This book provides a unique comparative study of the major secessionist and self-determination movements in post-colonial Africa, examining theory, international law, charters of the United Nations, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)/African Union’s (AU) stance on the issue. The book explores whether self-determination and secessionism lead to peace, stability, development and democratisation in conflict-ridden societies, particularly looking at the outcomes in Eritrea and South Sudan. The book covers all the major attempts at self-determination and secession on the continent, extensively analysing the geo-political, economic, security and ideological factors that determine the outcome of the quest for self-determination and secession. It reveals the lack of inherent clarity in international law, social science theories, OAU/AU Charter, UN Charters and international conventions concerning the topic. This is a major contribution to the field and highly relevant for researchers and postgraduate students in African Studies, Development Studies, African Politics and History, and Anthropology.
This book gives a comprehensive background to the long running conflict on the status of Western Sahara and particularly highlights the question of the territory’s natural resources, such as fish, oil and phosphates. The book analyzes why this territory, (mainly covered by desert and only sparsely populated), has since 1976 when the former colonial power Spain left the territory, engaged governments and people, both regionally and internationally, and the implications of its natural resources. The book includes: - a summary of the Western Saharan conflict, by Pedro Pinte Leite, specialist in international law in the Netherlands; - an up-to-date picture of the situation in Western Sahara with regard to natural resources, and the way in which exploitation is taking place, by Toby Shelley, a British journalist; - the UN’s legal opinion from 2002 on exploitation of the natural resources of a Non-Self-Governing Territory written by Hans Corell, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel. Two political views of the conflict are also included. Magnus Schöldtz and Pål Wrange from the Swedish Foreign Ministry elucidate the Swedish Foreign Policy on the Western Sahara Conflict. A statement by Karin Scheele, MEP and President of the Intergroup on Western Sahara in the European Parliament focuses on the economic interests of the parties involved in the conflict. These contributions together with an extended chronology, by Claes Olsson, over the different phases of the conflict form a useful information source for policy-makers, researchers, students and activists interested in or dealing with issues related to the Maghreb framework and in particular the Western Saharan conflict. Contributors include: Hans Corell, is Ambassador and a Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel Pedro Pinto Leite is a Portuguese international jurist based in Holland, secretary of the International Platform of Jurists for East Timor and coordinator of the Dutch section of the International Association of Jurists for Western Sahara. Claes Olsson has done further research after his degree in social sciences and is the author of several books and articles on the Western Saharan issue. Magnus Schöldtz, Deputy Director, Head of North Africa Section, Middle East and North Africa Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm. Pål Wrange is a principal legal advisor on public international law at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm. Toby Shelley is a journalist and writer. He is author of 'Endgame in the Western Sahara', published by Zed Books. He has visited the Western Sahara and the Sahrawi refugee camps on a number of occasions. Karin Scheele, Member of the European Parliament (MEP), is President of the Intergroup on Western Sahara in the European Parliament
At a crucial crossroads between Africa and Europe, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and the "Arab World" and the West, Morocco has long had a special place in U.S. diplomacy and strategic planning. Since September 11, 2001, Morocco's importance to the United States has only increased, and the more recent uncertainties of the Arab Spring and Islamist extremism have further increased the value of the Moroccan-American alliance. Yet one of the pillars of the legitimacy of the Moroccan monarchy, its claim to the Western Sahara, remains a point of violent contention. Home to the largest functional military barrier in the world, the Western Sahara has a long history of colonial conquest and resistance, guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, and evolving strategic thought, and its future may prove critical to U.S. interests in the region.
Over the 20th century, Morocco has become one of the world’s major emigration countries. But since 2000, growing immigration and settlement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Europe confronts Morocco with an entirely new set of social, cultural, political and legal issues. This book explores how continued emigration and increasing immigration is transforming contemporary Moroccan society, with a particular emphasis on the way the Moroccan state is dealing with shifting migratory realities. The authors of this collective volume embark on a dialogue between theory and empirical research, showcasing how contemporary migration theories help understanding recent trends in Moroccan migration, and, vice-versa, how the specific Moroccan case enriches migration theory. This perspective helps to overcome the still predominant Western-centric research view that artificially divide the world into ‘receiving’ and ‘sending’ countries and largely disregards the dynamics of and experiences with migration in countries in the Global South. This book was previously published as a special issue of The Journal of North African Studies.
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.
The primary thrust of the monograph is to explain the linkage of contemporary criminal street gangs (that is, the gang phenomenon or third generation gangs) to insurgency in terms f the instability it wreaks upon government and the concomitant challenge to state sovereignty. Although there are differences between gangs and insurgents regarding motives and modes of operations, this linkage infers that gang phenomena are mutated forms of urban insurgency. In these terms, these "new" nonstate actors must eventually seize political power in order to guarantee the freedom of action and the commercial environment they want. The common denominator that clearly links the gang phenomenon to insurgency is that the third generation gangs' and insurgents' ultimate objective is to depose or control the governments of targeted countries. As a consequence, the "Duck Analogy" applies. Third generation gangs look like ducks, walk like ducks, and act like ducks - a peculiar breed, but ducks nevertheless! This monograph concludes with recommendations for the United States and other countries to focus security and assistance responses at the strategic level. The intent is to help leaders achieve strategic clarity and operate more effectively in the complex politically dominated, contemporary global security arena.
The political economy problems of Nigeria, the root cause for ethnic, religious, political and economic strife, can be in part addressed indirectly through focused contributions by the U.S. military, especially if regionally aligned units are more thoroughly employed.
This book grew from an opportunity to study a third world air force fighting an externally supported insurgency. The players were the Royal Moroccan Air Force and the Polisario, the latter trying to wrest control of the Western Sahara from the Kingdom of Morocco. The United States has also been a player in the Morocco-Polisario war as the source of much of Morocco's war material, especially the weapons used by the Royal Moroccan Air Force. Help from the United States was especially important when the Polisario deployed Soviet-built SA-6 surface-to-air missiles to counter the growing effectiveness of the Royal Moroccan Air Force. For many reasons, the United States and the US Air Force were not able to assist the Moroccans effectively. The Morocco-Polisario-US scenario that provides the basis for this study was a tiny aspect of the US foreign and military policy in the early 1980s. But it shows a political-military problem that deserves a good deal of thought now. That problem simply stated is: How is the United States going to exert political-military influence in the third world during the next twenty years? Clearly, overall US influence in the third world will be a combination of political, military, economic, and social activity. But the military, in many cases, will be the most visible form of assistance, and one upon which the recipient nation will depend for immediate results. Are the military components as instruments of national policy able to act effectively in the third world? If not, what needs to be done? The US Air Force (and the other services) needs to consider the question of effective assistance to third world countries as part of a basic shift in strategic thinking. Our primary strategic planning effort has been to insert large numbers of US ground and air forces into an area such as the Persian Gulf to accomplish our policy objectives. That planning effort must continue, but with the understanding that inserting a major US force in any third world region is extremely unlikely, both for domestic political reasons and because potential host nations are reluctant to support large US forces. Our primary strategic focus for planning needs to shift to providing effective leverage for third world friends and allies. That leverage can be in the form of arms sales, training, doctrine, or even small specialized forces. But providing leverage depends on effective planning that builds the data base which allows us to pinpoint the host country's needs and capabilities. Developing that kind of expertise in the USAF, and in the other services, will be a difficult and frustrating long-term proposition. The Air Force must recognize the need for a change and must act upon it. Planning to exert effective political-military influence in the third world may not be a glamorous task, but it will be the name of the game for the next twenty years and beyond. This book offers some ideas in that regard.
