This paper offers an empirical model of the drivers of the level of the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) that is now part of the IMF’s methodology for the assessment of external positions, including exchange rates. It constructs a measure of the level of the REER and it offers a panel regression that considers a large number of cross-sectional and time varying factors, guided by the extensive literature. Its main contribution is to enhance our understanding of the cross-sectional determinants of the level of the REER, while taking into account the time-series drivers. The framework accounts for the much larger cross-sectional variation of the level REER, and can better explain the time series variation of level REER when these are based on GDP-deflators rather than on consumer price indices. The latter suggest there may be merits to broadening the assessments to include such measures, although further analysis is required.
The assessment of external positions and exchange rates of member countries is a key mandate of the IMF. The External Balance Assessment (EBA) methodology has provided the framework for conducting external sector assessments by Fund staff since its introduction in 2012. This paper provides the latest version of the EBA methodology, updated in 2022 with additional refinements to the current account and real exchange rate regression models, as well as updated estimates for other components of the EBA methodology. The paper also includes an assessment of how estimated current account gaps based on EBA are associated with future external adjustment.
The External Balance Assessment (EBA) methodology has been developed by the IMF’s Research Department as a successor to the CGER methodology for assessing current accounts and exchange rates in a multilaterally consistent manner. Compared to other approaches, EBA emphasizes distinguishing between the positive empirical analysis and the normative assessment of current accounts and exchange rates, and highlights the roles of policies and policy distortions. This paper provides a comprehensive description and discussion of the 2013 version (“2.0”) of the EBA methodology, including areas for its further development.
The assessment of external positions and exchange rates is a key mandate of the IMF. This paper presents the updated External Balance Assessment (EBA) framework—a key input in the conduct of multilaterally-consistent external sector assessments of 49 advanced and emerging market economies—following the two rounds of refinements adopted since the framework was introduced in 2012 (as described in Phillips et al., 2013). It also presents new complementary tools for shedding light on the role of structural factors in explaining external imbalances and assessing potential biases in the measurement of external positions. Remaining challenges and areas of future work are also discussed.
This 2015 Article IV Consultation highlights that Finland’s exports have suffered owing to the declines of Nokia and the paper industry, compounded by weak external demand, especially from the euro area and Russia. The current account and fiscal balances have deteriorated, with the 2014 fiscal deficit breaching the Stability and Growth Pact’s 3 percent of GDP criterion. A modest recovery is projected to begin in 2015 and gradually strengthen in 2016. However, in absence of further reforms, growth is likely to remain much lower than pre-crisis. Weaker-than-expected growth in key trade partners would be a drag on exports, and spillovers from an external financial shock would create tighter financial conditions, with negative effects on output.
This 2017 Article IV Consultation highlights that Rwanda has demonstrated strong macroeconomic policy management and implemented an ambitious development strategy that has resulted in high and inclusive growth, lower poverty and more gender equality, and improved living standards. Growth in 2016 was 5.9 percent, down from 2015, but comparing favorably to growth in the subcontinent. A recovery of growth is expected in 2017–18, owing to good rains and expanding domestic production. A spike in consumer price inflation in early 2017 was driven by food prices. Main risks to economic growth continue to be weather shocks affecting agriculture, regional security issues, and unexpected shifts in external development assistance.
Sweden’s economy has re-gained speed, following supportive macroeconomic policies and strong household demand. Employment has been rising, but the labor force expanded even more, resulting in higher unemployment mostly among vulnerable groups. Inflation remains very low, driven by external and domestic factors. At the same time, financial stability risks are an increasing concern, reflecting high and rising household debt, accelerating house prices, and Sweden’s very large banking system.
Rwanda’s medium-term outlook is positive, supported by the authorities’ large policy package to respond to the evolving COVID-19 pandemic and their continued commitment to the PCI in a challenging environment. Economic recovery is underway with easing of restrictions supported by faster vaccination rates since July. GDP growth is projected at 10.2 percent in 2021 and inflation remained subdued. But Rwanda’s remarkable economic and social progress over the last two decades faces a significant setback, with poverty, unemployment, and gender inequalities on the rise. These pandemic scars, if not addressed, risk reversing hard-won economic and social gains. With a large share of the population still unvaccinated and the emergence of new variants, risks to the outlook remain elevated.
Global current account imbalances were broadly unchanged in 2016, with minor shifts adding to the reconfiguration under way since 2013. The fall in commodity prices, uneven cyclical recoveries in systemic economies, and differences in policy responses contributed to the rotation of imbalances. Current account surpluses of oil-exporting economies, as a group, shifted from large surpluses to small deficits, while deficits in emerging and developing economies narrowed markedly. At the same time, surpluses and deficits in key advanced economies widened. These trends were generally supported by real exchange rate movements. Overall excess current account imbalances (i.e., deficits or surpluses that deviate from desirable levels) represented about one-third of total global imbalances in 2016, remaining broadly unchanged since 2013, although increasingly concentrated in advanced economies. In particular, excess imbalances narrowed in emerging and developing economies, led by a smaller excess surplus in China and smaller excess deficits in others (Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey). This narrowing, however, was accompanied by a widening of excess imbalances in some advanced economies. The persistence of large excess surpluses in several advanced economies (e.g. Germany, Korea, the Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden) remains a distinguishing feature of the constellation of imbalances, an issue that is explored in greater detail in this year’s report. Persistent global excess imbalances suggest that automatic adjustment mechanisms are weak. While the rotation of excess imbalances toward advanced economies—with deficits increasingly concentrated in the United States and United Kingdom—likely entails lower deficit-financing risks in the near term, the increased concentration of deficits in a few economies carries greater risks of disruptive trade policy actions. Diverging stock positions coupled with continued overreliance on demand from debtor countries could also pose risks to global growth and raise the likelihood of disruptive adjustments down the road. With nearly-closed output gaps in most systemic economies, addressing external imbalances in a growth-friendly fashion requires a recalibration of the policy mix in deficit and surplus economies alike. Excess deficit countries should move forward with fiscal consolidation, while gradually normalizing monetary policy in tandem with inflation developments. Excess surplus economies with fiscal space should reduce their reliance on easy monetary policy and allow for greater fiscal stimulus. Where monetary policy is constrained from playing a role, as in individual euro area members, fiscal and structural policies to facilitate relative price adjustments should take priority. Meanwhile, structural policies in excess surplus countries should focus on lifting distortions that constrain domestic demand or limit trade competition; while in excess deficit economies, policies should be directed to improving external competitiveness and overall saving. Protectionist and mercantilist policies should be avoided as they are detrimental to global growth.
This 2016 Article IV Consultation highlights that the Italian economy is recovering gradually from a deep and protracted recession. Buoyed by exceptionally accommodative monetary policy, favorable commodity prices, supportive fiscal policy, and improved confidence on the back of the authorities’ wide-ranging reform efforts, the economy grew by 0.8 percent in 2015 and continued to expand in the first quarter of 2016. Labor market conditions have been improving gradually, and nonperforming loans appear to be stabilizing at about 18 percent of total loans. Growth is projected to remain just under 1 percent in 2016 and at about 1 percent in 2017.
