquest of Malaya was one of the pivotal campaigns of World War II. Giving birth to the myth of the Imperial Japanese Army's invincibility, the victory left both Burma and India open to invasion. Although heavily outnumbered, the Japanese Army fought fiercely to overcome the inept and shambolic defence offered by the British and Commonwealth forces. Detailed analysis of the conflict, combined with a heavy focus on the significance of the aerial campaign, help tell the fascinating story of the Japanese victory, from the initial landings in Thailand and Malaya through to the destruction of the Royal Navy's Force Z and the final fall of Singapore itself.
People’s Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam explains why some insurgencies collapse after a military defeat while under other circumstances insurgents are able to maintain influence, rebuild strength, and ultimately defeat the government. The author argues that ultimate victory in civil wars rests on the size of the coalition of social groups established by each side during the conflict. When insurgents establish broad social coalitions (relative to the incumbent), their movement will persist even when military defeats lead to loss of control of territory because they enjoy the support of the civilian population and civilians will not defect to the incumbent. By contrast, when insurgents establish narrow coalitions, civilian compliance is solely a product of coercion. Where insurgents implement such governing strategies, battlefield defeats translate into political defeats and bring about a collapse of the insurgency because civilians defect to the incumbent. The empirical chapters of the book consist of six case studies of the most consequential insurgencies of the 20th century including that led by the Chinese Communist Party from 1927 to 1949, the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), and the Vietnam War (1960–1975). People’s Wars breaks new ground in systematically analyzing and comparing these three canonical cases of insurgency. The case studies of China and Malaya make use of Chinese-language archival sources, many of which have never before been used and provide an unprecedented level of detail into the workings of successful and unsuccessful insurgencies. The book adopts an interdisciplinary approach and will be of interest to both political scientists and historians.