This book is an introduction into the reductionism-holism debate, for aspiring as well as accomplished scientists. It is intended for those working in, or preparing for, research in any scientific field-ranging from the physical sciences to the life sciences to the behavioral sciences and the social sciences. It is certainly not meant for people specialized in areas dealing with the specific issue of reductionism in a strict philosophical sense; they won't learn much new from this book. In other words, this is not a monograph with specialized, original research, but rather an initiation into the debate-more like an introductory textbook, if you will.
This collection of papers investigates the most recent debates about individualism and holism in the philosophy of social science. The debates revolve mainly around two issues: firstly, whether social phenomena exist sui generis and how they relate to individuals. This is the focus of discussions between ontological individualists and ontological holists. Secondly, to what extent social scientific explanations may and should, focus on individuals and social phenomena respectively. This issue is debated amongst methodological holists and methodological individualists. In social science and philosophy, both issues have been intensively discussed and new versions of the dispute have appeared just as new arguments have been advanced. At present, the individualism/holism debate is extremely lively and this book reflects the major positions and perspectives within the debate. This volume is also relevant to debates about two closely related issues in social science: the micro-macro debate and the agency-structure debate. This book presents contributions from key figures in both social science and philosophy, in the first such collection on this topic to be published since the 1970s.
Holism and reductionism are traditionally seen as incompatible views or approaches to nature. Here Looijen argues that they should rather be seen as mutually dependent and hence co-operating research programmes. He sheds some interesting new light on the emergence thesis, its relation to the reduction thesis, and on the role and status of functional explanations in biology. He discusses several examples of reduction in both biology and ecology, showing the mutual dependence of holistic and reductionist research programmes. Ecologists are offered separate chapters, clarifying some major, yet highly and controversial ecological concepts, such as `community', `habitat', and `niche'. The book is the first in-depth study of the philosophy of ecology. Readership: Specialists in the philosophy of science, especially the philosophy of biology, biologists and ecologists interested in the philosophy of their discipline. Also of interest to other scientists concerned with the holism-reductionism issue.
The Extending Knowledge and Skills series is a fresh approach to A Level Psychology, designed for greater demands of the new AQA specification and assessment, and especially written to stretch and challenge students aiming for higher grades. Dealing with the compulsory topic of AQA’s Paper 3: Issues and Debates, this book is deliberately laid out with the assessment objectives in mind, from AO1: Knowledge and understanding material, followed by AO2: Application material, to AO3: Evaluation and analysis material. Providing the most in-depth, accessible coverage available of individual topics in Paper 3, the text is packed full of pedagogical features, including: Question Time features to ensure that the reader is consistently challenged throughout the book. New research sections clearly distinguished within each chapter to ensure readers have access to the most cutting-edge material. A clear focus on the assessment objectives for the Paper topic to ensure readers know when and where to apply knowledge. The use of example answers with examiner-style comments to provide greater insight into how to/how not to answer exam questions. An engaging, relevant and challenging text that broadens student understanding beyond that of the average textbook, this is the essential companion for any student taking the AQA A level Paper 3 in Psychology.
DT These highly successful revision guides have been brought right up-to-date for the new A Level specifications introduced in September 2000.DT Oxford Revision Guides are highly effective for both individual revision and classroom summary work. The unique visual format makes the key concepts and processes, and the links between them, easier to memorize.DT Students will save valuable revision time by using these notes instead of condensing their own.DT In fact, many students are choosing to buy their own copies so that they can colour code or highlight them as they might do with their own revision notes.
This volume investigates the notion of reduction. Building on the idea that philosophers employ the term ‘reduction’ to reconcile diversity and directionality with unity, without relying on elimination, the book offers a powerful explication of an “ontological”, notion of reduction the extension of which is (primarily) formed by properties, kinds, individuals, or processes. It argues that related notions of reduction, such as theory-reduction and functional reduction, should be defined in terms of this explication. Thereby, the book offers a coherent framework, which sheds light on the history of the various reduction debates in the philosophy of science and in the philosophy of mind, and on related topics such as reduction and unification, the notion of a scientific level, and physicalism. The book takes its point of departure in the examination of a puzzle about reduction. To illustrate, the book takes as an example the reduction of water. If water reduces to H2O, then water is identical to H2O – thus we get unity. Unity does not come at the price of elimination – claiming that water reduces to H2O, we do not thereby claim that there is no water. But what about diversity and directionality? Intuitively, there should be a difference between water and H2O, such that we get diversity. This is required for there to be directionality: in a sense, if water reduces to H2O, then H2O is prior to, or more basic than water. At least, if water reduces to H2O, then H2O does not reduce to water. But how can this be, if water is identical to H2O? The book shows that the application of current models of reduction does not solve this puzzle, and proposes a new coherent definition, according to which unity is tied to identity, diversity is descriptive in nature, and directionality is the directionality of explanation.
In Eliminativism, Objects, and Persons, Jiri Benovsky defends the view that he doesn't exist. In this book, he also defends the view that this book itself doesn't exist. But this did not prevent him to write the book, and although in Benovsky's view you don't exist either, this does not prevent you to read it. Benovsky defends a brand of non-exceptionalist eliminativism. Some eliminativists, typically focusing on ordinary material objects such as chairs and hammers, make exceptions, for instance for blue whales (that is, living beings) or for persons (that is, conscious organisms). Benovsky takes one by one all types of allegedly existing objects like chairs, whales, and persons and shows that from the metaphysical point of view they are more trouble than they are worth—we are much better off without them. He thus defends an eliminativist view about ordinary objects as well as the 'no-Self' view, where he explores connections between metaphysics, phenomenology, and Buddhist thought. He then also considers the case of aesthetic objects, focusing on musical works and photographs, and shows that the claim of their non-existence solves the many problems that arise when one tries to find an appropriate ontological category for them, and that such an eliminativist view is more natural than what we might have thought. The arguments provided here are always topic-specific: each type of entity is given its own type of treatment, thus proving a varied and solid foundation for a generalized, non-exceptionalist, full-blown eliminativist worldview.
