Chronic Hindu-Muslim rioting in India has created a situation in which communal violence is both so normal and so varied in its manifestations that it would seem to defy effective analysis. Paul R. Brass, one of the world’s preeminent experts on South Asia, has tracked more than half a century’s riots in the north Indian city of Aligarh. This book is the culmination of a lifetime’s thinking about the dynamics of institutionalized intergroup violence in northern India, covering the last three decades of British rule as well as the entire post-Independence history of Aligarh. Brass exposes the mechanisms by which endemic communal violence is deliberately provoked and sustained. He convincingly implicates the police, criminal elements, members of Aligarh’s business community, and many of its leading political actors in the continuous effort to “produce” communal violence. Much like a theatrical production, specific roles are played, with phases for rehearsal, staging, and interpretation. In this way, riots become key historical markers in the struggle for political, economic, and social dominance of one community over another. In the course of demonstrating how riots have been produced in Aligarh, Brass offers a compelling argument for abandoning or refining a number of widely held views about the supposed causes of communal violence, not just in India but throughout the rest of the world. An important addition to the literature on Indian and South Asian politics, this book is also an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the interplay of nationalism, ethnicity, religion, and collective violence, wherever it occurs.
The fascinating story of Boston's violent past is told for the first time in this history of the city's riots, from the food shortage uprisings in the 18th century to the anti-busing riots of the 20th century.
Jakarta, Sambas, Poso, the Moluccas, West Papua. These simple, geographical names have recently obtained strong associations with mass killing, just as Aceh and East Timor, where large-scale violence has flared up again. Lethal incidents between adjacent villages, or between a petty criminal and the crowd, take place throughout Indonesia. Indonesia is a violent country. Many Indonesia-watchers, both scholars and journalists, explain the violence in terms of the loss of the monopoly on the means of violence by the state since the beginning of the Reformasi in 1998. Others point at the omnipresent remnants of the New Order state (1966-1998), former President Suharto's clan or the army in particular, as the evil genius behind the present bloodshed. The authors in this volume try to explain violence in Indonesia by looking at it in historical perspective.
The art of successful negotiations over protracted conflicts presupposes a political commitment to peace and a willingness to compromise, which are sorely lacking in the current disorderly world. Part of the blame for this lies in weak and ineffective national and global leadership. This book’s sharp focus on the role of leadership at different levels—national government, rebel and Western/regional government mediators—as well as that of the UN and non-governmental players in settling intra-state disputes, is a unique feature which sets it apart from others. Much of the existing literature does not adequately discuss the role of the above actors in developing countries. Asia’s Trouble Spots is a serious attempt to fill this gap. The seven country studies in Asia—Myanmar, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India and China—discuss, inter alia, how peace negotiations between national political and rebel leaders have unfolded. The role of state-sponsored cross-border terrorists and non-state spoilers such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS is addressed in the context of geopolitical rivalry among regional and global powers. A. S. Bhalla challenges the view that Western leaders can act as impartial mediators in intra-state and inter-state disputes. With few exceptions, their record has been dismal at best. Their failure in conflict resolution arises from a loss of moral authority and credibility, which follows the gradual erosion over the years of such liberal values as the rule of law and respect for democracy and human rights. Commercial and strategic self-interests have also tended to undermine peacebuilding efforts.
Belligerent Hindu nationalism, accompanied by recurring communal violence between Hindus and Muslims, has become a compelling force in Indian politics over the last two decades of the twentieth century. Ornit Shani's book, which examines the rise of communalism, asks why distinct groups of Hindus, deeply divided by caste, mobilised on the basis of unitary Hindu nationalism? And why was the Hindu nationalist rhetoric about the threat from the essentially impoverished Muslim minority so persuasive to the Hindu majority? Shani uses evidence from communal violence in Ahmedabad, the largest and most prosperous city in Gujarat, long considered the 'laboratory' of Hindu nationalism, as the basis for her investigations. She argues that, contrary to the currently perceived wisdom, the growth of communalism did not lie in Hindu-Muslim antagonisms alone. It was rather an expression of intensifying tensions among Hindus, nurtured by changes in the caste regime and associated state policies. The causes for the resulting uncertainties among Hindus were frequently displaced onto Muslims, thus enabling caste tensions to develop and deepen communal rivalries. The book offers a significant and persuasive challenge to previous scholarship on the rise of communalism, providing a conceptual framework for thinking of similar conflicts elsewhere. It will be welcomed by students and readers with a professional interest in the region. Book jacket.
