Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services
An examination of the issues in the current debate on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, by an international team of auhors chosen for their expertise in the field.
Despite the progressive attitude between the two superpowers that initiated the signing in 1972 of the "Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems" (ABM), the Treaty itself has come under a number of challenges which threaten its current existence, especially in light of the fact each side accuses each other of blatant violations of the Treaty. This paper reviews efforts at ballistic missile defence from the 1960s and onwards, and evaluates and reviews provisions of the Treaty, noting compliance concerns and the reinterpretation dispute caused by President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). The paper concludes with comments on the future of the Treaty.
While congressional hearings on the Iran-Contra dealings have spotlighted one case of conflict between perceived policy imperatives and the law, another has gone relatively unnoticed. Of no less importance in political, international diplomatic, and constitutional terms is the Reagan administration's attempt to reinterpret the Antiballistic Missile Treaty to allow more leeway for its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This reinterpretation poses a comparaable issue of policy versus the law. Signed and ratified in 1972, the ABM Treaty bans the development and testing, as well as deployment, of space-based and other mobile ABM systems or essential components. The administration, citing the treaty itself and the record of its negotiation, has claimed that the ban does not apply to systems based on new technologies.
The Clinton Administration recently decided to establish a formal understanding with Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union on the demarcation between theater missile defenses (TMD) and strategic ballistic missile defenses limited by the 1972 ABM (Anti-ballistic Missile) Treaty. Although the proposed changes to the Treaty apparently have been received warmly by Russia and other former Soviet states, some supporters of the ABM Treaty in the United States have voiced strong concerns and opposition. The proposed changes come at a time of increasing concern over the global proliferation of ballistic missiles and when advanced U.S. TMD programs approach their testing phase. Continued development of these programs depends on the outcome of current negotiations in Geneva. The Administration seeks to ensure that TMD systems can be deployed against 3,000 kilometer range missile threats. Currently, however, only China and Saudi Arabia possess these long-range theater systems in the developing world. Almost all of the tactical and theater-range ballistic missiles today travel less than about 900 kilometers. The future, however, especially concerning North Korean missile developments, is unclear. Because Congress has strongly supported the ABM Treaty as well as development of TMD programs, the current proposed ABM Treaty demarcation could focus congressional attention on the rationale and need for advanced mm programs. Some in Congress have also begun to assert the need for a formal Senate role in any potential ABM treaty change. Although the Administration indicates it will consult closely with Congress on the form of any final agreement, it is not sure that Congress will be asked to play a formal role.