Myanmar’s recovery from half a century of military rule has been fraught. As in other religiously, culturally and linguistically heterogeneous countries where a dictatorship has loosened a tight grip, people there have wanted for democratic institutions to express and manage conflict. Under these circumstances, mundane and seemingly apolitical events sometimes unfold into moments of intense violence. Interpreting Communal Violence in Myanmar addresses one such violent chapter in Myanmar’s recent past: the communal violence that shook the country between 2012 and 2014. The violence, most of it involving Buddhists attacking Muslims, ranged from localised, fleeting, inter-group melees, to large scale, apparently well-organised, state-supported killing and destruction of property of a targeted community, running over a number of days. The book’s seven chapters comprise a response to the violence by a group of Myanmar and Southeast Asia experts. Their contributions trace the histories and contemporary features of the violence, and the legal and political arrangements that made it possible. Their interpretations, while specific to Myanmar, also contribute to broader debate about the characteristics, causes and consequences of communal violence generally. The chapters were originally published as a special issue in the Journal of Contemporary Asia.
Why are some places successful in moving from war to consolidated peace while others continue to be troubled by violence? And why does postconflict violence take different forms and have different intensities? By developing a new theory of postconflict violence Patrick Barron's When Violence Works makes a significant contribution to our understanding. Barron picks out three postconflict regions in Indonesia in which to analyze what happens once the "official" fighting ends: North Maluku has seen peace consolidated; Maluku still witnesses large episodes of violence; and Aceh experiences continuing occurrences of violence but on a smaller scale than in Maluku. He argues that violence after war has ended (revenge killings, sexual violence, gang battles, and violent crime, in addition to overtly political conflict) is not the result of failed elite bargains or weak states, but occurs because the actors involved see it as beneficial and lowcost. His findings pertain directly to Indonesia, but the theory will have relevance far beyond as those studying countries such as Colombia, the Philippines, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria seek a framework in which to assess what happens after war ends. Barron's theory also provides practical guidance for policymakers and development practitioners. Ultimately, When Violence Works pushes forward our understanding of why postconflict violence occurs and takes the forms it does.
Reassessing the developing world through the lens of Europe's past Today’s developing nations emerged from the rubble of the Second World War. Only a handful of these countries have subsequently attained a level of prosperity and security comparable to that of the advanced industrial world. The implication is clear: those who study the developing world in order to learn how development can be achieved lack the data to do so. In The Development Dilemma, Robert Bates responds to this challenge by turning to history, focusing on England and France. By the end of the eighteenth century, England stood poised to enter “the great transformation.” France by contrast verged on state failure, and life and property were insecure. Probing the histories of these countries, Bates uncovers a powerful tension between prosperity and security: both may be necessary for development, he argues, but efforts to achieve the one threaten the achievement of the other. A fundamental tension pervades the political economy of development. Bates also argues that while the creation of a central hierarchy—a state—may be necessary to the achievement of development, it is not sufficient. What matters is how the power of the state is used. France and England teach us that in some settings the seizure and redistribution of wealth—not its safeguarding and fostering—is a winning political strategy. These countries also suggest the features that mark those settings—features that appear in nations throughout the developing world. Returning to the present, Bates applies these insights to the world today. Drawing on fieldwork in Zambia and Kenya, and data from around the globe, he demonstrates how the past can help us to understand the performance of nations in today’s developing world.
Contesting Indonesia explains Islamist, separatist and communal violence across Indonesian history since 1945. In a sweeping argument that connects endemic violence to a national narrative, Kirsten E. Schulze finds that the outbreak of violence is related to competing local notions of the national imaginary as well as contentious belonging. Through detailed examination of six case studies: the Darul Islam rebellions, Jemaah Islamiyah's jihad, and the conflicts in East Timor, Aceh, Poso, and Ambon, Schulze argues that violence was more likely to occur in places that are on the geographic, ideological, ethnic, and religious periphery of the Indonesian state; that violence by non-state actors was most protracted in locations where there was a well-established alternative national imaginary supported by an alternative historical narrative; and that violence by the state was most likely in places where the state had a significant territorial interest. Drawing on a vast collection of interviews and archival and published sources, Contesting Indonesia provides a new understanding of the history of violence across the Indonesian archipelago.